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CULTURE AND SOCIETY

BY

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CIVILIZATION is not the average result of raw nature. It depends upon the long-time operation of selective energy. . . . The vigour of civilized societies is preserved by the widespread sense that high aims are worth while.

A. N. WHITEHEAD, *Adventures of Ideas*

Now what is true of the human organism is true of the State. The soul of a people is just its entelechy, and the higher manifestations of its soul afford a test of the standard of civilization to which that people has attained. The capacity for learning and the consequent development of the university spirit are of course no exclusive test. Literature and art, science and religion, may advance independently of Universities. But on the whole and as a rule, the development is *pari passu*. And to maintain the Universities of the country at a high level is thus an act of high patriotism on the part of the citizens.

R. B. HALDANE, *Universities and National Life*

CLEARLY, it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the Universities in modern life. Not only is it to them that we must look for the releasing of the great sources of intellectual energy and for the highest discipline of these energies, but it is also to them that we must turn for that dynamic idealism which flows from clarity of moral outlook vitalized by sheer intelligence. So conceived, the university stands at the very center of civilization, and the maintenance of its nobility of purpose is of paramount consequence to all mankind.

J. R. ANGELL, *The Obligation of Universities to the Social Order*

NEVER was it more important that the universities should be placed where thought and disinterested inquiry are pursued on the highest level, and where the best minds of each generation are trained for intellectual achievement. Teaching and research alike in the universities must be pursued in a spirit entirely free from bias, prejudice or preconceived ideas.

Nature, 2 September, 1944

PREFACE

As is natural with events of the magnitude of World War II there is evident a wide awakening and a great excitement about the world order to be., It is necessary to remind those who are old enough to have experienced similar sensations at the end of World War I and to warn others who are young enough to have escaped them that the course of events during the inter-war period chilled the initial enthusiasm and led it to waste. Civilization which was declared to be in danger in 1914 is today still more so. While politicians have been shaping the world as best as they can, realizing that many of their problems hail from far earlier times than 1914, students of human history have been unravelling the essentials of the civilizational process. Earlier thinkers of the nineteenth century, visualizing the problem for one society, had declared culture as the requisite solvent of the problems of their age. Their remedy is fundamentally identical with the lessons brought home by twentieth century students of human affairs. The present situation is full of potentialities for a retreat from culture. In this book is stressed the place and rôle of the universities in the civilizational and the cultural process. A plea is made that a retreat from culture can be avoided by the cultivation of humanistic studies at the universities which, if properly equipped and made autonomous, can maintain an adequate group of creators and disseminators of culture.

Professor K. T. Merchant, M.A., B.Sc. (Lond.), of the Sydenham College of Commerce and Economics, and Professor G. C. Banerjee, M.A., B.Litt. (Oxon), of the Elphinstone College, have obliged me by their comments on the material of this book. I am thankful to Dr A. R. Desai for his varied help in the preparation of the manuscript.

G. S. G.

27 January 1946

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CHAPTER I

CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION

Of the two terms culture and society, the latter is familiar yet needs to be defined for our purposes. By society I do not mean the tissue of relationships which, considered in the abstract, form society. I look upon society in this context as a much more concrete category. I mean thereby some particular society or grouping of mankind. For all practical purposes, owing to the importance of national sentiment and political activity, society must be considered to be co-terminous with a national state or national society. The problem discussed here, therefore, is the problem of the relation between a society and culture. What is culture ? How is it related to civilization ? And how can a society arrange for the creation and diffusion of culture ? These are some of the questions which will need to be answered in the course of this study. A society that has considered itself, or has been considered by others, as a distinct unit, separated and demarcated from other similar units, is distinguished by certain characteristics of similar groups. A society entertains certain ideals; it supports, propagates certain beliefs and ideas; it has a certain type of material culture—tools, weapons and so on—it has certain crafts. All these and many other things considered together are regarded by anthropologists, since the days of Tylor, to be the culture of that society. Anthropologists draw a distinction between what they call civilized peoples and primitive or savage peoples. The title of civilized peoples is retained for those societies and peoples who possess a script as opposed to savage peoples who depend upon only speech as the vehicle of their culture. The practice, however, is not universal, Goldenweiser having called his book, dealing with certain forms of primitive culture, *Early Civilization.*

Culture has become a very familiar term in the English language since Matthew Arnold wrote his, *Culture and Anarchy.* A slightly pungent flavour has been added to it since the Germans flashed forth through the world their desire to see *Kultur* imposed on it. The German idea of *Kultur* owed its origin to the concept of some of the greatest philosophers not only of modern Germany but of the world. The philosophical discussion of the category of *Kultur*, if it had avoided the Prussian

militarism, would have added strength to the purely literary treatment of culture that it had largely received in England. But it was an irony of fate for humanity that the German *Kultur* tried to march forward on the shoulders of militarism and thus led for a while to the creation of a sneering attitude towards culture. Though culture is a familiar term, its content is yet hard to define. And just because it is a familiar term it has some implications which, in any serious treatment of culture whether literary, sociological or philosophical, cannot find any place. The drawing-room concept of culture is an aspect of it, uppermost in the popular mind, which has hardly any place in a serious treatment of the subject.

What then is culture? Perhaps one would be surprised to know that the fourteenth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* with its ponderous twenty-three volumes of material does not list the category of culture. There is an article in it on civilization wherein J. H. Robinson, the author, points out that civilization is as wide as the knowledge dealt with in the twenty-three volumes of the *Encyclopædia*. It is a strange omission indeed that culture should not be listed nor even its identity with civilization—if the Editors believed so—should have been pointed out. There is also in another volume a large chart entitled the 'Periods of Art' from the pen of one of the famous art critics, Warren E. Cox.

In the usage adopted by literary masters, well-known art critics, by great historians and profound thinkers, the two terms culture and civilization are used as interchangeable categories. Viewing human activity and achievement as well as its treatment in various disciplines of knowledge, we find that a number of aspects, a varied list of vocational achievements, are treated by students who are specially interested in them as either pure indices of civilization or glorified into even the sole test of civilization. It is admitted that by civilization is meant all the results of human activity subsisting at a particular moment in the history of humanity as a whole or in that of a particular society. Civilization thus includes the tools and weapons, houses and utensils, dress and ornaments, agricultural products and dressed food, customs and manners, beliefs and ideas as well as magic and science, religion and philosophy, morality and social organization of the people. What are called arts and crafts, art and architecture, are put in the same category with philosophy, morality and religion. If civilization comprises all

these activities and achievements, the question may naturally be asked, is there any society which is not civilized? If the answer is in the affirmative, the further question, how do anthropologists speak of savage people, becomes the natural sequence. The contingencies created by the last question can be met, and properly met, by a further elaboration that there are degrees of civilization. Such a course does not agree with the general anthropological practice wherein usually a sharp line of demarcation is drawn between the people who have script and peoples who have none, the former alone being designated civilized and the latter savage, primitive, or barbarian. There is, however, every need to distinguish grades of civilization. There is ample justification for societies being classed as civilized, highly civilized and very highly civilized.

Apart from the need to distinguish grades of civilization it is a patent fact that the items of social heritage considered as civilization are rather cold and inoperative and can become vital and active only in so far as they are possessed and acted upon by the individuals composing the society and by the various groups within it. Religion with a set of beliefs and of ritual is operative when the individuals composing the society practise the beliefs and carry out the rituals. Philosophy vitalizes life only when philosophical ideals become part and parcel of the lives of individuals. Otherwise it remains mere intellectual gymnastics. Civilization of a society, however created—whether by the élite of that society through their own effort or through borrowing from some other society—becomes effective only through the lives of individuals. Civilization to be effective must, therefore, be appreciated, absorbed and acted upon by the individuals and groups composing the society. This individual aspect as opposed to the group-aspect, in other words the realistic and operative aspect, illustrated in the lives of individuals composing the society, may be properly termed culture. Civilization is the sum-total of social heritage projected on the social plane while culture is the same heritage focused on the individual plane. This distinction is the same as is current in the dictum, 'civilization is what we have and culture is what we are'.

We have seen above the need for distinguishing grades of civilization from one point of view. There is another reason too for accepting the gradation. Clive Bell and other students of civilization speak of three highly civilized periods in Euro-

pean social history. Whitehead too speaks of civilized and highly civilized society and men. Are the attributes of all of them identical? Is there or is there not a difference between the early civilization of the ancient Egyptians and the Mesopotamians on the one hand and of the Athenian Greeks of the age of Pericles on the other? Is there no difference between the early civilization of the ancient Egyptians and the civilization of the ancient Hindus either in the Upanishadic Age or in the Gupta Age and between this latter and the civilization of Periclean Athens? Evidently there is a difference. And our task is first of all to ascertain the points of difference.

Attempts have been made to relate a particular grade of civilization to a particular degree of achievement in only one of the civilizational activities. Flinders Petrie wrote in 1911 a book called *Revolutions of Civilization*, wherein he discussed the problems of the cyclical nature of civilizational activities, selecting the art of Mediterranean region in general and of Egypt in particular as the main test. The problem discussed by Petrie was concerned with discovering the periods over which the highly civilized activity lasted, and the interval that passed between such a period and a similar period that ensued. For a purpose like this, singling out of one activity, particularly that of art, especially if it was kept in mind that one was dealing only with one civilizational activity, however high in the hierarchy of such activities it may rank, was perhaps not objectionable. But when in 1929 Cox, dealing with the whole of humanity over a long period, from 6000 B.C. to A.D. 1929, speaks of periods of art and tries to establish parallelisms between one society and another, one must submit that the procedure is stretched too far. In order to prove this point it is necessary to see what parallelisms Cox has established and how he proposes to consider them as evidences of parallelisms in the development of civilization.

Cox observes: 'Yet when we study that small part of the history of man of which we have records we find that the development of civilization has extended over only a comparatively brief period of time and that it has in the various parts of the earth been parallel and consistent.' In favour of this generalization the evidence that he advances is that, as in the period 500 to 350 B.C., 'there seems to occur at times nearly a worldwide stimulus or depression in the field of art', To the greater renaissance of Southern Europe between A.D. 1400 and 1500 he

parallels the latest stages of Gothic movement in Northern Europe, the high development of painting, pottery-making and such other arts in Western Asia and the achievements of the Ming dynasty,' A.D. 1368 to 1644, in China. In his single-minded reference to art he has evidently forgotten that the period 500 to 350 B.C. in Athens saw the culmination of not only Greek art but also of Greek literature, Greek philosophy and Greek social life and character. For establishing his parallelism for this period he calls in the aid of Etruscan art in Italy and of the early Persian culture in Western Asia. It is well to remember that whatever the Persian civilization might have been in this period, as Zoroaster the Prophet, lived a few centuries earlier than the beginning of this period, Parsee religion at least was developed outside it. Of the religious literature of the Parsees hardly any can be ascribed to this period. Of the other forms of literature, whether in the Zend language or in the Persian language, there is not a trace in this period. Cox omits India while establishing parallelisms for this period, the great age of India falling in his next period of art, 350 to 200 B.C. It is well known that for this period, 500 to 350 B.C., there was hardly any highly developed art in India and whatever art existed by way of sculpture seems to have been rather crude. By the beginning of this period India had already exhausted her main impulse for philosophical quest and appropriate literature. In philosophy and religion the period was one of collection and handbooks. The period however claims the highest achievements of Hindu grammarians and philologists. For China he mentions the Chou dynasty which 'produced the most beautiful bronzes known to the collectors of today'. He has no other activity to place to the credit of this dynasty. Students of Chinese civilization do not mention this dynasty as the highest in the Chinese achievement. They would rather incline either to Tang or the Ming dynasty and Cox himself, as is evident in the quotation above, seems to favour the Ming dynasty.

In the renaissance period, A.D. 1400 to 1500, while China figures in the parallelism, India is conspicuous by her absence. In India as a whole the creative activity of painting, Rajput and Mogul, rather begins at the end of this period. Of the literary activity in modern Indian languages some of the highest had already been achieved at least a century earlier. Jnaneshwar, with his great book on the *Bhagawadgita*. flourished

in the early part of the thirteenth century. Tulsidas, perhaps the greatest of Hindi writers, having the greatest following among the Hindus, flourished after the end of this period. This particular period would be found to be rather barren either of art, architecture, literature or philosophy as far as the Hindus are concerned. The evidence of art alone taken by Cox as the guiding principle for testing the development of civilization and establishing parallelisms is thus found to be very defective owing to such parallelisms in the development of art either being found to be not universal or being not uniformly accompanied by high achievements in other civilizational activities.

On the other hand, the greatest age of Hindu civilization, the Gupta period, lies between A.D. 300 and 500. That is the golden age of Hindu civilization. That is the period when the greatest classical Sanskrit literature was produced. The best poetry, the best drama that Sanskrit language has to offer was written in this period. It is the age of some of the greatest Hindu sculptors, though equally great and perhaps greater specimens of Hindu sculpture were being produced till the end of the eighth century A.D. It is also the age which has preserved for us fresco-paintings, which are among the masterpieces not only of Hindu but also of world painting. Though this age is not so well known for its contribution to Hindu philosophy, it is the age when Hinduism as we know it—one may call it Brahmanism if one likes—was formulated or was rather being formulated. It would be hard to show and difficult to establish any parallel period in the civilization of the world outside India during this period. The formulation of Roman Law is the only achievement of Roman civilization that pertains to this period. Christianity had already begun its conquest of the Western world.

The one fact which a broad study of human civilization reveals is that high and comprehensive civilization has rarely been achieved in human history and that such a rare phenomenon has not been proved to recur in the history of the same people. Rather there is a tendency for high civilizational achievements to be made at different periods in their history. If a parallelism of comprehensive civilization in the history of the same people is so rare, it is rarer still among different peoples of mankind. This lesson is masked when art alone is taken as an index and applied as a test of civilization.

The Gupta Age of Indian history being the greatest in the history of Hindu civilization and almost being unique amidst the world civilization of that time must be of special interest to students of civilization and culture as is the Periclean Age of Athens. We may, therefore, deal with its aspects here in some detail. Art and architecture, science and literature, are found in the history of Hindu civilization to appeal to the Hindu mind in different intensities at different periods, in contrast to which the appeal of philosophy and religion, the lure of spiritual values and ritualistic creeds, appears as the most fundamental and abiding interest. In this most important and significant feature of social life, the Gupta Age is perhaps the most catholic of all the ages of this land famous for religious toleration. The catholicity is reflected in the life and doings of the royal family and also in the writings of the greatest poet not only of that age but of all Indian ages. Samudragupta—perhaps the greatest monarch of this dynasty and second only to the great Asoka—the great conqueror who carried the glory of Gupta arms to the far corners of India—celebrated his great victories in the well-known orthodox Brahmanic fashion, by *performing a horse-sacrifice, declaring his supremacy.* He was thus a confirmed Brahminist, and his poet laureate describes him as a great follower of Bhagawatism, an aspect of Vaishnavism, and as a restorer of the horse-sacrifice. Yet when approached by the King of Ceylon for permission to found a Buddhist monastery at Bodh-Gaya, he willingly granted it. The Buddhist monastery, built at the cost of the Ceylonese king, was reported by a Chinese scholar-traveller in the seventh century to have been a flourishing magnificent establishment accommodating a thousand monks of Buddhism.[1] His son and successor, the equally great conqueror Chandragupta Vikramaditya, who is described as a great follower of Bhagawatism, was to some extent at least a patron of Vasubandhu, the famous Buddhist teacher.[2] Kumaragupta I, the son and successor of Chandragupta Vikramaditya, showed his toleration and even partiality for Shaivism. Not only was a temple of Kartikeya or Skanda, the son of Shiva and Parvati, built in his reign but he himself showed his devotion to Kartikeya by striking a new type of coin in which, on one side Kartikeya is represented on his vehicle, the peacock, with the king riding the elephant on the other side. There is also reason to think that he was to some extent at least open to influences of

Buddhist teaching. It was during his reign that an image of Buddha was installed.[3] The partiality of Kumaragupta for Skanda worship is clearly indicated in the name of his son and successor Skandagupta. Yet the king Skandagupta is described as a great follower of Bhagawatism and is recorded to have installed the image of Vishnu with his famous bow in his hand.[4]

Kalidasa, as his name implies, is believed to have been a devotee of Goddess Kali and thus a follower of Shaivism. He describes in his *Meghaduta* the temple of Mahakala, an aspect of Shiva, at Ujjain which was famous in his days. In the invocations of his three plays, he praises God Shiva; and, in the *Kumarasambhava*, he lavishes his poetic gifts to describe Parvati's fascination for Shiva, to delineate with loving affection various doings of Shiva, to portray the amours of Shiva and Parvati as hucband and wife and their feelings as parents towards their peculiar son Skanda or Kumara, and to describe the outstanding characteristics of this general of gods, who saved them from their perils. But the same Kalidasa exercised his poetical genius, in no inferior fashion, in penning the saga of the dynasty of the Raghus in whose family Rama was believed by Kalidasa and his contemporaries to be the incarnation of Vishnu and is believed to be so even today. Nay, in connexion with the description of the birth of Rama in the family of Raghus, Kalidasa does not feel any scruples in speaking of all gods including Shiva as only the manifestation of God Vishnu. It is noteworthy that God Vishnu whom he has in view and he describes is that form of him which is known as 'Seshasayin'. In this form the God is depicted as reclining on a hooded cobra with his wife, the Goddess Laxmi, sitting at his feet. In this pronouncedly Vaishnava dynasty of Raghus, as Kalidas describes, one of the ancestors of the family has actually to propitiate God Shiva for progeny. It is evident that this catholic poet, though his personal religion was some form of Shaivism, has not only no feeling of antagonism against Vaishnavism but looks upon both forms of religion as compatible, the preference of one over the other being a matter of personal choice.

Literature of this age is generally known as the classical literature not only because it is written in what is known as classical Sanskrit, which is fully governed by the rules of grammar laid down by Panini, but also because it is free from

the excesses which it shows from the seventh century onwards. Sanskrit as a medium of communication between a ruler and the ruled, strange to say, was first used about A.D. 150 by a dynasty of foreigners who had got assimilated in India, the Shaka Satraps of Western India—the first known Sanskrit inscription, intended to convey the message of the king to the people being that of Rudradaman. Kalidasa, the greatest Sanskrit poet and dramatist, flourished fairly early in the age. There is a persistent tradition of an early king of this dynasty having patronized at his court nine literary gems, testifying to the great literary activity of this age. Besides Kalidasa's dramas, the great drama of Sudraka, the *Mrcchakatika,* may be ascribed to the early part of this age, Sudraka being generally considered to have flourished before Kalidasa. The collation of law and custom called *Dharma Shastras,* and the collection of mythology, cosmology and religion called *Puranas,* are other forms of literature typical of this age. Perhaps the last reaction of the greatest and best known collation of law and custom called *Manusmrti* was accomplished in the early part of this age. Works on politics too were not unknown, Kamandaka's work being ascribed to this age. Mathematics and astronomy flourished in this age. A well-known authority, Kaye holds that, 'the period when mathematics flourished in India commenced about A.D. 400 and ended about A.D. 650, after which deterioration set in'. Vatsyayana's *Kamasutra* may also be ascribed to the early part of the age. It is a standing testimony to the high development of all kinds of arts, erotic art being one of the most highly developed. Excepting in medicine on the side of science, and in philosophy on the side of humanities, this age produced writers on their own subjects who have been looked up to as either geniuses in their line or as great authorities. In medicine, one of the great authorities, Sushruta, flourished in the earlier period of the Kushan kings. The only philosophers of note that are ascribed to the age are Vasubandhu and Nagarjuna, both of them Buddhists. Perhaps the line of thought explored by Nagarjuna helped Shanker, the great Hindu philosopher of the eighth century A.D., to formulate his system of philosophy. Political literature written in the highly cultivated Sanskrit language, the establishment of that language as a medium of communication between the reigning dynasties and the people, the use of this language for dramas which were meant to be acted, show refinement which was fully

reflected in the development of the arts of dancing and music, of painting and sculpture, and also in a number of crafts.

About architecture, we can only speak inferentially, particularly of the secular and domestic section. That the palaces of the kings were spacious and beautiful is a well-established inference judged by the description of the house of the famous courtesan Vasantsena in *Mrcchakatika*. The houses of the rich were also spacious and beautiful. It is a sign of the times, indicating accumulation of wealth, that the arts of dancing and music, of painting and cosmetics, were studied and cultivated, not only by the courtesans such as Vasantsena, who are strangely redolent of the Greek Hetaerae, but also by the ladies of the royal household. It is interesting to note in this connection that the greatest monarch of the dynasty, Samudragupta, is represented on his coins happily engaged in playing on his Indian lyre. It is again a sign of opulence, that the art of shampooing and massaging could be made a means of livelihood. With great accumulation of wealth and cultivation of high civilization, it would appear that some vices and offences flourished almost automatically. And the vice of the Indian civilization of the Gupta Age was gambling *par excellence*. If in the modern scientific age the craft of theft and robbery reflects to a very large extent the advanced technique of science, in the Gupta Age the robber's craft breathed the spirit of the age in that it was cultivated as an art. It would appear that the artistic feeling of the robber was such a dominant note in his character that even at the time of actually committing a theft—when there was possibility of his being caught red-handed—he did not desist from gloating over his handiwork, as the thief in *Mrcchakatika* does.

The artistic excellence of this age, its essentially creative nature, is best brought home to the students of this period by the real indigenous nature and the supreme excellence of the Gupta coinage.[5] As for the plastic arts, it will suffice here to quote the judgement of Coomaraswamy, who observes: 'The outstanding characteristic of the art of India at this time is its classical quality. In the Kushan period, the cult image is still a new and important conception, and there we find quite naturally, magnificent primitives, or " clumsy and unwieldy figures ", according to our choice of terms. In the Gupta period, the image has taken its place in architecture; becoming necessary, it loses its importance, and enters into the general decorative scheme

and in this integration acquires delicacy and repose. At the same time technique is perfected, and used as a language without conscious effort, it becomes the medium of conscious and explicit statement of spiritual conceptions; this is equally true of sculpture, painting and the dance. With a new definition of beauty it establishes the classical phase of Indian art, at once serene and energetic, spiritual and voluptuous. The formulæ of Indian taste are now definitely crystallized and universally accepted.'[6] While in the matter of these fine arts this age had passed through the throes of creation to the positive pleasure of culmination, in the matter of temple architecture which is essentially related in the Hindu ideology to iconographic sculpture, it was still in the early pangs of creative effort. The origins of the beautiful spires, 'Shikhara', of the medieval temples of India are traced to the attempts made at such construction in the temples of the Gupta Age. It speaks for the great catholicity of the art of this age that the Buddha figure, fully evolved in the early period, became the source of all later forms both in and outside India.[7]

Nobility, it would appear, is writ large on the age. We know from the works of the Chinese pilgrim-traveller Fa-hien that the rich and prosperous people appeared to emulate one another in the practice of virtue. There were numerous charitable institutions such as rest-houses on the roadways and free hospitals in the capital endowed by private citizens. About the work of the hospitals, the traveller has left on record his appreciation of the way all kinds of patients were treated and made comfortable. Vincent Smith remarks: 'It may be doubted if any equally efficient foundation was to be seen elsewhere at that date: and its existence, anticipating the deeds of modern Christian charity speaks well both for the character of the citizens who endowed it and for the genius of the great Asoka whose teaching still bore such wholesome fruit many centuries after his decease.'[8] It speaks highly for the efficiency of the Gupta administration that the Chinese traveller should have acknowledged the comparatively greater freedom in which the citizens of India lived as against the irksome restrictions to which the traveller was accustomed to in his country. That the traveller was impressed with the administration of criminal law as being milder in India than in China proclaims the superiority of the Gupta Age over the contemporary Chinese civilization in point of humanity.

It must be clear that art by itself, though it may enable us to establish some synchronisms, cannot be made the sole basis for the study, comparison and synchronization of periods of civilization. What it does illustrate and establish is the process of unwitting co-operation of the various sections of mankind which succeeded in transcending the early crudities of art, in producing their art. This is clearly demonstrated by the very useful chart presented towards the end of the article on 'Periods of Art' referred to above. The results of such a comparative study of art are thus summarized by Cox: 'Thus we must get out of the habit of thinking that the last art is the best art. There is more loss than gain to be seen when the earlier arts such as those of Egypt or China or Greece are weighed in the scale against the modern in spite of (or perhaps because of) all the new means available to artists of today which these earlier civilizations did not know.'[9]

Another civilizational activity, which is much more connected with the daily needs of mankind, is architecture which is described by H. W. Corbett as 'the art of so building as to apply both beauty and utility', and by W. R. Lethaby as the 'matrix of civilization'. As this activity is connected with a primary need of man, viz. shelter, perhaps it may be made the basis of study of civilization. It is pointed out that architecture having been developed by each separate people and having the purpose of serving a very practical end has tended to reflect truly the society which it housed. The comfort and refinement as the guiding principles of this art arise only when wealth and leisure are sufficiently developed. But the quality of architecture as of other arts cannot be measured by the wealth of the community. As Corbett observes: 'Art in its highest form is produced by peoples of culture who possess high ideals; artists can only be developed by a demand for art.' Reviewing the history of architecture from its beginnings in Egyptian civilization, he deals with architecture of each of the civilized societies more or less separately, pointing out its characteristics in relation both to the social life of the people and to achitectural features. For Europe, beginning with the Renaissance, he deals with the history more or less by centuries and points out the poverty of the nineteenth century architecture. He notices that Egyptian architecture, of all architectures, best demonstrates the truth of the observation that architecture is an expression of life, for uniformity of architecture over a long period of Egyptian history

is but a reflection of lasting cultural habits and unchanging social relationships of Egyptian civilization. He notes the freedom of Greek architecture in contrast with the uniformity of the Egyptian. The architecture of the Greeks brings out their characteristics as well as art, and even more so. The regard for achievement of beauty whether of colour, texture, form, mass or proportion is demonstrated by Greek architecture to have been the chief consideration in the lives of the people. In the opinion of Corbett it illustrates perhaps the best synthesis between order and progress, between routine and adventure. He observes: 'There is neither abject adherence to precedent nor a searching for the new merely to be different, but that gradual change for the better that so eminently characterizes a nation of great culture, in which beauty and truth are the ultimate goal."[10] The Renaissance architecture he points out combines in itself the trends from Greek, Western, Asiatic and the Egyptian architectures and itself enters into the composition of the present. Modern architecture is becoming more truly expressive of contemporary culture. European architecture is influenced in its contemporary practice more by the ancient European including ancient Egyptian architecture than by that of India, China or Japan. The growing connections between the West and the Far East may affect Western architecture 'more materially than past centuries of separated civilizations'. With his conviction that man has only a limited capacity for absorbing arts, Corbett rightly desists from making architecture the sole test of civilization.

Culinary art is another activity of man which combines utility with taste as he proceeds on the path of civilization and culture. Yet it has not been, and cannot be, used as a criterion of civilizational attainment by itself. Its detailed history is not available; and its essence is too fine to be concretized for a comparative study.

With this short survey of the attempts at classifying periods of civilization we are in a position to answer the question regarding differences in civilizations formulated above. The main difference lies in the fact that in the Athens of Pericles almost all the items of civilization—art, literature, philosophy—were highly developed. The highest achievements of Greek science lie outside this age. The pursuit of truth, beauty and goodness was conducted sincerely and fairly on a large scale. Moral and psychological qualities were as high as to be met

with anywhere else or at any other time. The qualities of intellect again were as high as possible. The achievements in the domain of art, literature, philosophy, and government were some of the highest that humanity has known so far. Yet the whole was meant for the small Greek citizen population. The large slave-population which catered for its comfort was a stranger to it. We may conclude that there was intensity, there was extent but it was strictly limited. Not only were the slaves excluded from it but married women too were debarred from all intellectual culture. Political treachery was particularly rampant. The sophists who represent to later students so much of the good of Athens, were not only not favoured but were actually condemned, the greatest of them, Socrates, being martyred. In the case of India, in the Gupta Age, two of the civilizational values, art and literature, were highly developed, but the high development of Hindu philosophy lay outside that period, having taken place either much before or much after it. Its government though as good as that of Athens, was yet based on a different principle. It is almost certain that intellectual culture which was then available was denied to all but a small hereditary class.

One civilization may differ from another civilization in point of intensity or extent or both, in respect of moral and psychological qualities or qualities of intellect, or both, in regard to the extent of its absorption by the various sections of the society or again in respect of the extent of the class, which may be called the creators and propagators of civilization. It is necessary, therefore, to base the classification of civilization on the degree and extent of the creation and the realization of its values. We may then consider civilization in four grades: (1) civilization, (2) high civilization, (3) very high civilization, (4) complete civilization. Or we may speak of societies in adjectival terms as (1) civilized, (2) highly civilized, (3) very highly civilized, and (4) completely civilized. It may be summarily pointed out, in fact the discussion so far must have made it manifest, that no known society can be classed as very highly civilized, much less as completely civilized. Very high civilization is a state for the future to achieve. And may I point out that therein lies the truth of the theory of progress, therein centres the hope of mankind, therein lies the field for the activities of creative geniuses, for what Whitehead has called 'Adventures'.

Before dilating on the qualities exhibited by the various

grades of civilization, it is necessary to say something about the desirability of civilization or about civilization as a value. Needless to say, all those great writers who have written with firm faith in progress have believed in civilization. Only most of them desire to see a higher grade of civilization than has been possible. For this, our scheme of classification of civilization amply provides. Those who lay stress on progress, distinguish between bad civilization and good civilization, as, for example, J. B. Bury. He remarks: 'The phrase *civilization* and *progress* has become stereotyped, and illustrates how we have come to judge a civilization good or bad according as it is or it is not progressive.'[11] This manner of thinking does not or cannot be held to doubt civilization as a value. Among the great and influential writers, perhaps Rousseau stands alone in looking upon civilization as a mistake. J. B. Bury says that he thinks that 'social development has been a gigantic mistake, that, the farther man has travelled from a primitive simple state the more unhappy has his lot become, that civilization is radically vicious'.[12] The same scholar remarks that Rousseau 'was an optimist in regard to human nature, a pessimist in regard to civilization'.[13] The views of Rousseau must be considered to be the foibles of a great man. As Bury evaluating the views of Rousseau, observes: 'His attempt to show that the cultivation of science produces specific moral evils is feeble, and has little ingenuity; it is a declamation rather than an argument; and in the end he makes concessions which undo the effect of his impeachment.'[14] More recently Edward Carpenter in a highly popular book called *Civilization, its Cause and Cure,* tried to substantiate Rousseau's views about present civilized people. He observes: 'With regard to the mental condition of the Barbarian, probably no one will be found to dispute the contention that he is more easy-minded and that his consciousness of sin is less developed than in his civilized brother. Our unrest is the penalty we pay for our wider life.'[15] Naturally he considers the state of civilized man as 'lapse or fall'. One of his charges against civilization is that being founded on property, it has led to the disintegration and the corruption of man.[16] He takes exception to using the word civilization in an ideal sense 'to indicate a stage of future culture towards which we are tending'. He is positive that the actual tendencies of modern life being ennobling is doubtful unless in a quite indirect manner.[17] It is clear from this that

for Carpenter the advance of humanity, such as has taken place with the institution of private property, is an undiluted curse.

We may look upon civilization as a complex value, whose component values have changed and will change, whose intensity and extent have varied, will vary, and which, therefore, has to be graded into different classes as I have done. But we have every reason to look upon it as a value. The idyllic picture of civilization is no longer going to appeal to any intelligent reader as a course of life either to be imitated or to be desired. It is not to be doubted that man has been trained to fulfil his mission in the effort that he has put in creating civilization. The error lies in considering the achievement of today as the finality and not as a step for further advance.

Having seen that civilization is a complex value, worthy of being created and achieved, I may summarize its component values, which emerge from the contributions of various writers, in order that we may be able to judge of its absorption by groups and individuals. In the opinion of Clive Bell, the three highly civilized periods of European social history are characterized by: The Sense of Values and the Enthronement of Reason. From these primary qualities others ensue. They are: 'A taste for truth and beauty, tolerance, intellectual honesty, fastidiousness; a sense of humour; good manners; curiosity; dislike of vulgarity, brutality, and over-emphasis; freedom from superstition and prudery; a fair acceptance of the good things of life; a desire for complete self-expression and for a liberal education, a contempt for utilitarianism and philistinism; in two words—sweetness and light."[18] Bell does not imply that all these qualities are possessed by any and every civilization. But they are present in a very few highly civilized societies. Focussing our attention on the essentials, it is seen that in a highly civilized society truth and beauty are cultivated; curiosity is, like intellectual honesty, prized. Some of the qualities and characteristics here enumerated are what I have termed moral and psychological qualities and some are qualities of intellect.

Whitehead considers the five qualities of Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art and Peace, as the characteristics of a civilized society. Truth and Beauty are common to both the lists. Whitehead justifies a separate enumeration of Art from Truth and Beauty, while omitting the mention of goodness, which is the third member of the trinity, usually associated with art. Peace, as we shall see, is rather difficult to specify. But it will be

seen from the brief discussion regarding this category posited by Whitehead that it comprises within its complexity and comprehensiveness the qualities which are denominated by Bell as 'tolerance', 'good manners', 'dislike of brutality, vulgarity and over-emphasis', as well as 'freedom' from superstition and prudery'. It connotes not only equanimity but a certain sense of active happiness which is rather of the nature of religious ecstasy of the highest order. Powys has very largely dwelt on this element of culture. It is the highest degree of the process of substitution of persuasion for force which Whitehead rightly considers to be the archstone of civilization. The quality when cultivated by individuals is the culmination of self-culture and is generally referred to in religious literature as bliss. It seems to be akin to what is called *samatva,* 'equanimity', or *sthitaprajnatva,* 'transcendent mentality', in the *Bhagawadgita.* When it is possessed by a society it manifests itself first as absence of cruelty and presence of humanistic and humanitarian feelings. I shall designate this quality as Bliss.

Whereas according to Clive Bell it is the variation in the number of qualities enumerated by him that determines whether a society is to be regarded as civilized, highly civilized or very highly civilized, in Whitehead's scheme all the attributes posited by him must be shown by a society in order that it may be considered as civilized. Apart from the fact that some of the qualities are capable of being cultivated in varying degrees of intensity, Bliss is a quality so rare in its manifestation, that to make it a necessary constituent of civilization is to deny the title of civilized to almost all the known periods of civilization. Indeed, Whitehead thinks that the Italian Renaissance lacked in some essential quality of civilization because it did not show this quality.[11] All other students of civilization have agreed that the Italian Renaissance represents a period of high civilization. The group of qualities, the common possession of which alone in Whitehead's view entitles a society or a period to be classed as civilized, must be considered in its totality and intensity to be the characteristic of a completely civilized society. We may waive for the present the question whether anything human can ever be complete, whether a civilization which is complete still stands in need of adventure and proceed with the consideration of grades of civilization. These grades must clearly depend not only on the varying number of qualities posited by Bell but also on the varying intensities both of these and of the qualities

enunciated by Whitehead. Further, the spread of these qualities and their intensities in the population is a relevant consideration in determining the grade of civilization. A very high civilization must not only show most of the qualities and those too in high intensities but also must have them widely spread in its population and not restricted to a limited class.

Culture is civilization absorbed and operative. Just as there are gradations of civilization, there must be gradations of culture. Further, as individuals are endowed with unequal capacities, whether there are or there are not social inequalities and social institutions which build on these original differences, they are not equally capable of absorption of civilization. Individuals must differ from individuals in this matter. Thus culture too in the very nature of the process and of the subjects who experience that process must be differential and graded. Comparably with civilization, high civilization, very high civilization, and complete civilization we may have culture, high culture, very high culture, and complete culture. Just as I have proposed to speak of societies as civilized, highly civilized, very highly civilized or completely civilized, similarly, quite logically and with equal justice, I may speak of individuals or groups as cultured, highly cultured, very highly cultured, and completely cultured.

This distinction in the gradation of culture will enable us to accommodate the facts of culture to the realities of modern life and to grade the values given by Bell and Whitehead. Thus bliss is a quality which, as I have already stated, ought to be associated with a completely civilized society which would not be found in individuals of ordinary culture. As a matter of fact in the religious literature of the world the quality of bliss as possessed and exhibited by individuals is believed to be the highest of attainments. To expect that any individual who professes to have culture should show that quality is to put the standard of culture too high. On the other hand, every cultured individual must show some appreciation of truth and beauty. The quality of appreciation and the intensity of it may and do differ from individual to individual, and this difference becomes a further basis for the gradation of culture I have proposed. I may, therefore, state that individuals may be classed as cultured, highly cultured, very highly cultured, and completely cultured accordingly as they possess only some of the qualities and in some intensity, while others who possess either

more of the values and qualities or the same qualities in a higher measure of intensity may be termed highly cultured. Individuals, on the other hand, who cultivate at least four out of the five qualities mentioned by Whitehead, namely, Truth, Beauty, Art, Adventure, Bliss, and those who possess the first three in full intensity and full measure and the last two in some measure at least may be grouped as very highly cultured, the designation of completely cultured being reserved for those who show all these qualities in their intensity, which is the final culmination of human personality.

As there are individuals with varying capacity in a given society and as is very well known the really creative individuals in a society always form an extremely limited percentage, it is clear that we must sharply distinguish between appreciative practitioners of culture and adventurous creators of it. Even amongst appreciative practitioners there is bound to be a large class which is merely appreciative and practitioner, while there is a much smaller class which is not only appreciative practitioner, but at the same time enthusiastic disseminator. Far outnumbering all these classes, in fact the largest bulk of any society, is composed of individuals who can only be described as absorptive practitioners or passive participators. In the light of this classification too culture can be seen to fit in with the gradation I have proposed to some extent. The largest class which I have designated as absorptive practitioners or passive participators is a class which can be described as merely cultured while the appreciative practitioner class is surely to be highly cultured. The two other gradations, namely, very highly cultured and completely cultured are represented by the enthusiastic disseminators and the active creators.

The qualities, that are described by Bell as having been associated with periods of high civilization, needless to say, will be shown by the last three classes of cultured individuals, the qualities, viz. of enthronement of reason and of a sense of values. The quality of persuasion which Whitehead finds to be the essence of civilization would seem to have its origin in these two qualities. Adventure and bliss must characterize the last two classes in some degree at least and in a large measure the last class of active creators of civilization and culture. The élite, the completely cultured, must not only enthrone reason and cultivate a sense of values but must possess adventure in abundant measure. Otherwise the civilization and culture which

they are privileged to create will tend to stagnate and be a routine affair. Some degree of bliss must be attained by them in order that the values of civilization and culture they create be of the right kind.

Apropos of certain supposed characteristics of civilization, I have examined a period of Indian civilization and shown that civilization is hardly comprehensive and complete in a given age of a society or contemporaneous over a wide range of societies. Periods of great civilization other than the Gupta Age of India have been examined by Clive Bell for determining attributes of high civilization. MacCabe and Randall have studied these and other periods from a slightly different viewpoint. MacCabe speaks of the century and a quarter from about 1820 as the 'Age of Science' and the 'Modern Achievement'. Randall includes the nineteenth century among his 'Creative Centuries' along with 'Periclean Athens', 'Renaissance Italy' and 'Eighteenth Century France'. In 1837 Emerson introduced in the English language prominently the consideration of the concept of 'Culture' and wrote various essays, during thirty years or so, on 'culture', 'civilization' and topics connected with these concepts. In 1869 Matthew Arnold, as it appears, independently exhorted the contemporary British people to make culture the guiding concept of their ideal and practice. Randall's example of the creative nineteenth century is the British society of that age. Disparaging comments on the nineteenth century before the World War I and after it on the twentieth century were and have been the vogue. It is proposed to study nineteenth century British society with a view to unravelling the skein of culture and society. Such a study may be expected to enlighten us on the nature and extent of the development of various civilizational activities, on the problems of culture and society.

References

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[4] Saletore, pp. 497-8, 501-2.
[5] Rapson, E. J., *Indian Coins* (1897).
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[10] *Ency. Brit.*, Vol. II, p. 281; Lethaby, W. R., and Purchon, W. S., *Architecture*, p. 7.
[11] Bury, p. 7.
[12] ibid., p. 177.
[13] ibid., p. 178.
[14] ibid., p. 179.
[15] Carpenter, p. 26.
[16] ibid., p. 46.
[17] ibid., p. 18.
[18] Clive Bell, pp. 63-4.
[19] Whitehead, p. 366.

CHAPTER II

THE QUEST OF CULTURE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND

THE eighteenth century in Europe in general, and in France and England in particular, was marked by the atmosphere of high civilization, its latter part being generally known as the Age of Enlightenment and Reason. Towards its end, however, in England with the publication of some of the works of Wordsworth and Coleridge in 1798, there opens an age which is known as the Romantic Period. The Romanticism typified by such fascinating personalities as Scott, Lamb, Byron, Keats, Shelley, Wordsworth and Coleridge, drew to its close in 1824 with the death of Byron, and finally, ended in the early thirties, when nearly all the chief figures of the Movement had died. This period of nearly thirty years is sometimes spoken of as the Romantic Revolt. The distinguishing characteristic of the literature of this period is its intense individualism. Two-thirds of the nineteenth century itself was largely an era of individualism. Individualism, therefore, as an attribute of the Romantic Period can hardly be said to mark it off from the nineteenth century as a whole. Yet there appears to be a difference between the atmosphere of the first third of the nineteenth century, its middle forty years, and its last thirty years. The chief figures of the Romantic Movement believed and acted on the belief that their first duty was to express themselves. 'Their appeal was always to what transcended common sense. They would become universal in that appeal not by smoothing away all individual characteristics but by reaching the very heart of individuality. They held that to express one's own intimate thoughts and feelings was really to express everybody. Thus it comes about that these Romantic poets, for all their wonders and crazy flights of fancy, are actually more realistic than the poets in the English classical tradition. And when they are at their weakest, they arrive at sheer eccentricity. Their danger always is that they may become mawkishly egoistic or barbarically anti-social.'[1]

We may contrast the above description of the Romanticists and their work given by Priestley with the description of the prevailing atmosphere of the third quarter of the nineteenth century

given by G. M. Trevelyan to realize the difference existing in the atmosphere and colour of the first third of the nineteenth century and that of its latter part. Mills' treatise *On Liberty* was not only a plea for political liberty but also a testament for freedom of thought and discussion which in the earlier part of the century was very much limited by social convention. It appealed for a change in the direction of the freedom to express any ideas both in word and action. Yet the literature of the period 'represented by Matthew Arnold, George Eliot, the Brownings, and Meredith, was instinct with the principle of freedom and experiment, always within the limits embodied by sound learning and the social sense. Victorian literature, essentially liberationist, was not revolutionary. As art, it had its own various traditions and standards distinct from those of journalism'.[2] This description of the third quarter of the nineteenth century, placed in juxtaposition with the characterization of the Romantic Movement made by D. C. Somervell, viz. that its fundamental impulse was 'the Call of the Wild',[3] brings out the difference in the atmospheres of the two periods.

Extravagance was the very hall-mark of the Romantic Movement, and 'romance was the very breath of the early Victorian culture'. But by the thirties it had learned to accommodate itself to the standards of the English drawing-room or genteel parlour. Socially there was a great but silent revolution whereby the dominating situation between 1832 and 1867 was the influence of the middle class not only in matters political but also spiritual, whereas in the age of Byron the ideals were the ideals of the aristocracy.[4] Trevelyan, viewing the History of England from the social angle, marks out the period of 1793 to 1832, as 'Cobbett's England', and distinguishes the period of 1832 to 1867 as the 'Age between the Two Reform Bills'. He marks off the third period, from 1865 to 1901, as the 'Second Half of the Victorian Era'.[5]

The historian of British civilization, Wingfield-Stratford, observes regarding the beginning of the nineteenth century that an outstanding feature of its onset was the swift 'running to seed' of the eighteenth-century culture. And though a certain amount of high standard of culture continued in the upper classes for some time, in his opinion it was only a masquerade in form without its spirit. With all the difficulties of the gentry of the eighteenth century, it imposed a standard of good taste on all who catered to its needs but with the opening of this century

and some time later the demand for beauty in furniture and in architecture was neither discriminating nor insistent.

Perhaps this degradation in the standard, in spite of the Romantic Movement, is illustrated with such clarity in no other item of culture as in dress. As Wingfield-Stratford observes: 'For a time there was over-emphasis on dress, a sartorial self-consciousness that was a sure prelude of decadence.' The influence of such a man as Beau Brummell—who died in 1840—who is considered himself to have been 'above the vulgarity of soliciting attention to himself by consciousness of attire' and who in the opinion of Byron used to dress with exquisite propriety, strange to say, resulted in the later twenties in what is known as dandyism.[6] The testimony of such an expert student of dress as James Laver may here be noted. He informs us that a typical eighteenth-century male costume, which was largely a French creation, was more or less universal in Europe and was considered a mark of civilized life. But the influence of the Romantic Movement had worked its way in the country gentleman of England who began to introduce a number of modifications in his eighteenth-century costume. There is a marked element of prudery in the feminine clothing of this period. Dresses reached the throat and ended there in a frill of lace. Evening dresses became higher and long, white gloves became a feature making up for the shortness of sleeves. There was growing unwillingness to wear a single sheet-like garment as it tended to reveal the outline of the figure. Petticoats began to be worn underneath, and they increased in number. Tight-lacing came back and reached its maximum pitch about the year 1833. The effect of the influence of Romanticism on dress apart from its prudery by the year 1835 is thus described by Laver: 'So sallow was the prevailing complexion in 1835 that a memoirist of the period compares the contemporary beauties with the Chinese and the Japanese. Some, both men and women, even made up with yellow pigment. Men strove to be pale, to look pale and distinguished as if ravaged by some secret sorrow; women to look frail and afflicted with a settled melancholy. It was as if universal lunacy had settled upon the fashionable world. The Byronic hero, with his cadaverous features and sarcastic smile, was to be seen everywhere, flanked by women with faces like alabaster, almost transparent, just rescued from the tomb and liable at any moment to return to it.' Romanticism in dress was really the

challenge of the poor artist in defence of self-respect against the growing wealth of the bourgeoisie. Naturally it resulted in excesses and orgies. Yet divested of the excesses it remained there to lend colour to the succeeding age through its being adopted and adapted by the bourgeoisie, 'the respectable people, who finally decide what a fashion shall be, although they very rarely inaugurate it'. Towards the end of the thirties the Romantic impulse seemed to have exhausted itself ushering in the era generally known as that of Early Victorianism, while by 1850 the triumph of the 'bourgeoisie' was complete, 'the clothes of their women varying only between narrow limits, and the clothes of their men stereotyped for ever'. Whereas the Romanticists sported sometimes tasteful and sometimes gaudy colours, the middle class decided that only the dark colour shall prevail in the male dress.[7]

Rightly has Wingfield-Stratford, reviewing the type held up as the ideal, characterized the gentlemen of the first third of the nineteenth century as eccentrics and the period as ushering in the barbarians.[8] He points out that an English gentleman, who was already a complex of contending influences and factors, developed his provincialism and eccentricity, perhaps inherent in the English nature, since English manners and customs began to free themselves from the French influence which dominated them in the eighteenth century. With the back-to-nature cry of the Romanticists, which was peculiarly congenial to English nature, 'which never takes kindly to a centralized or academic discipline', the ideal of a gentleman freely evolved on native lines. The English individual tended to become a law unto himself. 'Instead of disciplining his emotions so as to produce perfect conformity to a system he gladly embraced the new tendency of the age, which was to give them all the scope possible. Back to nature—and the more natural the better ! Not only he—but to an even more marked extent, she !' He gives some examples of the practical working of the superbly rampant individualism of the British gentleman and lady of this period. Eccentricity running riot passes out of the bounds of culture and even though the period is marked with great energy there was no idea of 're-integrating the lost nucleus of culture'. He remarks : 'The time was coming, of which its most distinguished critic would be able to lump the whole of that class (upper class) together under the comprehensive designation of Barbarians.' With the wearing out of the period it began to be

assumed that a gentleman's first duty could be concretized in sporting alone. It was postulated that sport was the one appropriate way for the expression of one's personality in contrast to the varied fields for the same exercise which were considered to be proper at the beginning of the century. The eccentrics of culture disappear from the scene ushering in the age of the great sporting characters.[9]

H. V. Routh, a literary historian and a literary critic, reviewing the literature of the nineteenth century from an ethico-social angle, marks off the period 1820-50 as the period of hope as well as of disillusionment and dissatisfaction. The period of hope is found to be rather the earlier part of the thirty years thus marked off. Though Carlyle had begun his attack on the contemporary ideals in 1829 with his article on the *Signs of the Times,* in which he asserted that the civilization of his time was all machinery, yet as his other works of this period, in particular *Sartor Resartus,* make it clear that he was hopeful, he had faith that all negation may be turned or converted into the ' ever lasting yea '. It should further be borne in mind that the Oxford Movement with its religious reformatory appeal is believed to have been started in 1833 and was really the first important sign indicating that all was not well with the time, that the hopes entertained in the earlier period were far from coming true. In the late thirties and early forties of the century, there was a large body of educated opinion concerning itself with the inquiry how far ' the increase in wealth and learning might lead to the increase in spirit; in what ways progress might be turned to blessedness ; whether civilization could become culture '. The critical spirits of the latter part of this period, seeing that ' the ideals of the Romantic Period were adjusted to a life of contemplation such as an intelligent and active man might enjoy in the simpler less stimulating civilization of the eighteenth century ', had come to lose hope.[10] That is not to say that there were not perhaps equally great writers like Macaulay fanning up a robust optimism of the middle class Englishmen who were just sensing the exhilaration of political power,—an optimism, which reached its high-water mark by the time of the Great Exhibition of 1851. Macaulay wrote in 1830 with a gusto hardly to be met with in equal measure in any other well-known author of the period the following : ' By the prudence and energy of the people England has hitherto been carried forward in civilization ;

and it is to the same prudence and to the same energy that we now look with comfort and good hope."[11]

Routh's next period covers the years 1850 to 1870. Describing it as the great period he distinguishes two main tendencies. One beginning with disillusionment ends in indignation and the other, with a similar beginning achieves the quest. He thus appraises the period: 'We are now entering upon one of the most remarkable epochs in English literature at its height between 1850 and 1870; the period during which the rule of the Middle Class was established. Literary men, then as always, belonged to the Middle Class and their attitude to this phase of their civilization is most instructive. It was certainly a time of progress and expansion; yet they do not share the public confidence. It was also a time of world-wide unrest and of unexpected eventualities, when the nation's resolution was tested by every sort of crisis and humiliation; and they seemed to dwell on any symptom which might cause Englishmen to doubt their own future."[12] Routh himself wonders why the literary men dwelt particularly on the darker side of the picture, especially as there was no lack of individual energy and character, every crisis finding its proper hero enabling the nation to tide over it comfortably.

Carlyle and Froude are the two outstanding critics and pessimists hacking at the extraordinarily solid optimism of the Victorians of this period. Carlyle deplored 'the decay and degradation of the once great English people who had now lost their individuality and character in the petty details of business'. He describes the industrial operatives 'as the victims of civilization'. 'In this hopeful and democratic age he had made up his mind that the majority of his contemporaries were poor creatures, hardly to be trusted with science, much less with political and economic theory, only fit to be led and, if necessary, enslaved by the few God-inspired men who had still faith.'[13] It is a difficult question to settle how far Carlyle's view of contemporary life and his theory of better life influenced his generation.[14] But it is certain that he had some great men as his disciples, Froude and Ruskin being the most eminent. Kingsley too traced his inspiration to him. Froude thought that the Englishmen of the period of Reformation were at their greatest and maintained that his generation lacked 'Nationhood'. The people had become very commercially minded. As an historian he looked to the past for inspiration to counsel his generation regarding the action of the future. In his quest he came to the

conclusion that what his countrymen had gone through was only a change and not progress. He observes : 'Where money is the measure of worth the wrong persons are always uppermost.' He was appalled at the unpreparedness of the middle class which was sacrificing both public and private honesty, for 'the only resource of a people which has broken with tradition is the quality of the men produced by the new conditions'. Froude cast his searching glance in the direction of the quality of the contemporary population. There was nothing for him to be satisfied there. The working classes were doomed to a life of lifeless and grim drudgery. The upper classes were effete, lacking in adventure for which the only field they had created was hunting, which was the consequence of the change in the ideal of a gentleman.[15] It will be seen from this that both Carlyle and Froude 'were fully alive to most of the problems which have come to a head in our own day. Contrary to the general belief, they could already sniff the twentieth century spirit in the air'. Even more hopeful, active, and constructive seers such as Ruskin, Morris and Arnold were equally depressing in their criticism of the culture of their age.[16]

It is a strange phenomenon that the period which brought forth such poignant satire and scathing criticism from the pens of Carlyle and Froude, Ruskin and Arnold, was not only going on smoothly with its optimistic attitude but was fostering the cult and practice of work, engendering 'that peculiar moral earnestness, common to all the Victorians of the middle class heyday with the possible exception of Disraeli'. This was such a marked feature of this period that Wingfield-Stratford describes it as 'England in Earnest'. The period is remarkable for the solidity and thoroughness of its output. The crowning glory of the age is, by common consent, *On the Origin of Species.* Darwin was at it for over twenty years. Herbert Spencer's works would have done credit not only to one healthy and long life, but even more. And yet Spencer himself was an invalid. To complete his *Frederick* alone Carlyle put in fourteen years of labour. If Macaulay had carried out his plan of his History, at the rate at which it actually took him to write it, it has been calculated that it would have taken him one hundred and fifty odd years to complete it. Another similar torso is Buckle's *History of Civilization in England.*[17] It is not merely that the writers of this age revelled in work and brought out tome after tome but they enjoyed vogue with the general public

unequalled by most of their successors today. Macaulay, Carlyle and Froude were not scientific historians but in their own field of history they appealed to the public at large; 'they wrote history not only to tell the story of the past but indirectly, to interpret the present'. Harriet Martineau has written of the forties with some exaggeration that the middle class public of the time preferred serious scientific literature to fiction to such an extent that it bought five copies of an expensive work on geology to one of the most popular novels.[18] The whole edition of Darwin's great work, *On the Origin of Species,* of 1,250 copies was exhausted on the day of its publication in 1859.[19]

It is in this period that the transformation of the ideal of a gentleman took place. The ideal came more and more to stand for certain moral qualities. That Mrs Craik could present her hero John Halifax, a pauper by birth, as a gentleman in 1856 makes this transformation clear. In 1862, Mill in an article stressed this 'increasing disposition to insist more upon the moral and less upon the social element of the word'. Newman in 1852 had gone even further. He described the character of a gentleman stressing all moral qualities and ended by remarking that 'the lineaments of the ethical character' would result from 'cultivated intellect', from the intellectual culture that he had advocated.[20]

It is not only serious writers, such as Carlyle and Froude, who were disillusioned and dissatisfied with their contemporaries but a number of writers of imaginative literature also took a depressing view of the circumstances of their times, some of them sympathizing with the victims, others though not devoid of sympathy satirizing their faults. Almost all of them devoted their imaginative energies to unravelling the weak spots and the mental and moral sloughs to such an extent that they may be legitimately said to have created a new variety of literature, the social novel. Being novelists they had hardly any remedy to suggest. They only revelled in analysis, and, as Routh has pointed out, harmed the cause of the depressed in an indirect manner. 'All these humanitarian-industrial novels rendered a positive disservice to their age. Their appeals to pity and fear rather persuaded the sympathetic reader that he needed no physician. If you could feel for the victims of civilization, your heart was in the right place, your justice was tempered with mercy, you belonged to the enlightened. You were not stimulated to reflect that the unequal distribution of wealth

arose from many far-reaching causes, one of which was the national misunderstanding of its usefulness and purpose; that the acute poverty of the mid-nineteenth century was due to certain special causes, removable by discussion and legislation, when once the nation had changed its habits of thought. This change of mind was the urgent need of the age. The humanists over-emphasized pauperism partly out of exasperation because it was the obvious evil, ready to hand; the deeper evil was not so easy to find. Thus the books which shamed complacency in progress, counselled complacency in oneself. Not being able to put man right, they encouraged themselves by telling him he was wrong.' Routh suggests that their failure to reach the root of the cause lay in the fact that their apparent indignation had deeper roots and that they were really groping at a solution of the problem of how to turn civilization into culture. Three of these writers—Dickens, Disraeli and Kingsley—were males and two—Mrs Gaskell and George Eliot—were females, with the addition perhaps of a third, Miss Harriet Martineau. A. W. Ward observes that the rise of this social and political novel was timed with circumstances which were charged with great fears and high hopes, terrible sufferings and ardent efforts for betterment. About Dickens and his work, George Saintsbury remarks: 'Certainly he, perhaps more than anyone else, started that curious topsy-turvyfied snobbishness—that cult of the "lower class"—which has become a more and more fashionable religion up to the present moment.' A. W. Ward too thinks that the work of Dickens on behalf of the 'New Idealism' was the most effective among his contemporaries, while Routh thinks that Dickens did not accomplish more than his contemporaries. Ward further thinks that Dickens and Martineau did help by their writings the larger movement of Christian Socialism under the leadership of F. D. Maurice and Charles Kingsley. He opines that thus they became 'the leaders of a movement which has been given the name of "interventionism"'.[21] There is no doubt that by the seventies the new school of thought in practical politics, which may be called socialism, but which was better known as collectivism, combating the ideal of Benthamite individualism, had made its distinct appearance.[22]

Routh speaks of this period of 1850 to 1870 as the period when the humanists maintained that the whole trouble with their time was that civilization had mastered man instead of man mastering it, that civilization was not turned into culture.

The writers, who discovered this and having diagnosed the disease prescribed the remedy, were all of them serious writers —Ruskin the prophet, and Arnold the poet and the critic. Ruskin who in 1857 prophesied that 'there will come a time—I am sure of it—when it will be found that the same practical results both in mental discipline and in political philosophy are to be attained by the accurate study of the Middle Ages, and modern as of ancient history; and that the facts of medieval and modern history are, on the whole, the most important to us', prescribed the remedy of art as the most effective medicine for the social disease. Civilization could be made to serve culture only by teaching the individuals the significance of art. In essence this remedy is the same as the insistence of certain philosophers on the need for stimulating the individual's consciousness of himself. In Routh's words the significance of Ruskin's teaching may be summarized thus: 'If the world was really to be made a place worth living in, every man and woman must begin by discovering his own faults and ministering his own virtues.' This is the ideal of self-help and self-culture. It was 'inaugurated by Goethe, expounded by Carlyle, and illustrated by Kingsley'. Routh reminds us of the vitality of the idea by drawing our attention to its pulsations in Gissing, Besant, Wells and Shaw.[23] Ruskin further preached that contemporary society was all wrong as regards its ideals, that the Industrial Revolution had strengthened the lust for wealth and had led to the transformation of the craftsman into a machine. All that, in his view, could be changed if the people took to art, that is, if they approached their life, their occupation, with a spirit of the artisan and the craftsman. Though his approach would appear to be socialistic, yet he was not a socialist, and he could not gain the sympathies and kindle the enthusiasm of the working-class men for his theory and practice of life. It was far too cultured to make a direct appeal to the working class. The socialistic bent of his thought is brought out and made more operative by Morris, the poet, who was immensely influenced by his writings. As far as contemporary and immediately subsequent society was concerned, Ruskin's main influence must be considered to be that of an inspirer, a prophet, who 'inspired the rising generations of writers and thinkers with disgust at the industrial civilization that had filled their fathers with such pride'.[24]

Morris practised what Ruskin had preached. Being himself

a poet and a craftsman, he began by designing his own furniture. He inaugurated the principle that an article of daily use should be itself a work of art. This philosophy of art in daily life, though the fashions set up by Morris have passed away, has made a wider appeal and got a firm foothold. He became the pioneer in England of beautiful printing and book production. In one of his early works he represents 'a community which lives for art and industry and occupies their evenings by telling beautiful and inspiring stories to each other'. Unlike his master, Morris was also an active worker. He plunged himself into the Socialist Movement and addressed meetings at street-corners and in debating societies. He explained to the wage-earners their mission in life and their need to care for the welfare of their fellow men. Walter Crane puts the beginning of the movement of the English revival of decorative art about the year 1875, pointing out that it was in connexion with this movement that 'arts and crafts' came into use as a comprehensive title for the arts of decorative design and handicrafts. Morris is credited with the great achievement of changing the 'cheap and vulgar tastes in furniture which prevailed in the fifties and sixties in which work of artistic revival he was helped by his friend the artist Burne-Jones and the poet Rossetti'.[25]

While the critics, whether prophets, seers, imaginative writers, poets or craftsmen, were thus analysing, criticizing, satirizing or remoulding contemporary life, there were two great men—J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer—who were the apostles of individuality, living 'their belief as eloquently as they wrote it', and who were, to judge by their writings, popular among the middle classes. Mill not only expounded the principles of political economy but also dilated on the need of political liberty, carrying his doctrine fairly into fields which were so far closed and hemmed in by strong popular prejudice. Spencer interpreting the biological theory of evolution and applying it to social life, propounded the doctrine that the activities of the State should be limited to one of policing in order to allow the principle of natural selection to act on the social plane and work for the salvation of humanity. This doctrine was applied with even greater keenness but without the breadth of Spencer's vision by Walter Bagehot. It is admitted that much of the writing of Mill which was considered to be authoritative in his time needs great modification. But it is equally acknowledged that,

with all the shortcomings of his so-called hedonistic psychology, Mill succeeded in creating a real fervour among his contemporaries for freedom and liberty. His clarion call against the subjection of women is well known to have affected his contemporaries and his treatise, *On Liberty*, is even now a tonic of freedom. As Trevelyan observes: 'J. S. Mill on *Liberty* (1859) and on the *Subjection of Women* (1869) attacked the bondage of convention and proclaimed the rights of individual men and women to free life and thought, in a manner that may be taken as a turning point between the early and the later Victorian Age.' Dicey has called attention to the fact that Mill's *Principles of Economics* ushered in the era of collectivist thought.[16]

It is surprising that of the two forceful writers, who applied science to life and popularized it and who 'created culture for the lower classes', Trevelyan should mention only Huxley and totally forget Herbert Spencer. Routh thinks that though they did not produce much effect on practical reform yet they achieved far more than Ruskin, Morris, Hyndman and Reade. 'Their influence was strongest on the unprivileged class from which they had sprung. They showed these under-cultured and over-educated people how it was possible to be master of one's future. Whoever had neither the means nor the mood to worship the human spirit could worship scientific law. There were forces higher and more pervasive than culture and religion, under whose sway we are all equal, and these influences could be studied and applied to the betterment of man, not of classes.... No wonder the common folk heard such teachers gladly; they showed how you can refashion the world without being gentlemen.' It was Spencer who turned the theory of evolution into the doctrine of progress as regards social life. He declared: 'Progress is not an accident but a necessity. Instead of civilization being artificial, it is a part of nature; all of a piece with the development of an embryo or the unfolding of a flower. The ultimate development of the ideal man is logically certain—as certain as any conclusion in which we place implicit faith; for instance, that all men will die.' Between Spencer and Huxley the hope had been created that there was nothing impossible for civilization. The intellectual who was master of facts and figures had the key to the future. In Spencer the individualist tendency of the age stands almost caricatured. His life is a monument to energy and the middle-class contempt for pleasures and graces of life. In a way,

Herbert Spencer's life is a typical and representative replica of the life of the Victorian Age. About the sixties and early seventies, as Wingfield-Stratford observes, 'the worst faults of the Victorian middle class were exaggerated in Spencer, its Philistinism, its lack of culture and urbanity, its incapacity to philosophize—for who but Spencer would have dubbed his God unknowable, and then proceeded to know so much about him? Who but he would have succeeded in weaving his inherited prejudices so completely into the texture of the Universe? And yet the greatness of his blemishes does but serve to emphasize the greatness of Spencer's personality. There never lived a man more magnificently true to himself and his ideals... Carlyle might—or might not—have changed his attitude of defiance for one of worship, had he but realized that he was glaring into the eyes of a hero.'[27]

Many competent writers have sensed a change in the sixties and seventies that came over the nineteenth century. As Trevelyan remarks: 'On the whole, the most marked changes of tendencies in Victorian England may be ascribed to the later sixties and the seventies. The old landmarks are still there but they are no longer so prominent.' The Englishman had already lost some of his cock-sureness which was so rampant in the fifties.[28] In 1859 Mill brought out his treatise *On Liberty*, the publication of which his younger contemporary, Morley, has compared in importance with Emerson's address to Phi Beta Kappa Society delivered in 1837.[29] Darwin's *Origin of Species* was published in the same year. In 1860 T. H. Green began to teach philosophy at Oxford. About Green's influence his senior contemporary, Morley, has observed: 'At Oxford a leading mind between 1860 and 1880 was T. H. Green, a man remarkable both in mental power and influence. He first gave a shake to Mill's supremacy as logician and metaphysician. But, notwithstanding Mill's conviction that false philosophy is the support of bad institutions, his critic's intuitionist philosophy did not prevent Green from being an ardent reformer, with Cobden and Bright for idols.' Indeed Green's advent at Oxford was as great a portent as Mill's before him and even perhaps greater. By many Green is considered to be the greatest teacher at Oxford after Newman. No doubt it took a fairly long time for Green to supersede the influence of Mill, his hedonistic ethics, and his political individualism, and to substitute in its place idealistic ethics and social collectivism. All authorities agree that by

1880, that is two years before his death, Green had successfully established newer ethics, philosophy and politics. As Graham Wallas has observed: 'By 1880 Hegelian idealism almost became the official Oxford philosophy.' L. R. Farnell, who went to Oxford as an undergraduate about 1878, and who later became the Master of Exeter College and the Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University, has recorded his appreciation of the fluent lectures that Green used to deliver and the great influence that Green wielded. He has also told us that though a great master, later on, he dwindled into a sort of public-park speaker, when he had diverted his attention from thinking out systems of philosophy, ethics and politics to practical social work of a philanthropical nature. It is interesting to know the exact reactions of young Farnell to this aspect of the great philosopher and the inspiring lecturer. He observes: 'But the influence of the school was spread mostly by the oral discourses of Green at Balliol, with whom I maintained a fervent and unflagging intercourse for some three years; and I only left him when I discovered that he was beginning no longer to lecture but to preach, and that his discourses had in view, no longer the Absolute, but Bethnal Green.' The testimony of another philosopher, who went to Oxford as an undergraduate much later, in 1910, is even more important for bringing out the dominating influence not only on the higher thought of England but also the higher policy and schemes of practical amelioration which were set afoot in England during the thirty years, from 1880 to 1910. R. G. Collingwood observes: 'When I began to read philosophy there in 1910, Oxford was still obsessed by what I will call the school of Green: a philosophical movement whose leader was Thomas Hill Green and whose other chief members were Francis Herbert Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, William Wallace, and Robert Lewis Nettleship.... The school of Green sent out into public life a stream of ex-pupils who carried with them the conviction that philosophy, and in particular the philosophy they had learnt at Oxford, was an important thing, and that their vocation was to put it into practice. This conviction was common to politicians so diverse in their creeds as Asquith and Milner, churchmen like Gore and Scott Holland, social reformers like Arnold Toynbee, and a host of other public men whose names it would be tedious to repeat. Through this effect on the minds of its pupils, the philosophy of Green's school might be found, from about 1880 to about 1910, penetrating and fertilizing every

part of national life... the pupils of this school had gradually formed a block of opinion in the country whose members though not professional philosophers, were interested in the subject, regarded it as important and did not feel themselves debarred by their amateur status from expressing their opinions about it. As these men died no one took their place.' The writer of the biographical note on Green in the Fourteenth Edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* has presented an excellent summary of some of the ideas of Green, from which one sentence, regarding the idea of freedom that Green popularized, will clearly establish the importance of Green and of the year 1860 as the dividing line in English political philosophy. He remarks: 'Freedom is not a supposed ability to do anything but the power to identify one's self with that true good which reason reveals as *one's* true good.' This good can be achieved only through the realization of one's personality as a member of a group of similar personalities. The society and the individual are thus the obverse and the reverse of a whole unity. As regards the importance of Green's teaching he points out that it was the most potent philosophical influence, directly and indirectly, in England during the later nineteenth century. I have already referred to Somervell's opinion about the rise of collectivism in the sixties and seventies and here I need only mention his opinion that the philosophical basis for collectivism was provided by the Oxford school of philosophy, of which T. H. Green was the greatest teacher. Though these philosophers wrote rather difficult books yet they influenced a considerable number of the most influential public men of the next generation. He remarks: 'It is obvious that one cannot measure his [Green's] importance by the extent of the sale of his books.' This school of philosophy forming the basis of collectivist ideal propounded that 'the true function of statesmanship is to produce a community in which all the individuals shall, so far as is possible, be capable of living and free to live a good life'.[30]

In 1860 at the Oxford meeting of the British Association, Huxley routed Bishop Wilberforce, who was trying to laugh evolution out of court. In 1863, he published *Man's Place in Nature,* in which year was also published Charles Lyell's work, *Antiquity of Man.* In 1869 Huxley coined the word 'Agnostic' to denote a person who, as distinguished from an atheist, who denies the existence of a personal God, does not believe in it. By this time the new biology, between Spencer and Huxley, had

completely established itself and had begun already to affect the religious beliefs of the time. As Trevelyan observes: 'The "intellectuals" became more and more anti-clerical, anti-religious and materialistic under the stress of the conflict.' While Huxley played an important role in establishing the new biology as an item of culture, and in creating the new attitude towards individual's relations with the supernatural called agnosticism, he helped to counteract some of the extravagant doctrines regarding struggle for existence which Spencer was preaching. He clearly pointed out that in highly civilized societies 'the struggle for existence' had already been replaced by 'the struggle for enjoyment'.[31] Matthew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy* was published in 1869 which year also witnessed the publication of Mill's *Subjection of Women.* A year later appeared Morley's *On Compromise.*

The movement for the regeneration of arts and crafts connected with the names of William Morris and Rossetti was more or less in full swing by 1875. Another movement, whose object was also the re-enthronement of beauty in daily life, associated first with the name of William Pater, was started by him in 1873. It was a movement of art for art's sake. Pater for whom art gave an ecstasy advised his followers 'to burn always with this hard, gem-like flame, to maintain this ecstasy', for that was 'success in life', and 'to live in harmony with the highest'. Pater was acclaimed as a prophet by groups of young persons, who took up the cry that what mattered in life was art, and who came to be known as æsthetes. The movement is generally known as the Æsthetic Movement. While this movement under the guidance of Pater appealed to the higher nature of man and following it involved self-suppression, there was another great personality, Oscar Wilde, who believing in art for art's sake was against the 'cloistered virtue' of the apostles of beauty, such as Ruskin, Morris, and Pater, who exercised tremendous influence on this movement. This development of the movement of art for art's sake into the Æsthetic Movement of Wilde is generally considered to be an unfortunate accident bringing the whole movement into a kind of disrepute owing to the contribution of Wilde to the movement lying in the proclamation of 'the unimportance of some of the elementary rules of morality'. Wilde indulged in luxury as an art. All the pleasures from French cookery to liquors were to be indulged in. Under the influence of Wilde the Æsthetic Movement may be declared to

have turned itself into a movement for releasing Victorian inhibitions. At Oxford, Wilde began by casting scorn on manly sports and by affecting certain fashions in dress and decoration.

About the influence of the Æsthetic Movement on dress Laver observes: 'Few people will now deny that the female costumes of the late seventies were neither commodious nor particularly graceful. . . . The Æsthetes, if they had not been so peculiar, might even have succeeded in introducing a more rational style of dress and a better colour scheme.... On the whole it must be admitted that as a dress reform the Æsthetic Movement was a failure. It was never adopted by more than a fraction of the *intelligentsia*, although perhaps it did bring violent contrasts and too complicated dress-making into discredit and opened the way for the use of Liberty stuffs. Morris and Burne-Jones had never been associated with the more doubtful second phase of Æstheticism, and their influence continued to the end of the century.'[32]

Thus on the whole, a change in philosophy and spirit, costumes and manners, ideals and practices must be considered to have come about in the Victorian Age at about the late sixties or the early seventies. As we have already seen, Somervell, Wingfield-Stratford, Routh and Trevelyan are more or less agreed that the greatest achievements of the Victorian Age had already been made by 1870.

It is necessary to review briefly the principal features of the Victorian Age or of the nineteenth century, as this period may be called, because it happens to be the period of middle forty years from 1830-70, before we proceed with the description of the changes and the actual happenings consequent thereon, that marked the last twenty or twenty-five years of the century. We find that serious writers on political and economic subjects preached with almost unrivalled eloquence the supreme reign of *laissez faire* and individualism. They were supported by some historians whose writings were brilliant and popular. Individual liberty and freedom became the centre of their doctrine. Seriousness was the prevailing tone of their preaching. On the other hand, in the earlier part of the period the serious writers were opposed by a number of great literary writers—who were so great that they had earned the title of prophets even in their lifetime—and were also supported by brilliant historians who laid bare the iniquities of the economic system and the extravagances of political individualism and

who preached either openly or in a veiled manner the doctrine of the hero and the great man, the theory of greatness of the State and its responsibilities towards its weaker citizens. One of the critics finding artistic feeling and achievement at a low ebb preached that the 'regeneration of society could lie only through art. Writers of imaginative literature generally supported these writers by their satirical or sympathetic pictures of the actual drudgery of contemporary life, its iniquities, its sins and vices. It was towards the end of this period that a great philosopher, T. H. Green, a great literary critic and poet, Matthew Arnold, and a great statesman and author and a deep student of the eighteenth-century great men, John Morley, made trenchant criticism of the prevailing doctrines and practices. Amongst them the contribution of the philosopher was the greatest. I have quoted contemporary and later opinions which show that for over thirty years his idealistic sociology having ousted the utilitarian and biological sociology of Mill and Spencer not only ruled over the minds of the élite and the intellectuals but also guided the practical activities of a number of politicians and statesmen. The creeds of both Matthew Arnold and Morley—strange to say in rather apparent opposition—insisted on earnestness and seriousness being made the guiding star of intellectual life as well as of daily activity. I have already quoted the opinions of Wingfield-Stratford, and Routh characterizing the literature of this period as some of the greatest that was ever produced in Britain. I have referred to the stupendous nature of the works undertaken—some of them accomplished—by writers and intellectuals. I have also drawn attention to the great avidity with which the general public was consuming not only the imaginative literature but also the serious, the historical, and the scientific literature, whatever its volume. It is clear thus that the contributing intellectuals and the reading public were almost in tune with one another. The ideal type of the period is a gentleman not so much by birth but by the possession of moral qualities which Newman insisted could result from intellectual culture. On the other hand, it must be pointed out that the same public was declared by a critic of the age to be self-complacently indulgent in their miry existence and was characterized by him as the Philistines. Gilbert Murray's description of the nineteenth century as a cosmos[33] in contradistinction to the chaos of the first quarter of the twentieth century can only be understood to bring out the

contrast between the steady and traditional working faith in a complacent life which offered plenty to the middle classes of the nineteenth century and the life of tension and discomfort which became the lot of many in the years of World War I and thereafter. Self-complacency is helped in a very significant manner by the era of unusual plenty and prosperity that was ushered in England by the establishment of the Industrial Revolution and the expansion of colonial possessions.

Cultural shortcomings of this period are further proved by the history of art and architecture. Though we have learned from the writings of Ruskin and Morris in particular that in the England of this period there was a general decline of craftsmanship, yet it should be borne in mind that Alfred Stevens, the sculptor of this age, was enough of a craftsman to be described as having demonstrated his all-roundness characteristic of the Italian Renaissance artists. In 1848 William Holman Hunt and Millais formed the Pre-Raphaelite brotherhood which Rossetti and Edward Burne-Jones joined. The Pre-Raphaelite Movement in art is regarded as an almost purely British development signifying independence from continental influence. The work of the artists, though interesting, cannot be ranked as supremely great, and their main achievement must be considered to be in the refinement of design and the introduction of colour and beauty in articles of daily life.[34]

In architecture the attempt at Gothic revival is declared by competent authorities to be a failure. Architects of this period were unable to devise a new style. The total result was the jerry-built buildings with some kind of ornaments applied to them. H. W. Corbett speaks of architecture being at a low ebb throughout the nineteenth century. He observes: 'While painters, writers, and musicians were preoccupied with developing new forms of expression, architects, both in Europe and America, were chiefly concerned with adapting, and much too often awkwardly adapting, the old. . . . Fresh conceptions in mass or line were unknown until its end.' He finds the explanation of this in the phenomenon that between two great periods of art there is inventive stagnation. The abrupt changes that were coming about in the ways of life stimulated the painter or the writer but were too rapid for the architect. And he finally puts part of the blame on the contemporary population, which had no 'special taste or knowledge of what constitutes the beautiful'. Howard Robertson, who thinks that English

domestic architecture, which has throughout served as the most continuous tradition and, therefore, the best form of national expression, fell away from its position for once in its history during the nineteenth century also, seeks the explanation of its disgrace in the quality of the population. He remarks: 'Architecture reflected the human characteristics of the time and these were not of the type which would promote beautiful quality in architecture.' He notes that Webb and Morris started a reaction against the prevailing neglect of the national art. Wingfield-Stratford thinks that there was one great man who would have been an eminent architect, as his book, which had fallen into contemporary neglect, reveals. The author of it is one W. V. Pickett, who was probably set aside as a crank by his generation. Of all persons this crank had an idea that his contemporary age required a clean sweep of the old architectural ideas, and had understood the qualities of steel for the kind of architecture that was needed for his age. Thus did it come about that, in the words of Corbett, 'the nineteenth lost to the twentieth century what might have been a claim to architectural distinction'. Trevelyan attributes the cheap ornamentation of English architecture of this period to the distortion of Ruskin's teaching as it reached the lower classes and the craftsmen. Craftsmanship having declined and the real secret of architecture, namely proportion, having been lost, the people, who held on to their job without having read the books of Ruskin but having had some knowledge of them by hearsay, could not do better.[35] We thus see that of the great arts the literary art was at a high pitch, painting was at the middle pitch and architecture at the lowest pitch, in this great period of Victorian Age.

Corbett offers an explanation of this phenomenon in terms of the limited capacity of human beings to absorb the arts. He points out that from ancient times to the early renaissance the arts of design were to the forefront; thereafter flourished literature, 'the fine arts including architecture became secondary and have so remained'. Secondly, he thinks that the success of democracy and the utter disappearance of feudalism removed the aristocratic support to beauty which was a mark of superiority. He observes: 'When class barriers were broken down wealth and power passed from an aristocracy, which had employed and inspired artists as a necessary adjunct of its position, to any individual, irrespective of training or background,

who could grasp them.' The third reason for this backwardness he finds in the development of the technique of art and the progress of science and invention.[56] To my mind the last two arguments do not at all meet the case. At least in the part of the century, with which we are dealing, at present, science had not made such an onslaught as to impede the growth of arts. Further, if the population was ready to patronize great literature, not only imaginative but even serious, not only in small compass but in ponderous volumes, there should have been sufficient wealth in the hands of sufficient number of citizens for some great art to be patronized. And as Corbett admits, and as I have already pointed out, it is not that all plastic arts were at a low ebb but only architecture. The true explanation of this phenomenon of non-convergence of greatness in all arts should be sought for in the limited exaltation of this age as a period of civilization.

As I have already stated, at the end of this period, that is to say, the late sixties and the early seventies, a change is felt. The utter individualism which reigned supreme is being countered by collectivist philosophy, complacency and philistinism are challenged by reason and culture, the application of science to extreme individualism is being tempered in favour of mutual aid. Preaching of the spirit of craftsmanship is being transmuted into regeneration of æstheticism. On the other hand, science is developing into agnosticism, religious feeling getting a setback, however mild. Though as regards the actual personalities of the élite and the intellectuals, there is hardly any change—Tennyson, Browning, Darwin, Huxley and Spencer, George Eliot and Matthew Arnold, Morris and Swinburne, Millais and Rossetti having continued to dominate the scene—there is no new great man on the horizon except Green in philosophy.

As Routh opines, it was about this time that the age of extravagance and self-indulgence had begun to dawn in a nation of Puritans. In imaginative literature, there begins an emphasis on individualism, on 'the complete unfolding of the creature', without nipping his passions. Meredith is never wearied of telling his readers that unconscious repression of one's self will lead to disastrous consequences. Another writer, George Gissing, appeals to the sense of tragedy in his readers. He dwells on the importance of money for the cultivation of culture; for to him 'civilization has turned culture into the

poor man's curse'. If one seeks money one has to sacrifice culture and if one must have culture one must first have money. Such being the dilemma in the mind of Gissing, money is presented by him as the source of all good. Samuel Butler also pointed out that money was the root of all power, though his theory did not catch the public conscience till towards the end of the century.[37] The eighties and the nineties evinced little appreciation for either Gissing or Butler but they began to live and think as if they believed in both. The Victorians of the earlier period having gone into business and politics wholeheartedly, had neglected their individualities. The younger generation naturally tended to revolt against it. It began to think in terms of self-development rather than of conformity. There were a large number of people who had the money made for them by their predecessors and, therefore, looked to it from the point of view of spending. As a result of these circumstances life began to be changed. The young man made a cult of society. Social functions were converted into parades. Luxury-trade naturally flourished. Manners and extravagances came to be cultivated as a fine art. The influence of the æsthetic movement is one more factor that materialized about this time and strongly influenced young people.

By the eighties a new generation of intellectuals was rising in revolt against everything that was held in respect by the middle class and the word 'bourgeoisie' was already becoming a term of positive insult. It is clear that the class which had already begun to lose its complacency had almost lost faith in its own ideals. Its self-respect was, therefore, distinctly on the wane. Matthew Arnold had branded this class as Philistines. Thackeray had charged them with snobbery. Now Du Maurier once again renewed Thackeray's charge. The great Victorians had been dropping off fast during these years. Darwin, Carlyle, Browning, Matthew Arnold, Rossetti, Beaconsfield and Bright had passed away. Newman and Ruskin were in such utter old age that they were as good as gone. Tennyson was still there but was an exploded force. Yet in serious literature stars of the first magnitude had flashed in the firmament or were still shining. Green had already held the field and had taught for twenty years a new scheme of ethical philosophy. Jowett had re-interpreted Plato. Great constitutionalists were revealing the growth of the English constitution. The brilliant Maitland was interesting people in medieval life and in juris-

prudence. Huxley was still writing. In physical science the great Cambridge physicists Clerk Maxwell, Rayleigh and Thomson were raising Cambridge and England to—or rather keeping England in—her high place in Physics. In imaginative literature Morris, Wilde, Butler and Meredith, Stevenson and Hardy were still contributing or had begun to contribute; and all of them, excepting Wilde, though opposed to orthodox religion were as deeply serious as the early Victorians. Yet as Trevelyan has observed: 'In the nineties, the *fin de siecle* as the time was called, a change in the direction of levity, if not of laxity, was observed, due no doubt in part to the gradual crumbling of definite religious beliefs with which a strict and slightly ascetic moral code had been associated.' Wingfield-Stratford summarizes this period in a chapter headed 'Culture in Canary'. With the death of Tennyson, the last of the Victorian giants, there was a consciousness of new living, with the younger writers—a large proportion of whom squandering their energy died young—attempting to teach their generation. The period, therefore, appeared to be rich in promise and is sometimes referred to in flattering term as the 'Renaissance of the Nineties' instead of in the deprecatory term, 'the naughty nineties'.[38]

It is interesting to note some of the characteristics of this period. I have already referred to the extreme doctrines and practices of the Æsthetes with their pose that 'nothing in this world was worth taking seriously'. It was a doctrine of releasing inhibitions that surcharged the atmosphere, as the reformers were revolutionaries and extremists. It was the swing of the pendulum from the extreme of the earlier Victorian doctrine of being earnest to the other extreme, which proved later to be a false start. If the earlier Victorians had treated chastity sentimentally the newer ones lavished their sentimentality on much worse items such as alcoholic poisoning and promiscuous sex. They were yet to learn the lesson that character is not built up without inhibition, as integrated personality is not formed without some forgetting. It is interesting to note that Wingfield-Stratford sees 'a profound moral resemblance' between the art of Beardsley and the prose of Aldous Huxley. Literature told 'the same tale of restless activity, of new ways explored, of ancient idols de-throned'.[39]

This is the period when a reduction in the size of the family among the middle class begins to appear. Simultaneously the

new woman begins to emerge. As a result of complex circumstances, partially as the consequence of Mill's advocacy of woman's cause, partially as the result of the new industry and new scope afforded by it to woman, and again as the effect of the free education which was imparted under the Act of 1870, woman had started emancipating herself. She began to be more athletic, indulging in lawn tennis. The bicycle had begun to be fashionable, further liberating woman by opening up the countryside to her either alone or in the company of the complementary sex.[40]

The passion for sport, which has been aptly described as 'the great outlet for superfluous energy', was so great that Wingfield-Stratford entitles one of his chapters, describing the life of this period, as 'The Apotheosis of Sport'. If sport is an outlet for superfluous energy for the active participants, it is a release from boredom to the spectators, who may be described as vicarious participators. In the form of clapping, shouting and such other emotional responses they release the psychological tension which accumulates as a result of monotonous work carried on in modern industry. In the early part of the century, the aristocracy was trying to fulfil some social function as organizers of entertainment and sports. But the regular capitalization of sport leading on to its modern developments may be traced to its beginnings in this period. Great cricket was played; but far more important was the professionalization of football. Teams were hired and put in opposition to provide the maximum of excitement for industrial workers, so much so that in the words of Wingfield-Stratford, 'a Cup-tie match was a gladiatorial contest, brought up-to-date with the killing part cut out'. The final Cup-tie drew as many as 65,000 spectators to the Crystal Palace in 1897. The middle class imported into England the Scottish game of golf for providing relaxation for both sexes. About 1893 mixed hockey was introduced, and soon became the rage. Mixed hockey, played with costliest apparatus that money could buy, was an adjunct of tea and was accompanied by a number of niceties of etiquette. But as with other sports this leisure affair of tea-party hockey soon developed into a technical affair of hockey with high standard, more or less the monopoly of amateur specialists. It is curious to notice that if seriousness in other activities of life was declining, in the domain of sport it was steadily growing. As Wingfield-Stratford has observed: 'The drift was

already setting, at the end of the century, towards a deadly seriousness of both sexes in the pursuit of what had once ranked as pleasure. If you presumed to meddle in games, you must be an expert or nothing.' Farnell has pithily recorded the advent of sport or of the athletic movement, which he calls 'the national fatuity of games-worship', particularly at the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge between 1874-81. Our age in his opinion may be distinguished as 'the motor-age, and the games-age'. By 1890 the progress of the movement in the Oxford University was great indeed. Farnell thus describes its effects: 'As the games-cult waxed in its intensity, I felt for many years that our academic intercourse both with our juniors and seniors became somewhat flatter and duller and there was a flagging of interest in intellectual conversation.'[41]

Sport and levity, work and ideal, combining to throw up the new woman, impressed themselves unmistakably on the dress of the period. As Laver tells us, they laid the foundation as a new æsthetic, viz. that of functionalism. He remarks on the existence of a curious unity in the general lines of fashion between 1890 and 1899. The main change in the fashion of female dress took place between 1880 and 1885. Throughout the nineties skirts were of a more or less uniform shape, being 'smooth over the hips and flaring out widely at the head'. Sleeves were the only changing items of fashion. Regarding the designation of the nineties as the 'naughty nineties' Laver's observations are rather interesting. 'It is probably merely a matter of alliteration that the nineties rather than the eighties or the nineteen hundreds should have earned the adjective "naughty"; yet naughty they are in the retrospective imaginations of most people who have any taste or flavour of an epoch.' This was largely due to the final effervescence of Æstheticism.[42] It should be noticed that though the period is characterized as one not only of levity but even of laxity, and as the culmination point of the doctrine of 'art for art's sake' and of the cult of 'living one's own life without nipping one's passions', yet the guiding principle in female dress is provided by the new enthusiasm and new ideals, such as sports, athleticism and professionalism. May we see in this the shadows cast by future? May we interpret this as the triumph of functionalism over æsthetics? May we infer from this the victory of materialism over idealism?

Looking about for the actual life during the century one may note the opinion of Trevelyan that an individualist commercialism, an individualist religion, somehow produced a self-reliant and reliable type of men who were good citizens though they were Philistines. All circumstances had combined to make drunkenness and heavy expenditure on drink one of the major evils of city life. Drink had become one of the chief concerns not only by reason of the ruin it brought on families but also by foreboding ill for the society as the chief cause of crime. The great caricaturists began their work of showing up the evil as early as 1847. In later years an organized and fairly successful attack was made on the drink habits of the people. In the seventies the Temperance Party became a power to count with in liberal politics. This led to the reaction in the drink-interests being organized by the brewing companies. In the last decades of the century they virtually captured the Conservative Party. But teetotalism as a movement and practice had come more or less to stay. As a practice it was helped by the increasing amenities through various amusements that were being offered. Ultimately the brewing companies and the drink-interests discovered that their wider interest required them to accept some policy of control in the management of the public houses. This was no small triumph for the ideal of purification, for the cause of amelioration and the spirit of social service. It established the principle of restraint and was an indirect homage to higher ideals.[43]

Humanitarianism made itself felt slowly but surely in a number of aspects of life one after another. 'It softened the rude and often brutal temper of the past' and fostered instead 'a cheerful benevolence of heart sometimes running to sentimentality'. Though the movement for the abolition of slavery may be said to have begun a little earlier it was in this century that it aroused real popular enthusiasm leading to its ultimate abolition. Abolition of slavery is a true moral victory for the human spirit. To Jethro Brown the story brings 'new faith in the possibilities of the human race'.[44]

One of the fields in which this humanitarianism manifested itself in the form of enlarged sympathy was the treatment of children. Though these feelings were not universal and were rather slow to be concretized in legislation and practice, yet on the whole their achievement, however little it may be, is regarded by Trevelyan as 'one of the chief contributions made

by Victorian England to real civilization'. The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children was founded in 1844.[45]

In the matter of securing the political rights to the vast number of the population, that this period made a supreme contribution to the source of possible fullness of life is very well known. The development of Local Self-Government, giving a sense of corporateness and of solidarity, through the excitement of the feeling of local patriotism, and creating a consciousness of the control of one's people over one's life, is a special gift of this age to modern civilization.

No less important—as a matter of fact, the necessary corollary and the essential condition of success of the political measures in the field of central and local government—was the advance in education. Between 1870 and 1891 various pieces of legislation were passed by which latter date primary education was made compulsory and free for all. Women's colleges were also being founded, making it possible for women to take higher education. On the other hand, the universities realized the need of extending facilities of some kind of education to a larger and wider public than came to its portals. The University of Cambridge began its extension lectures in 1873. The extension lectures were the forerunners of the tutorial classes for working men and of the Workers' Educational Association of the twentieth century.[46]

Factory legislation is another ameliorative factor more fully developed in this century. Factory Acts beginning in 1802, achieving their first decided triumph in 1847, developed into the Labour Code known as the Factory and Workshop Act of 1901. As Dicey has observed: 'The modern Labour Code is the fruit of more than 40 enactments extending over the great part of the nineteenth century.'

Even in the matter of religion and its repercussions on political rights, law and practice were slowly but surely liberalized.

Perhaps it was in the matter of Criminal Law that the best spirit of humanitarianism took its shape or bore its fruit. As Dicey remarks: 'If capital offences have been reduced from at least 160 to 2, this humanization of our law is the consequence of a series of Acts dating from the beginning of the nineteenth century, and passed for the most part between 1827 and 1861.'

In the matter of the care of the poor, too, some advancement was registered during this century.[47]

It is well known that the sound foundations of social work were laid during this century by men and women who are generally regarded as some of the noblest and finest spirits that have ever worked in the cause of humanity. Elizabeth Fry carried on the work of John Howard in regard to prison reform. Florence Nightingale, during the Crimean war, organized the first nursing service and laid the foundation of a noble profession, which has so selflessly tended suffering humanity and lightened its misery. Octavia Hill, following the advice of or taking her cue from Ruskin, started housing reform and provision of houses for poor classes. Peabody donated a large sum for building proper tenements for the London labouring classes, in whose welfare there was another great spirit, Charles Booth, showing keen interest. Canon Barnet and Arnold Toynbee between them founded the University Settlement and started the University Settlements Movement. It is perhaps symptomatic of the spirit of the times that Count Rumford, who first organized philanthropy, was also instrumental in helping to found, in 1799, the Royal Institution of London and appointing thereto Sir Humphry Davy as a lecturer.[48] The lectures at the Royal Institution have been some of the most popular in science that have ever been delivered. And in the nineteenth century there was a regular succession of brilliant lecturers who popularized science—Davy, Faraday, Tyndall.

It is no wonder that Trevelyan passes the following judgement on the humanitarianism of the nineteenth century. 'The changes of feeling were a striking improvement upon all past ages. As the nineteenth century grew older humanity pervaded more and more all the dealings of life, particularly the treatment of children. The advance in humanity, far more than the boasted advance in machinery was the thing of which the nineteenth century had best reason to be proud; for in the wrong hands machinery may destroy humanity.'[49] Gilbert Murray evaluating the nineteenth century and entering a caveat against the criticism of its earnestness by such writers as Lytton Strachey, concludes that there was one real weakness of the Victorian Age or the nineteenth century and that defect is one which is generally an aspect of great virtue. He observes: 'It was so creative that it forgot to criticize. It was so sanguine that it overlooked flaws and dangers; so confident in its achievements that it preferred to acquiesce in a comfortable faith rather than vex its spirit with the search for a strictly consistent philosophy.'

It will be observed from what has been written so far that the age did not lack profoundly critical spirits, on the other hand, in the earlier part and even in the middle part, the period is very strong in critics who were so great that some of them have by common consent been declared to be prophets. Towards its end too it had its critics, the bigger and older ones in the persons of Meredith and Hardy and the newer ones in the persons of H. G. Wells and Bernard Shaw. It was not, therefore, a deficiency in criticism or a forgetfulness of its theory and practice that this age is conspicuous for. It is known rather for its confidence in its achievements and its unwillingness to be moved out of a comfortable faith. Observers have remarked on the economic prosperity that till then was unimaginable or inaccessible, on the plenty of various good things of life, on the remarkable freedom from war and continuity of peace which gave the age not only the appearance but the flavour of a cosmos. Only small groups, touched to the quick by some prophet or brilliant practitioner such as Ruskin and Morris or Pater and Wilde, moved outside their grooves in pursuit of a fresh ideal. As Murray himself observes, in contrasting the nineteenth century with the twentieth century, 'the Victorian era was in the main a cosmos, an ordered unity', though not a complete one.

When Murray tells us of achievements of the Victorian Age he is evidently thinking only of the middle period. Its chief attributes, according to him, are (1) its care for life in preference to thought, producing abundant and fine life by unambitious thought; (2) its care for morals and religion but not for metaphysics and theology; (3) its reticence in art and literature which led their practitioners to ignore dirt, obscenity and 'all the multitudinous vibrations of meanness, spite, and sensuality below the threshold which so enchain and almost monopolize the attention of many modern writers'. With its gigantic creative power it created a vast literature in which these things were practically absent; (4) it had an immense faith in goodness, in beauty and in the future of mankind. I have already observed the working of some of the characteristics as they appeared in individual lives or in movements or as they were concretized in legislation. And regarding the literature, I have also stated the views of some literary historians, making it clear that in the last decades of the century this literature was showing precisely the tendencies which Murray says were practically absent and which in reality were absent in

the literature of the middle great period.[50] As a matter of fact, as I shall show with the help of the opinions of other critics and scholars and of a survey of its activities, the twentieth century was a continuation, only in an emphasized form, of the last decades of the nineteenth century.

The century which at the end of its first quarter started on the quest of culture as the elixir which would vitalize civilization and divest it of its material drawbacks, which would turn it into a spiritual entity, ended in a failure to achieve it. The endeavour of the high spirits did not go completely waste or unheeded. Some of the worst features of industrial civilization were softened through legislation. Foundations of a more corporate and socially integrated life were laid. Humanism, sympathy and urbanity gained strength. Along with them, however, also developed a certain laxity, some levity and the beginnings of externalization of pleasure, militating against an endeavour to cultivate and realize higher values. The problems of our age are truly the problems created in the nineteenth century. They appear, and even are, larger owing to the change in the general tempo. Culture as their solvent, though preached, was not sought after and found by the bulk of the nineteenth century population of Britain. We shall see if the twentieth century pursued the quest or realized it.

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CHAPTER III

WHAT IS CULTURE?

EMERSON, MATTHEW ARNOLD, AND JOHN MORLEY ANSWER

Emerson

C. G. SHAW contributing the article on Culture in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* informs us that we owe the term 'culture' to Bacon. Though the concept was handled and further developed in Germany and also in France, in the English language, it appears, it was Emerson who first resuscitated the concept in 1837. His address, *The American Scholar*, contains his scheme for the promotion of national culture. He discusses therein the influences of nature, literature and activity on the development of culture and emphasizes the scholar's role therein.

There are three other essays by him—one on *Culture*, one on *Civilization* and one on *Progress of Culture*, contributed at various times, which directly deal with this problem, while there are at least five or six others such as *Society and Solitude*, *Social Aims* and *Behaviour*, which are indirectly concerned with the same topic. His essay on *Culture* which forms part of the book, *The Conduct of Life*, opens with the sentence, 'the word of ambition at the present day is Culture'. In the next sentence Emerson has put his unerring hand on the pulse of the century and that too almost at its very beginning. Culture, he points out, is a corrective to the theory of success, power, and wealth which is the pursuit of the contemporary world. Individuality is the basis of this culture. Individualism is secured by nature in the case of great men by associating it with egotism. Culture provides a corrective against this egotism by opening a range and variety of attractions and thus enabling the individualist to redress his balance. Culture warns such a person against exaggeration and the dangers of repulsion and solitude. In brief, it fosters geniality. For the inculcation of culture we must begin with education, so that every fine soul is provided with culture. In the notion of culture books form a large part. Quiet manners are another ingredient of culture. But intellectual quality is perhaps a more important aspect of culture. Culture opens the sense of beauty without

which man is beggarly. Cheerfulness and repose which are the badge of a gentleman are also the ingredients of culture. But, above all, culture must heighten the skill in eloquence, in politics, trade and useful arts of the practitioners, because by culture they get an insight of the whole. There are higher secrets of culture which are seen in the life of those who are adepts. Though, for such men, there are no hatreds and though they value men as only channels for power, those who aim high cannot go on being merely amiable.

In the essay on *Progress of Culture,* which is an address delivered in 1867, he particularly refers to the contribution of America to the progress of culture, whereby he mostly means the progress of science. He refers to natural science as the principal characteristic of the nineteenth century and points out that the chief benefit from this devotion is metaphysical. It fosters one characteristic of the human mind, its capacity for truth. The foundation of culture is moral sentiment which in his opinion is helped by natural science. Natural science is part and parcel of culture because culture reveals to the mind its own powers.

Civilization is a certain degree of progress from man's rudest condition. Nobody has given a definition of the concept, nor does Emerson propose one. He sets down only the indices to civilization. Position of woman is one, for example. And diffusion of knowledge is another. In regard to the latter attribute, it must be pointed out that Emerson predicates it of culture too, thus equating civilization with culture. Commenting on this index, he remarks: 'Another measure of culture is the diffusion of knowledge overrunning all the old barriers of caste, and, by the cheap press, bringing the university to every poor man's door in newsboy's basket. Scraps of science, of thought, of poetry, are in the coarsest sheet, so that in every house we hesitate to burn a newspaper until we have looked it through.' As other attributes of high civilization he mentions complex organization, achievement of technical skill, and the management of the prison as reformatory and 'manufactory of honest men out of rogues'. Yet civilization which depends on morality is not complete unless society is founded on moral basis. Everything good in man depends on what is higher. He quotes with approval the following definition of moral conduct given by Kant: 'Act always so that the immediate motive of thy will may become a universal rule for all intelligent beings.'

Gloating over the material aspect of civilization, as he does in this and the last essay, his views about civilization will thus be seen to be predominantly moral and humanistic. He exhorts his fellow men 'to work rather for those interests which the divinities honour and promote, Justice, love, freedom, knowledge, utility'; for '*the true test of civilization is, not the census, nor the size of cities, nor the crops,—no, but the kind of man the country turns out*'.* And again he observes that the moral and intellectual advance is in reality the vital refinement of mankind. Moses, Buddha, Socrates, Jesus, Savonarola and Luther, are persons who have been causal facts carrying forward humanity to newer convictions and refining their rule of life. As a corollary of this, personal liberty is an essential attribute of civilization. The morality and individual liberty thus promulgated and achieved by individuals must be reflected in the corporate group, the State. In conformity with the common ideas of his times, Emerson provides a criterion for gauging the public action of the State in its duty of 'securing the greatest good of the greatest number' as 'the highest proof of civility'.

In two other essays—*Social Aims* and *Behaviour*—Emerson insists on the importance of manners which, in his words, are 'the happy ways of doing things'. Manners can reveal the asymmetry, if any, in our mind and character. Manners do not necessarily mean hypocrisy. For our conversation must be both happy and sincere. Nor do they imply self-assertion. Power in address must be accompanied by grace. Manners do imply petty sacrifices. The basis of civil and polite society is: 'manners, conversation, and lucrative labour, and public action, whether political or in the leading of social institutions.' He is proud and hopeful about American society, about which he observes: 'We have much to regret, much to mend, in our society; but, I believe, that with all liberal and hopeful men, there is a firm faith in the beneficent results which we really enjoy; that intelligence, manly enterprise, good education, virtuous life, and elegant manners, have been and are found here, and, we hope, in next generation will still more abound.' In *Social Aims*, he refers to the provision of the élite in the European society through hereditary nobility. The class as a whole he finds was so far trained in the great arts of life that continuity of customs, certain external culture and good taste, were properly provided for. But heroism and manliness were

* Italics mine.

not necessarily hereditary. And ease and wealth corrupted the stock. In *Society and Solitude*, he has attempted to strike the balance between individuality and sociability. He insists that society must be enjoyed in small doses; for, 'if solitude is proud, so is society vulgar', and 'solitude is impracticable and society fatal'. The exact balance is struck, he says, when 'we keep our independence, yet do not lose our sympathy'.

Matthew Arnold

*Culture and Anarchy** by Matthew Arnold was published in 1869, the year in which John Stuart Mill published his famous essay on the *Subjection of Women*. In its sub-title it is described as an essay in political and social criticism. As we have seen, the whole question whether or not the advance in material heritage that was registered for over fifty or sixty years had justified the hopes and anticipations, which were entertained about it, was agitating some of the best and most influential minds of the first half of the nineteenth century. That Matthew Arnold felt impelled to write this book is clear indication that, in spite of their best efforts, the labours of some of the greatest writers had gone waste. Arnold was both a poet, and a highly educated, almost classical, literary critic. Naturally we find a good deal of flourish in the book. Whatever the merits of the book as a permanent contribution to English thought, and though the need of culture was already stressed by a senior poet, essayist and philosopher from the other side of the Atlantic, Ralph Waldo Emerson, the peculiar flavour of the term culture and its currency in literature was very largely the result of the clarion call sounded by Arnold through this book.

As Arnold himself has told us in his preface, the scope of his essay is 'to recommend culture as the great help out of our present difficulties; culture being a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world; and through this knowledge, turning a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and habits, which we now follow staunchly but mechanically, vainly imagining that there is virtue in following them staunchly which makes up for the mischief of following them mechanically. This and this alone is the scope of the essay.'

* It ran into its twelfth edition by 1909, and has been reprinted at least five times by one publishing house alone. There is also another edition of the book.

What were the difficulties which Arnold set about troubling himself over and resolving by his remedy of culture? He informs his readers of the dangers and inconveniences to which English literature is exposed in the absence of any central authority such as the French Academy in France for setting the standard of taste. He finds that 'sensitiveness of intellectual conscience' is lacking among his compatriots who reveal 'disbelief in right reason' and 'dislike of authority'. He is quite emphatic that contemporary England was in the bondage of machinery, that his compatriots were prone 'to value machinery as an end in itself, without looking beyond it to the end for which alone, in truth, it is valuable'. He declares that freedom 'was one of those things which we thus worship in itself, without enough regarding the ends for which freedom is to be desired. In our common notions and talks about freedom we eminently show our "idolatry of machinery".' He points out that the prevalent notion most rampant amongst contemporary Englishmen was that 'it is the most happy and important thing for a man merely to be able to do as he likes'. 'On what he is to do when he is thus free to do as he likes, we do not lay so much stress.' It is thus seen that what Arnold found lacking in contemporary theory and practice was a standard of reference or the ideals for which freedom was desired and towards which free action was to be directed.

Analysing the population into three classes, he declared that the leading class is an aristocracy and like all aristocracies does not relish the idea of the State being a greater authority than itself. The middle class is the great representative of trade, and in religious matters airs dissentient opinions. Its guiding maxim is 'every man for himself in business; every man for himself in religion'. It does not desire to see a powerful administration interfering with its cherished liberties. The third section of the population is the working class, which he thinks, is 'the very centre and stronghold of our national idea, that it is man's ideal right and felicity to do as he likes'.

Describing the aristocracy of his time he designates the class by the name of Barbarians. The Barbarians, from whom the English aristocracy has sprung, were strong individualists and evinced passion 'for doing as one likes for the assertion of personal liberty' and by their example spread this notion through the whole people. The Barbarians again had passion for field sports which they had successfully handed down to

the whole people. They had manifested an extraordinary carefulness for procuring and preserving vigour, fine complexion and good looks. They had cultivated chivalry 'with its characteristics of high spirit, choice manners, and distinguished bearing'. But Arnold declares that 'all this culture of the Barbarians was an exterior culture mainly. It consisted principally in outward gifts and graces, in looks, manners, accomplishments, and prowess.' The inward qualities that they possessed and exhibited were only such as were the adjuncts of their exterior culture. They were : 'Courage, a high spirit, self-confidence.' He finds that the contemporary representatives of the Barbarians, the aristocracy, exhibited, making allowances for differences of time, more or less the same characteristics. There was amongst them 'an insufficiency of light' and among their feminine half the need of 'a shade more soul'. The characteristic of this class, which stands out most prominent, is lack of intelligence and unaptness 'to perceive how the world is really going'. A member of this class has no ideas, nor even seriousness to offset the lack of ideas. Aristocracies are best suited to govern in 'epochs of concentration' but not in an 'epoch of expansion'. The contemporary period being an epoch of expansion, ideas are more in evidence than serenity and high spirit or distinguished manners and dignity. The class has another attribute, viz. 'their natural inaccessibility, as children of the established fact, to ideas', which would entitle them to the designation of the next class, viz. Philistines. But he desists from giving that designation to them in the interests of clarity of thought and ease of comprehension, and in view of certain extenuating circumstances. He is, therefore, not prepared to hand over to them the authority of the State as the representative of 'the right reason of the nation'.

The Philistine is 'the enemy of the children of light or servants of the idea' and as such is a title peculiarly appropriate to the middle class. A Philistine conveys the notion of something 'particularly stiff-necked and perverse in the resistance to light and its children'. The middle class lives 'on the machinery of business, chapels, tea-meetings, and addresses' from people of their own class, opposed to the Roman Catholic Church. They are best represented by the commercial members of the Parliament and the fanatical Protestant Dissentients. Its great strength is its 'seriousness' which may prove its 'salvation'. The main body of Philistines, being industrialists absorbed

in the fun of fortune-making and of 'exaggerated industrialism', is sacrificed to it. The class does not mind both tediousness and rawness. It was the middle-class liberalism of this class which Newman, with his Oxford Movement, attempted to fight but failed to quell. Its cardinal beliefs were : the belief in the 'Reform Bill of 1832 and Local Self-Government, in politics; in the social sphere free trade, unrestricted competition, and the making of large industrial fortunes ; in the religious sphere the dissidence of dissent and the Protestantism of the Protestant Religion'. He is so impressed with the 'hardness and vulgarity of middle-class liberalism' and 'the hideous and grotesque illustrations of middle-class Protestantism' that he believes, that the Oxford Movement of Newman must have contributed a good deal to 'swell the tide of secret dissatisfaction which has mined the ground under the self-confident liberalism of the last thirty years and has prepared the way for its certain collapse and supersession'. He instances some of the spokesmen of liberalism including Bright and points out that they generally dwelt on the number of rail-roads which the Philistines had constructed, or 'the bigness of tabernacle' they had built, emphasizing that they had done it all 'with their energy, self-reliance and capital'. The middle classes are marked by certain complacency as is evidenced by the topics of speeches mentioned above as well as by their comments on the need of education for their class. They believe in 'resting and being' and not in 'growing and becoming'. Such a class excludes itself naturally from being considered for wielding the authority of the State. If any further disqualification of this class were necessary, it is pointed out that it is singularly lacking in tact or consideration. As an example, he quotes a speech of a member of this class in the midst of an irritated population of Catholics in which the Roman Catholic Mass and the Roman Catholics of Ireland were both roundly condemned.

The third section is the working class, being 'pressed constantly by the hard daily compulsion of material wants, is naturally the very centre and stronghold' of the idea that 'it is man's ideal right and felicity to do as he likes'. Members of the industrial middle class look forward to the happy day when they would be joining the business of Government by their brethren from this class, which he designates Populace and sometimes calls democracy. The section of the populace which

is likely to join the middle-class ranks may be set apart. There is another part of the working class also whose aims are more or less the same and must, therefore, be numbered to belong to the Philistine class. This part, though it is the target of the activities of philanthropists, yet is energetic enough to organize itself through trade unions and other means. It seems to constitute 'a great working-class power independent of the middle and aristocratic classes'. By dint of numbers it hopes to share with the Philistines the governance of the country. This section too, properly speaking, having the same ideals and believing in 'industrial machinery and power and pre-eminence and other external goods' must be marked off from the rest. There is a third section, however, which by far is the largest and which 'raw and half-developed has long lain hidden amidst its poverty and squalor and is now issuing from its hiding place to assert an Englishman's heaven-born privilege of doing as he likes and is beginning to perplex us by marching where it likes, meeting where it likes, bawling what it likes, breaking what it likes'. It is properly to this section that he gives the name of Populace. It is the members of the Populace that seem to have worked the ire of Matthew Arnold by their Hyde Park rioting. This class is told that the material civilization that the country enjoys has been made with their 'hands and sinews'. For a long time this class, under the influence of feudal habits, used to appreciate subordination and show deference to the upper classes. 'The modern spirit has now almost entirely dissolved those habits and the anarchical tendency of our worship of freedom in and for itself, of our superstitious faith, as I say in machinery, is becoming very manifest.' The Reform League looks upon this working class as possessing 'the brightest powers of action' and thus entitled to the authority of the central State. This class has no distrust about itself. He refers to their doings in Hyde Park as evidence of their readiness to take upon themselves the functions of Government. Looking to the intemperate manner of the talk and lack of experience of Government among the members of this section Arnold fails to find any legitimate ground for vesting the central authority of 'right reason' in the class.

With all the differences subsisting between these classes it must be understood that there is something common to all of them. Thus every Englishman is a combination of the attributes of all the three classes in varying proportions, and his class is

determined and designated only by the preponderance of its characteristics. To all these three classes belong the common characteristic of believing that the happiness of an individual consists in doing what his 'ordinary self' likes. So marked is this characteristic that anyone, like the author of the essay, for example, who ceases to believe in the particular felicity and likes to refer the basis of his behaviour to wider principles is generally looked upon as an alien and has a rough time in his life. Another important point that must be borne in mind is that the characteristics of the populace are really an abstract attribute of general application and may crop up anywhere. Wherever it crops up the possessor of it must be termed to have the spirit of the populace in him. He remarks that 'every time we snatch up a vehement opinion in ignorance and passion, every time that we long to crush an adversary by sheer violence, every time that we are envious, every time that we are brutal, every time that we adore mere power or success, every time we add our voice to swell and blind clamour against some unpopular personage, every time that we trample savagely on the fallen', we show the eternal spirit of the populace. It is clear from this that much of what we call mean, irreligious or unethical, is looked upon by Arnold as the ordinary activity of the populace and is condemned by him as the opposite of culture.

What is it that agitated Arnold and led him to exhort his compatriots? First and foremost, he informs us that nine out of ten Englishmen of his time believed that the greatness of England and the welfare of its people were proved by the riches of England; that the English people instead of regarding wealth as a means looked upon it as an end. The very incomplete perfection in religious life which their religious organizations have enabled them to attain they complacently look upon as complete perfection. They fail to comprehend the truth that beauty and sweetness are essential attributes of a complete human perfection. He characterizes the middle-class liberalism of his time as hard and vulgar. The new democratic force that was arising and superseding that liberalism could not rightly be judged at that time. The worship of freedom and individual liberty to do as one likes, whatever its merits or demerits in the past, had become very dangerous in his time, as the working class, which was more or less outside the influence of those doctrines, had appropriated them. The whole thing was leading to anarchy. He observes:

'The outbreaks of rowdyism tend to become less and less of trifles, to become more frequent rather than less frequent; and that meanwhile our educated and intelligent class remain in their majestic repose, and somehow or other, whatever happens, their overwhelming strength, like our military force in riots, never does act.' He also notices the strangely contradictory behaviour of the English public towards the Irish question. Whereas Englishmen are entitled to the assertion of personal liberty, it is almost taken for granted that the non-English Irish have no right to it. He finds that of the contemporary 'real human thought' English thought itself is not the most significant factor. The political leader instead of setting up a high standard of 'right reason' before his electors is prepared to 'accommodate himself as much as possible to their natural taste for bathos'; nay, he even goes to the opposite extreme of trying to flatter his electors by attributing to them a 'relish for the sublime'. Everything in the political life of the country is calculated to prevent the notion of a paramount right reason from ever arising in the minds of the people. It is suggested that in following freely their natural tastes somehow or other the people will be led to right reason. The particular form of philosophy preached by the newspapers he calls 'a peculiarly British form of Atheism' and 'a peculiarly British form of Quietism'. He remarks: 'A kind of philosophical theory is widely spread among us to the effect that there is no such thing at all as a best self and a right reason having claim to paramount authority, or, at any rate, no such thing ascertainable and capable of being made use of.' The whole philosophy and practice of life tends to prevent 'the erection of any very strict standard of excellence, the belief in any very paramount authority of right reason, the recognition of our best self as anything very recondite and hard to come at'.

With this notion of the populace and his diagnosis of his times we are in a position to understand his fundamental idea about culture. It must be stated very emphatically that culture is not motivated either by curiosity, exclusiveness or vanity as its disparaging critics try to maintain. Neither is culture imbued with fierceness, nor is it addicted to abstract systems. Culture does not consist in developing one of our sides to the disregard of harmonious development. Nor is it a fanaticism in any regard. Culture does not necessarily mean action nor does a believer in culture take to despondency and violence.

Culture is 'a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world; and through this knowledge, turning a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and habits, which we now follow staunchly, but mechanically'. It is entirely an inward operation. True human perfection being harmonious, culture must mean developing all sides of our humanity and 'total perfection' must involve 'developing all parts of our society'. Naturally such an endeavour should be thoroughly disinterested. It involves seeing things as they really are. Culture is intended to produce 'sweetness and light and not turn out miners, engineers or architects'. The study of perfection cannot be guided merely by the desire to see things as they are, nor is it 'possessed by the scientific passion', but is also moved by 'the moral and social passion for doing good'. The social side of culture is stressed through the exhortation to make the Will of God prevail. It is also stressed through the aspect of culture being a total perfection; for such 'perfection is not possible while the individual remains isolated. The individual is required, under pain of being stunted and enfeebled in his own development if he disobeys, to carry others along with him in his march towards perfection, to be continually doing all he can to enlarge and increase the volume of the human stream sweeping thitherward.'

Now what is perfection? The main attributes of perfection according to Arnold are 'beauty and intelligence' or 'sweetness and light'. Working for 'sweetness and light' is making 'reason and the Will of God' or the dictates of one's best self and 'right reason' always prevail. Culture then in terms of historical civilizations implies a judicious combination of Hebraism and Hellenism, the former stressing *strictness of conscience*, the latter emphasizing *spontaneity of consciousness*. Though this is the trend of thought elaborated by Arnold, making his culture a component of Hebraism and Hellenism, yet it must be observed that he looks upon the Greeks 'as the great exponents of humanity's bent for sweetness and light united, of its perception that the truth of things must be at the same time beauty', which inclines one to look upon his 'culture' as the same thing as the Greek theory and practice of life. For the time being there is greater need of Hellenism or 'the habit of fixing our mind upon the intelligible law of things' for thereby alone will we be able

to see that 'the only absolute good, the only absolute and eternal object prescribed to us by God's law, or the divine order of things, is the progress towards perfection—our own progress towards it and the progress of humanity'. As the standard of reference is our best self and not any self, it will be an impersonal and harmonious standard. The Hebraic standard or the ideal of Hebraism is made a component of his idea of perfection, although Hebraic ideal is 'declared to confine perfection within narrow limits, as an ideal to be restored not today but tomorrow'. For 'to walk staunchly by the best light one has, to be strict and sincere with oneself, not to be of the number of those who say and do not, to be in earnest,—this is the discipline by which alone man is enabled to rescue his life from thraldom to the passing moment and to his bodily senses, to ennoble it, and to make it eternal'. This ideal culture should lead its practitioners to 'absolute inward peace and satisfaction, —the peace and satisfaction which are reached as we draw near to complete spiritual perfection, and not merely to moral perfection, or rather to relative moral perfection'.

If we ask the question what is culture going to achieve for us, we are told that the only 'sure authority' being 'right reason' which culture alone can secure for us and by doing so place us in possession of a source of sure authority. The public, instead of following the opinion of the literary organ of its own section either in the matter of information or taste, would be able to apply an absolute standard thereto. Culture will thus enable us to prevent the future from being vulgarized. It will enable the people to assign to their proper places renovators of society, systematizers of social life, ideal planners of the future, such as Bentham, Comte, Buckle and Mill. At the same time with its 'inexhaustible indulgence' and its 'consideration of circumstances', 'the severe judgement of actions joined to the merciful judgement of persons', it will be able to withstand fierceness and fanaticism. Culture seeks to do away with classes, men of culture being the true apostles of equality. The great men of culture, such as Abelard in the Middle Ages, and Lessing and Herder in Germany at the end of the eighteenth century, have a passion for humanizing knowledge—'to make it efficient outside the clique of the cultivated and learned, yet still remaining the *best* knowledge and thought of the time, and a true source, therefore, of sweetness and light.' Culture will bring home to us the lesson that we have only duties and no rights, and that

if *'liberty is the law of human life'* is one valid maxim, *'renouncement is the law of human life'* is another, which is equally true. The believer in culture will neither indulge in violence nor in despondency. Nor will he very much enter actively into public life or undertake direct political action. To sum up: culture provides us with 'a much wanted principle, a principle of authority, to counteract the tendency to anarchy which seems to be threatening us'.

We have already seen that in the opinion of Matthew Arnold a cultured man has no right to be despondent and cannot afford to be violent. We have also seen that rowdyism, which is an aspect of violence, is also discountenanced by the theory of culture. It is inherent in the theory of culture as opposed to the rank individualism of Arnold's times, as the quotation above demonstrates, that even the one-pointed pursuit of anything is taboo under it. Fanaticism is very nearly related to one-minded and one-sided pursuit of something. The theory of culture discourages fanaticism of this sort as Arnold has made clear by his remarks against Buckle. Culture does not encourage a person to be actively connected with direct political action.

On the positive side the theory of culture postulating the reign of right reason and providing the principle of authority not only counteracts any tendency to anarchy but is expected to establish harmony. Culture, in short, in Matthew Arnold's opinion, being the discovery and putting into operation of the 'will of God', of the 'intelligible law of things' is like religion. Nay, it is even superior to religion in so far as it aims at a harmonious expansion of all the powers of human personality. As Arnold remarks: 'Here culture goes beyond religion, as religion is generally conceived by us.'

Two important corollaries follow from this theory of culture: one, entirely concerned with self and the other, with one's projection on the social plane. As far as one's self is concerned, the man of culture will come to believe with firm conviction 'that the intelligible law of things has in itself something desirable and precious, and that all place, function and bustle are hollow goods without it'. On the social plane, a man of culture will cultivate an attitude towards so-called reforms which is likely to be misunderstood. It is likely to be interpreted as a 'spirit of cultivated inaction', though in reality it is a comprehensive search for a true remedy and, therefore, a coun-

sel of suspension of judgement and action till the search is over.

There is a frequent appeal to right reason underlying the theory of culture. There is also a reference to some central authority. Who is to be the repository of right reason? Who is to discharge the function of attempting to relate actions of individuals in a society to larger aims, to wider ideals? The theory of perfection lays down positively that all individual values, all individual exertions and activity, must be related to the larger aims and wider ideals. It is clear that there must be some individual or individuals, group or groups, which must be authorized to lay down or to interpret these larger ends or wider ideals. There must be also some authority to judge, when the ideals are made clear, whether individual actions are in the direction of achieving those ideals, whether individual exertions do not tend to weaken the ideals or even to undermine them. Arnold does not entertain high opinion about the Press or about the political leaders elected to the Parliament or local authorities as mentors and prescribers of standards and ideals. Having characterized the aristocracy as Barbarians and the middle class as Philistines, and having concluded that contemporary English thought and literature was not of a very high order, it is really a problem for Arnold, the urgency and piquancy of which he does not seem to have realized. Wherever he has to postulate the repository of right reason, wherever he has to posit authority in opposition to anarchy, Arnold mentions the State. He observes: 'This common reason of society looks like our best self or right reason to which we want to give authority by making the action of the *State* or nation in its collective character the expression of it.' He points out that in France the action of the State on individuals is even more preponderant than in Germany where it already was great. He quotes with approval the following words of Renan on State-action: 'A Liberal believes in liberty and liberty signifies the non-intervention of the State. *But such an ideal is still a long way off from us, and the very means to remove to an indefinite distance would be precisely the State's withdrawing its action too soon.*' He wants the State to be powerful because settled order alone makes for any programme of amelioration which is worthwhile having. Our right reason seeks to strengthen provisionally the authority of the executive power, to establish the State, or 'organ of our collective best self, of our national right reason' for facilitating

whatever changes are needed just as much as to preserve an established order. He poses the problem as to how to get this State to sum up the right reason of the community and give effect thereto. He is aware that in answer to this question or in the solution of this problem he is likely to be caught by his enemies, the opponents of culture. But he is determined to 'elude them'. Convinced that none of the three principal classes of the community were fit to form the State or capable of being the 'centre of light and authority', he proposes that his countrymen should rise 'above the idea of class to the idea of the whole community, the *State*',—his countrymen who, in his own admission, have 'the idea of a country as a sentiment', but hardly any idea of the State as a working power. In other words, because in his opinion 'by our *best self* we are united, impersonal, at harmony', his countrymen ought to follow the suggestion of culture that the basis for a firm State-power, not being available in our ordinary selves, should be enthroned through our *best self*. Thus we see that in eluding his enemies Matthew Arnold has deceived himself into the belief that he has answered the question, how to create the State that will be the repository of the right reason of the community. The question is not at all answered. And it is a crucial question.

Exhortation to make culture the arbiter is excellent and may be accepted by a large number of people. At the same time they are entitled to ask the relevant question as to how to find out the 'best self' as opposed to the ordinary self of one's self, which culture postulates ought to be enthroned over the ordinary self. This natural question is as difficult to answer as it is easy to formulate. Nor has Matthew Arnold attempted to give an answer to it. Under the circumstances, the alternative approach to gaining of knowledge as to how the enthronement of culture will actually affect our decisions regarding social and other questions, of opinion and conduct, that are presented to us from time to time, is to examine critically the writer's decisions, if any, on such questions. Fortunately for the readers of Matthew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy*, the author has enabled them to judge of the utility and capacity of culture to help in the matter of such decisions, as he has given his judgements on four different religious and social questions, which were some of the burning topics of his day.

The first topic, in fact the most burning religious question

of the day, was connected with the attitude of Nonconformists towards establishments and endowments for religion. The Church-establishment in Ireland was, in the opinion of the Nonconformists, contrary to 'reason and justice' in so far as it was the Church of a small minority of the people. It was proposed, therefore, that the Church in Ireland should be disestablished. Matthew Arnold points out that what was being used to disestablish the Irish Church was not power of 'reason and justice' but the power of Nonconformists' opposition to all Church-establishment. He has no difficulty in arguing on pure religious grounds that congregational worship was the most effective form of religious practice and that according to the preaching of Christ, though our thought on the intellectual aspects of Christianity may be left to be fostered individually according to the capacity of the individual, the worship was to be collective. The contemporary attitude to disestablishment of the Irish Church was thus an example of 'simple, practical, common sense reform aiming at the removal of some particular abuse and rigidly restricted to that object', and not one where the theory and practice of culture were applied to arrive at a proper decision on the matter.

Another question, which was hotly debated and on which Matthew Arnold has given his judgement, is the proposal to enable a man to marry his deceased wife's sister. Though today this question may appear to be an entirely social one, in the atmosphere of the times of Matthew Arnold it had also a religious aspect. Arnold is opposed to such freedom being granted, and is in favour of the *status quo*. In attempting to establish his position as the correct one or the proper one, he appeals more to sentiment than to anything else. He does not seem to have followed his own rule of culture which enjoins upon its practitioners the duty of consulting all the best that has been written or thought on the subject, regarding which they are called upon to give their judgement, before they actually do so. He does not seem to have consulted any literature bearing on the practices connected with marriage—the extent of prohibited degrees—even among his favourite people, the Greeks. And yet he opines very boldly and dogmatically in a jeering manner against the proposal as being 'a kind of first instalment, or public and parliamentary pledge, of the great sexual insurrection of our Anglo-Teutonic race'. This apostle of culture believes that by appealing to sentiment he has

disposed of the arguments. It is interesting to know the kind of sentiment, the popular feeling on the matter, enlisting thus popular prejudice in his cause, that he brings forward as a ground of opposition. He remarks: 'And his true humanity, and therefore his happiness, appears to lie much more, so far as the relations of love and marriage are concerned, in becoming alive to the finer shades of feeling which arise within these relations, in being able to enter with tact and sympathy into the subtle instinctive propensions and repugnances of the person with whose life his own life is bound up, to make them his own, to direct and govern in harmony with them the arbitrary range of his personal action, and thus to enlarge his spiritual and intellectual life and liberty, than in remaining insensible to these finer shades of feeling and this delicate sympathy, in giving unchecked range, so far as he can, to his mere personal action, in allowing no limits or government to this except such as a mechanical external law imposes, and in thus really narrowing, for the satisfaction of his ordinary self, his spiritual and intellectual life and liberty.' It will be observed that in this long sentence there is nothing but a verbose repetition calculated to make an appeal to the popular prejudice or to the popular tradition subsisting in society which likened one's wife's sister to one's sister. If culture, in the hands of this apostle of culture, is capable of this reasoning, we doubt if any lovers of culture will have any chance of convincing society that culture, with such a kind of arbitration, has a value which is worthwhile having, or that the practice of culture will lead to intellectual harmony and international amity. This apostle of culture felt so strongly against the proposal to allow a person to marry his wife's sister that in spite of his admiration for Hebraism as the twin sister of Hellenism, making up the complex he calls culture, he calls in the aid of ideology of race, utilizes the belief—his own as well as that of his contemporaries—in the superiority of the so-called 'Indo-European race' over the Semitic people. He declares: 'Who I say, will believe when he really considers the matter, that where the feminine nature, the feminine ideal, and their relations to them, are brought into question, the delicate and apprehensive genius of the Indo-European race, the race which invented the Muses, and chivalry, and the Madonna, is to find its last word on this question in the institutions of a Semitic people, whose wisest king had 700 wives and 300 concubines?'

The third question on which we have his definite pronouncement is what was called the Real Estate Intestacy Bill, which was purported to prevent the land of a man dying intestate from going to his eldest son only and to enable it to be distributed equally among all his children. He is opposed to the reform and his main argument is an appeal to the past and the reiteration that children have only duties and no rights.

There is one more problem, a contemporary problem, on which Matthew Arnold brings to bear his theory and practice of culture ; and that is the belief that free trade and unrestricted growth of population was good. He points out that the argument that free trade increases the trade, business and population of the country is not a sound consideration as these are 'machinery', or means, and as such mere fetishes. He has no difficulty in proving—and here it should be remembered that he was in the direct line of Carlyle and Ruskin—that the cities and the manufactures which are the results of free trade policy were after all not such good things as deserved multiplying. Looked at from the viewpoint of men's well-being they were hardly salutary. He calls in question some of the Malthusian doctrines of population and opines that some of the checks on the growth of population, are not self-acting laws and really require for their operation some 'planning'. He points out that the fact that one person in nineteen was a pauper did not speak much for the Liberal policy of free trade and free growth of population.

It will be seen that Matthew Arnold has not followed the dictates of his method of culture in his approach to all the contemporary problems which he has attempted to solve by its application. This does not establish the limitations of the theory of culture but rather the faults of Arnold's own appreciation of his method. It must be remembered as Graham Wallas has pointed out in reference to Arnold, that 'every advocate of an intellectual method is bound to illustrate his argument by himself using his own method, and is bound to make mistakes in doing so. But Arnold did not give his method a fair chance'. Arnold seems to have taken his lesson from his Prussian experience to make what Graham Wallas has told us is a psychological criticism of Mill's political thought, particularly his idea of liberty. He frequently appeals to 'right reason' Newman too brought in 'right reason' for his support. His whole plea in the *Idea of a University* is for knowledge which

will mature right reason. Right reason, however difficult it may be to define or cultivate it, is no doubt the only reliable guide to opinion and action.

John Morley

*On Compromise** by Morley, whom H. A. L. Fisher counts among the prophets, is a book whose subject-matter is intimately connected with problems arising in the practice of culture, though it does not directly deal with it. Morley is directly concerned with the individual's duty to formulate right opinions, to act up to them and to promulgate them. In discussing these three aspects he starts by insisting on the need for principles with reference to which alone opinions can be formed and action launched. Finally the central qualities on which civilization depends have to be made the terms of reference. Thus the problems discussed are intimately connected with the maintenance of civilization and their solution is nothing but an essay on the principles of conduct of a man of culture.

As it has been described, this essay, as the author calls the book, is an uncompromising critique against compromise. The question that the author raised to himself is one of great importance and is concerned with 'the right of thinking freely and acting independently'. The author seeks to decide under what circumstances this right becomes a positive duty, what are the limits of dissent in opinion and in behaviour, what are the principles, if any, that should guide us regarding the practice of compliance. In answering these questions Morley starts by stating that though there are some common rules regarding compromise and conformity yet their application is very varying.

Preachers still go on assuming that to cling to truth and right under all circumstances is an imperative law. Yet in practice a certain amount of compromise is not only expected but generally yielded. That is exactly the reason why the word fanatic has become a term of reproach. It is, therefore, clear that the chief emphasis must lie on the drawing of proper boundaries. We must be able to give guidance which will enable the people to distinguish and separate 'wise suspense in forming opinions, wise reserve in expressing them and wise tardiness in trying to realize them, from unavowed disingenuousness and self-illusion, from voluntary dissimulation, and from indolence and pusillanimity'.

* Published some time in 1870. A new edition appeared in 1877. Since then till 1917 it had run into its thirteenth reprint in an edition by one publishing house alone.

In his contemporary England he discovers the national characteristic of a profound dislike of and a deep distrust in general principles in full bloom in spite of there being a number of intrepid truth-seekers. He finds that the habit of refusing any practical authority to general principles and the disposition to judge philosophic truths by political tests is tenaciously held by the people. The opposition between principle and expediency has been pushed to such lengths that the contemporary practice values 'the paramount wisdom of counting the narrow, immediate, and personal expediency for everything, and the whole, general, ultimate, and completed expediency for nothing'. He points out that in reality, 'principle' is only another term for 'one of these larger expediencies', and that such an attitude towards principles or larger expediencies indicates that people are utterly engrossed with the interests of the day and are averse to consideration of the larger interests of the future. In short, it means that it is a life of narrow vision. Taking examples from politics, he contrasts the German's attitude towards his fatherland, or the Spaniard's loyalty to God, or the American's enthusiasm for and belief in the high destinies of his people, or again the Frenchman's aspiration for enlarging life with the hopes and desires of contemporary Englishman. He observes: 'What stirs the hope and moves the aspirations of our Englishman? Surely nothing either in the heavens above or on the earth beneath. The English are as a people little susceptible in the region of the imagination.' If Englishmen were not strong in imagination, they were at least strong 'in their hold of the great emancipating principles'. He asks the question, is it possible that the old protestant spirit has exhausted itself? It is not merely the ordinary people that evince the attitude analysed above but even the people who ought to lead are not free from it. And what is worse is that when something really great is done it is done in such a tardy spirit that it loses much of its grace. In the opinion of Morley, this is not a sign of a nation's greatness or even of health. He observes: 'The decisive sign of the elevation of a nation's life is to be sought among those who lead or ought to lead. The test of the health of a people is to be found in the utterances of those who are its spokesmen, and the action of those whom it accepts or chooses to be its chiefs.... It is a commonplace that the manner of doing things is often as important as the things done.'

He tells his readers that during the last forty years England had lost one by one all her enthusiasms, which had given a clear proof that an Englishman believed in certain general theories and made them his guides to practical conduct. In short, the lofty idealism had departed and petty-minded practicalism had taken its place. 'Immediate social convenience' had come to occupy the first place in the national life and 'respect for truth' the second. That surely led to the lowering of the national life. He points out the paradoxical position that whereas accurate reasoning and correct conclusions were cultivated in physical science, the same was not the case with morals and politics. Further, one of the results of the party politics of the time was to force a member to subordinate his principles, if any, to the policy of the party. Thoroughness is considered to be a mistake, conviction a cumbrance, thought of tomorrow a positive nuisance. The result may better be stated in Morley's own words: 'No zeal, no faith, no intellectual trenchancy, but as much low-minded geniality and trivial complaisance as you please.' The general mental atmosphere is anything but invigorating.

As regards the causes of this weakening of the mental tone, he points out that one of them was the 'exaggeration of the political standard as the universal test of truth'. Another and a deeper cause he finds in the influence over contemporary thought and sentiment was the growth of the Historic Method. The devotees of that method are far more concerned with the pedigree of a custom or an idea than with its value. Though, therefore, there is no necessary reason why a systematic use of this method should lead to such results, yet in practice men shirk fundamental considerations. He observes: 'Men easily come to consider clearness and positiveness in their opinions, staunchness in holding and defending them, and fervour in carrying them into action, as equivocal virtues of very doubtful perfection, in a state of things where every abuse has after all had a defensible origin.' The third cause of the state of affairs, Morley discovers in the newspaper press, which he characterizes as the 'huge engine for keeping discussion on a low level, and making the political test final'. He is so much impressed by the role of the Press in lowering the standard that he thinks that the policy of taxation which enabled the newspaper press to flourish had indirectly taxed heavily sound and independent opinion. It has led to

stamping out of all individuality in public judgements. His appraisal of the press of his time deserves to be noted carefully, as it is similar to later evaluations of the newspaper press of subsequent times. He observes: 'It has done much to make vulgar ways of looking at things and vulgar ways of speaking of them stronger and stronger, by formulating and repeating and stereotyping them incessantly from morning until afternoon, and from year's end to year's end. For a newspaper must live, and to live it must please, and its conductors suppose perhaps altogether rightly, that it can only please by being very cheerful towards prejudices, very chilly to general theories, loftily disdainful to the men of a principle.' There are other causes also deeper than these, such as the increase of material prosperity and decline in sincerity of spiritual interests. Conscientiousness has lost its energy and personal responsibility its edge. The system puts a premium on hypocrisy.

The only remedy for stopping the national deterioration is to prepare ourselves for our liberation through discarding 'small calculations and petty utilities', as the guiding stars of our conduct. The resolution 'to search for the highest verities, to give up all and follow them, must first become the supreme part of ourselves'.

This being an inquiry concerned with ascertaining the measure, if any, which should be allowed to existing facts to overrule ideas and principles in case there is opposition between them, it is necessary to begin with the discussion of the theoretic possibility that even error may have utility. It is necessary to determine whether the more enlightened classes in a community, when they have achieved light on any question or doctrine, are justified in going by their light silently and privately; whether further they are justified not only silently holding their views opposed to the prevailing views but also in encouraging openly the belief in and the practice of the doctrines by the less enlightened sections of the community, which they themselves have been able to transcend by the light of their reason and which, therefore, they no longer consider to be true, because they think belief in and practice of it by the classes which have not realized their error is very useful to these classes. It is necessary to evaluate the attitude that while thinking one doctrine true one may preach its contrary as being morally beneficial. It is suggested that the

unlearned may morally benefit by their belief in the wrong doctrine. Thus when culture rationally develops, a belief in the supernatural becomes impossible for some. It is suggested that they may discard the belief; but at the same time it is exhorted that they shall not meddle with the belief of the common people. He quotes Renan as supporting such an attitude and gives a very concrete instance. The learned people do not believe in hell and rightly so; but they are expected to keep the fiction for the lower classes, it being a useful device to keep them to the strict path of morality. It is this theory which is brought in all discussions regarding the difference between compromise and hyprocrisy. As against this view Morley sets down his firm conviction that 'erroneous opinion or belief in itself and as such can never be useful' and suggests by quoting Condorcet's opinion that every change from false to true opinion must be attempted to be produced with prudence. He then takes the arguments in favour of the dual behaviour and has no difficulty in disposing of them. Out of these I shall select for consideration one which appears to be most formidable. It is pointed out that opinions which are discovered by the learned to be false may be so intimately integrated in the whole life of the people that to pick out one or two false opinions and to substitute true opinions instead may result in the breaking up of the coherent wholeness of the person, i.e. his character. If this result ensues, hardly any service to the man, or even to the true opinions, can have been rendered. Morley rejoins, that this way of looking at the substitution of false opinions by true ones ignores the caution that such an attempt must be made with prudence. A wise teacher can proceed by approaching first of all the people's general ways of thinking and thus will begin the process by implanting the correct opinions so as to fit them in in their general ways of thinking and allow them to jettison their false opinions as a result of the ferment. Nor is it true that the kind of perfect coherence that is postulated for the sake of argument exists between reason, affection and will among the population at large. And further so long as an element of character was based on an error the whole product was vitiated. In measuring utility we have to remember that the present is not the only time and existence or being is not the only mode of living. There is such a thing as future growth and progress. He concludes by observing: 'If we have satisfied ourselves on good grounds

that the doctrine is false or the motive ill-directed, then the only question we need ask ourselves turns solely upon the possibility of breaking it up and dispersing it, by methods compatible with the doctrine of liberty'.*

Having disposed of the doctrine of two castes and dual behaviour, he probes the question of intellectual responsibility by bringing out the degrading consequences to the character of the person who compromises. Intellect must be considered to have a sensitiveness of its own. When it is employed in the service of mean purpose, when it is operated without the concept of sanctity of fact, it begins to lose its finer quality. He remarks: 'It has been often said that he who begins life by stifling his convictions is in a fair way for ending it without any convictions to stifle.' He affirms his belief that opinion alone can effect permanent changes and deduces from it the conclusion that the potent force must be honest and independent. He takes some examples from the political field to illustrate the relative position of opinions held by a party and its leader. Since it is not sufficiently realized that the potent force of opinion must be kept honest and pure, sometimes a party is praised for its tact if it allows itself to be forced out of its convictions by its leaders just as much as a leader is eulogized if he allows himself to be led into the opinions of his party. In Morley's opinion, not only in the political but also in the other spheres as well, 'it is worth while "to scorn delights and live laborious days" in order to make as sure as we can of having the best opinion, even if we know that this opinion has an infinitely small chance of being speedily or ever accepted by the majority, or by anybody but ourselves. Truth and Wisdom have to bide their time and then take their chance after all. The most that the individual can do is to seek them for himself, even if he seek alone. And if it is the most, it is also the least.'

There cannot be any compromise in making up one's own mind. When it is the turn of this opinion to be translated into action it may be, and very often is, necessary to consider the prejudices of the majority, to observe self-restraint and to be conciliatory. It is because of such inherent necessity of social life that 'a society is seldom at the same time successfully energetic both in temporals and spirituals; seldom prosperous

* Readers of the *Bhagavadgita* will recognize that Morley has here discussed the precise problem which Lord Krishna has discussed and finally upheld as *Lokasangraha* with just the opposite conclusion.

alike in seeking abstract truth and nursing the political spirit'. He refers to the men of the past, of the era of Protestantism, who had the conviction that their salvation depended upon their having true beliefs. The eighteenth-century philosophers of France too, though their daily lives can hardly be declared to be lofty, sincerely believed in the duty of intellectual responsibility. He cites the examples of Voltaire and Diderot, who would not, and could not be tempted away from their sincere opinions. He further instances the Oxford Movement as being in England the latest attempt on a considerable scale 'to suppress the political spirit in non-political concerns'. He thus characterizes the movement: 'It was, what every sincere uprising of the better spirit in men and women must always be, an effective protest against that leaden tyranny of the man of the world and the so-called practical person.'

He sees and raises one objection to his insistence on a man's duty to form correct opinions even if he were not going to put them into practice, nay even if he was not prepared to express them. Forming correct opinions under such circumstances is a troublesome task; and why should a man take all this trouble? His answer to this question is very characteristic. He says: 'Opinions do not come to naught, even if the man who holds them should never think fit to publish them.' He points out another important aspect of intellectual opinion, viz. its influence on character. Serious reflection on questions, social or spiritual, tends to increase one's dignity without lessening one's humility. It is these opinions that shape one's ideals, which inspire conduct. A grasp of principles, to which an attempt to form correct intellectual opinions must lead, is at the very basis of coherency of character. He points out that the political creed of Liberalism would be much the better for it, if its champions were to apply the underlying theoretic ideas more and more to matters of practical reform. It is worth while to mention some of the ideas which he considers fundamental to Liberalism. One such idea is 'that contented acquiescence that has come down to us from the past is selfish and anti-social, because amid the ceaseless change that is inevitable in a growing organism, the institutions of the past demand progressive readaptations'.

Such an attitude of intellectual responsibility about one's opinion naturally raises the question of tolerance for the opinions of others. Morley is satisfied that the benign appearance of tolerance was only a cloak for the reality of indolence and

timidity. It indicates want of settled opinions and, what is worse, a lack of desire for such. Tolerance, to be proper tolerance, must be clearly distinguishable from indifference. There are three attitudes one can take up towards any important problem : one may affirm it, one may deny it or one may require more evidence either to deny or affirm. But he finds that in his contemporary England on such important questions as those of God and Soul, his countrymen were trying to harmonize contraries. I may close this discussion of intellectual responsibility in Morley's own concluding words: 'The law of things is that they who tamper with veracity, from whatever motive, are tampering with the vital force of human progress.... We have to fight and do lifelong battle against the forces of darkness, and anything that turns the edge of reason blunts the surest and most potent of our weapons.'

While it is the duty of man to arrive at correct ideas and opinions and hold them irrespective of the approval or disapproval of persons around him, when he proceeds to carry this out in actual conduct of life the position is much different. There are good reasons for him to adopt a more pliant attitude. Society in which he lives is an ancient and composite growth and the opinions, ideas, customs and institutions have a deep root in the minds of the contemporary generation. And it is not given to all, even if it were possible, to see the incongruity or the futility of some of the contemporary customs. It is, therefore, necessary for one who has seen light to be patient with his time. He must remember that 'men and women have to live. The task for most of them is arduous enough to make them well pleased with even such imperfect shelter as they find in the use and wont of daily existence.' And this is in a way good. Quoting from Herbert Spencer about the compromising characteristic of English life he warns that the compromise referred to is the resultant of divergent forces and is not laid down as a practical duty.

A discussion like the present regarding the fundamental principles of conduct in order to be fruitful must be founded on some accepted theory regarding the social union. In this connection Morley lays down his theory of civilization. He observes: 'The history of civilization is the history of the displacement of old conceptions by new ones more conformable to the facts. It is the record of the removal of old institutions and ways of living, in favour of others of greater convenience and

ampler capacity, at once multiplying and satisfying human requirements.' Compromise under the circumstances can be of two types. It may be the deliberate modification or suppression of an idea or an opinion to harmonize with the current doctrines, which is the wrong kind. Or it may be rational acceptance of the fact that one's contemporaries are not prepared for the new idea or opinion and the consequent determination to hold the opinion personally without forcing or even expecting others to do the same. This is the proper and justifiable kind of compromise. In so far as this kind of compromise establishes the fact that at least one individual transcends the prejudice and proclaims the fact, there is possibility of a change for the better, which is the essence of civilization. It is possible that such a person may be reproached as being impracticable but Morley points out that as abuses and bad customs will not remove themselves but will have to be removed by some such persons who have the intellectual integrity to discern the right idea or cultivate the right view and the resoluteness and persistence to express and carry out in one's personal life the right view and the right opinion, there lies a special responsibility on the person or persons who realize the right opinion or view to proclaim and even practise it because 'in all cases the possession of a new idea, whether practical or speculative, only raises into definite speech what others have needed without being able to make their need articulate'.

In matters of political life the province of compromise is much wider for 'all government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue, and every prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter'. But even here it must be remembered that the compromise resulting in a small and a temporary improvement must be so arranged that this small improvement, however small, is in the direction of the second instalment whenever it comes, otherwise the compromise would have failed in its main purpose. The considerations governing political practice do not apply to the conduct of individual lives, either in the matter of expression of opinions or in that of actually putting them into practice. If individuals who have seen light shirk from their responsibility, they cause a double disadvantage to the moral health of society. Not only do they deprive society of the possible advantage of the given change but they also decrease the operative amount of conscientiousness in it. Quickening of moral sensibility being a definite factor in the advance

of a society, such action involves a definite loss to it. This opinion directly follows from Morley's conviction about the rise and decline of societies. He observes: 'The immediate cause of the decline of a society in the order of morals is a decline in the quantity of its conscience, a deadening of its moral sensitiveness, and not a depravation of its theoretical ethics. The Greeks became corrupt and enfeebled not for lack of ethical science, but through the decay in the numbers of those who were actually alive to the reality and force of ethical obligations. Mahomedans triumphed over Christians in the East and in Spain—if we may for a moment isolate moral conditions from the rest of the total circumstances—not because their scheme of duty was more elevated or comprehensive, but because their respect for duty was more strenuous and fervid.'

It may be contended that if it is the duty of the dissidents to proclaim and to try to assert their views it is equally the duty of the conservatives, believers in the *status quo,* in order to assert their views, to stop by force the opinions of the self-asserting minority. For, thus alone will they be establishing their sincerity and thoroughness with regard to their own opinions. Otherwise they would be compromising. Morley's reply to the contention is as follows: 'The hollow kinds of compromise are as bad in the orthodox as in the heretical. Truth has as much to gain from sincerity and thoroughness in one as in the other. But the issue between the partisans of the two opposed schools turns on the sense which we design to give to the process of stamping out. Those who cling to the tenets of liberty limit the action of the majority, as of the minority, strictly to persuasion.' Further, the acquiescence in current opinions and ideas which is secured through law and even through social disapproval, is valueless. Here he instances the conversion of a savage to Christianity through baits of an economic nature as an example of worthless conversion. Again, threats and promises can only influence overt acts but not inward opinions. Therefore, the one sure result of intolerance is the growth of hypocrisy. Having thus disposed of the right and duty of the conservative majority to resort to coercion to keep the *status quo,* Morley turns to the other side of the picture and points out that the self-assertion of the progressive minority too need not mean intolerance. Earnest sincerity about one's opinions need not lead to intolerance. He concludes: 'A principle, if it be sound, represents one of the larger expediencies.

To abandon that for the sake of some seeming expediency of the hour, is to sacrifice the greater good for the less, on no more creditable ground than that the less is nearer. It is better to wait, and to defer the realization of our ideas until we can realize them fully, than to defraud the future by truncating them, if truncate them we must, in order to secure a partial triumph for them in the immediate present. It is better to bear the burden of impracticableness, than to stifle conviction and to pare away principle until it becomes mere hollowness and triviality.'

There is here much that is common to the concept of culture as developed by Emerson and Matthew Arnold though their phraseology may not reveal the fundamental similarities in their views. In the opinion of both, culture implies a large knowledge-content and constitutes essentially an intellectual attitude. As such it sets up standards and must lead its votary to endeavour to live upto them in the intellectual sphere. Thus opinions, ideas and ideals are formed on the basis of full knowledge and high standards; and they become convictions. The practitioner of culture as implied by Emerson and Matthew Arnold has to form convictions. In the opinion of Morley too the process of forming convictions with intrepid and free play of intelligence is very important in the history of civilization and as such is one of the highest individual duties. In behaviour the individual practitioner of culture is naturally serious-minded, earnest, and conscientious. Earnestness and conscientiousness, however, need not and should not mean intolerance, roughness or violence. Urbanity without hypocrisy, firmness without vehemence, must be cultivated by the practitioners of culture. Culture is not necessarily an abstraction to be practised by individuals in isolation. Emerson makes it clear that for a full life of culture solitude and society are equally necessary. Matthew Arnold too insists on the social role of culture in due proportion so that a man of culture is not too much involved in practical action. And, as Morley implies, such a man may very often be considered so impracticable in his ideas by his contemporaries that he may have no occasion to play any active part in social life. Arnold, developing the concept of culture in greater detail than Emerson, has stressed the need of allowing the free play of one's right reason after one has gathered all the best thoughts of the past on the subject one is called upon to formulate one's opinion on and

to guide one's conduct so that reform or progress may be made in the right direction. He has further suggested the potentialities of a life of culture in securing to its votaries not only a harmonious life but a life of perfect contentment, repose and bliss.

CHAPTER IV

TWENTIETH CENTURY: CIVILIZATION IN DANGER

SPEAKING in 1928, Gilbert Murray characterized the nineteenth century as a great age, an age with a definite form and character in which society on the whole seemed to be successful. He attributed the definitiveness of the age to the fact that the three fundamental foundations of society—the State, the family and religious belief—were mutually not irreconcilable. Commenting on the declaration of the then Conservative Prime Minister of Britain that one more war in Europe would end civilization, he pointed out that the one thing noticeable in England after the first World War was the increase of soldiers and everything that would lead to such increase, in short, the atmosphere and circumstances of war. War which decides questions not by reason and argument, which cares not for justice and right but depends on ruthlessness and violence, creates a mentality and a generation that hardly understands the need for and the moral worth of respect for law and personal liberty or the value of reasonableness and fair play in social life. As contrasted with the Victorian Age, his contemporary world, Murray points out, shows all the signs of its being a chaos rather than a cosmos. A combined result of various factors operating during the war period is loss of standard. The implications of a loss of standard for the behaviour of individuals and for the character of the age are serious. For as Murray observes: 'Every wholesome society has its own standards: and almost the whole *raison d'être* of a wise conservatism is to see that those standards are upheld. The daily conduct of human beings is seldom governed by appeals to their reason or to general principles; what moves them is the spell of their traditions and customs and the expectations which their fellows have formed.'[1] Conventions being rejected and no longer having binding force for the vast majority of people, Money, Pleasure, Passion or Impulse remain the ruling guides of behaviour. These guides are notoriously variable in their effects, making mutual confidence and trust among individuals ruled by them rather difficult. One of them, Passion or Impulse, is all for the present, its interest in the future being conspicuous by its absence. Persons governed by

this guide show very variable and undependable behaviour not characterized by what is called character.

To the unsettling effect of World War I, scientific knowledge in its advance has contributed in no insignificant measure. Biology with its theory of Evolution had thrown doubts at the older religious beliefs but had simultaneously established a faith in progress at least. And as we have seen, it was Huxley himself who stressed the importance of moral considerations in social life. Darwin, as is very well known, was himself a religious man. But Mendelism, which marks the advance in biological knowledge in the first part of the twentieth century, made evolution appear mechanical, less intelligible and, therefore, less helpful to morals. As interpreted by Bergson, it appeared mystical. Murray thinks that even the study of the insect world had its disturbing effect in belittling the worth of human morals. The advances in physical science, befogging as they were to the ordinary man, mystified him still further. They made the firm law of gravitation appear as if it were a mere formula which was not even entirely correct. Murray attributes a significant share in the general unsettling of the mind of the twentieth century to this advance. He remarks: 'The effect of this immense change in the scientific conception of the world has been, if I am not mistaken, to shake the general belief in science, therefore in knowledge, therefore in reason. Nothing was certain. Every supposed truth was overthrown. Life was a gamble.... I have heard the discrediting of Victorian science used as a basis for discrediting Victorian morals."[2]

G. M. Trevelyan, writing in 1942, contrasts the twentieth with the nineteenth century in that in the former 'self-discipline and self-reliance are somewhat less in evidence, and a quasi-religious demand for social salvation through State action has taken the place of older and more personal creeds'. The undermining of religious beliefs as a consequence of scientific knowledge with the particular religious history of England is also another distinction and contrast. Yet as far as the action of the State was concerned, Trevelyan thinks that in the inter-war period—1919 to 1939—a moral idea which was not very effective in personal conduct was made the basis by the State of its foreign and military policies.[3]

Critical students of English literature basing their judgement very largely on the literature of the twentieth century and its contrast with that of the nineteenth century have characterized

the twentieth century either as an age of interrogation or of iconoclasm or again as an era of frivolity. One of them, Swinnerton, finding that in the first decade of the twentieth century the Victorian tradition was represented by Hardy and that typical writers of imaginative literature representative of the twentieth century—Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, Joseph Conrad and Arnold Bennett—really became famous in the reign of George V, i.e. after 1910, places the line of demarcation in 1910, when 'human nature underwent a remarkable change'. Human nature changed in 1910 in the sense that every twenty or thirty years it changes, that is to say, it is a demarcation between two generations. What is called modernity is a phenomenon marking such change. But modernity is ever recurrent. Revolt of youth, for example, which is considered to be an exclusively modern phenomenon, has its reverberations in the eighties of the nineteenth century. Young women of the time shocked their parents by their uncouth doings. Towards the end of the century they were using all sorts of cosmetics for beautification and were smoking cigarettes at an ever increasing pace. The week-end habit was in strong evidence. Dinner parties were arranged in hotels and restaurants and not at home. It is perhaps the fashion that changes and not human nature. However it may be, 1910 does mark a change, for in or about that year, as Swinnerton observes: 'We entered the period of time which is now universally described as, not "modern," but "modn"'. Thus in the opinion of Swinnerton, the first ten years of the century are more or less a continuation of the nineteenth century and the Edwardian period an appenage of the Victorian Age. Belloc and Chesterton, though they continued working hard during the next period, he thinks, have not been of it. He remarks: 'Something has happened to their bugles. Instead of sounding triumphantly a further change, these instruments will utter nothing but the retreat.' They belong properly to the Edwardian period, writers of which were concerned either with Victorianism or medievalism, picturing either a fixed world or criticizing their times on the background of past history. The voices that spoke distinctly and were heard clearly in the Georgian period were of a different kind, saying very little of the past, scathing the present and treating the future as an opportunity for remoulding the world to one's liking. The criticism levelled against their own times by the representative writers of the Georgian period was different in style from the criticism of their own times by

Dickens, Mrs Gaskell, Kingsley and others of the Victorian Age. The new criticism worked through 'irresistible raillery' and 'a quite shockingly fearless vein of speculation'. 'Shaw and Wells were the "teachers" of the Georgian Age.' Swinnerton remarks: 'In those days, as in these, the play and the novel were the chief recreation of those who consider themselves cultured.' The plays were those by Shaw and the novels by Wells.[4]

Somervell, writing in 1929, referring to the present age as one of disillusionment, points out that it is abused as an age of mere pleasure-seeking and of frivolity. To the charge of pleasure-seeking, his reply is that greater opportunities of and different fashions in pleasure are not by themselves a detriment of an age. He suggests that they are healthy, specially as the vice of drunkenness has strikingly declined. Trevelyan too puts to the credit of the twentieth-century amenities of the radio, etc., the decline in drunkenness, and marks them as an asset in the account of the twentieth century. The charge of frivolity, which is deeper, is, Somervell believes, somewhat justified. Firstly, for the first time, a very large section of the population has ceased to take any interest in religious problems which, after all, bring persons in conscious relation to the fundamental problems of life. It is not merely that the majority of people have lost interest and faith in religious beliefs or show no religious feelings at all but, what is worse, even those who still entertain the feeling, are imbued with the futility of the discussion of religious problems. Social work has been increasing at the cost of sermons. Secondly, in the field of political philosophy, the same doubting attitude prevails instead of adherence to fundamental principles. At the end of the nineteenth century, it seemed as if a great battle would be fought between the adherents of the old order and the sponsors of Socialism. Somervell points out that no such battle has taken place. Practical expedients have debunked fundamental principles. That an unprecedentedly large number of people are seriously engaged in promoting social welfare is a feature which must protect the present generation against a too sweeping accusation of frivolity.[5]

A. C. Ward seems to agree more with Somervell than with Swinnerton in regard to the demarcation of the period of the twentieth century and with Swinnerton more than Somervell in the matter of its characterization. For him, 1901-25 is a unit—the first quarter of the twentieth century—marked by

general uniformity of attitude. About its leading characteristics he observes: 'English literature was directed by mental attitudes, moral ideals, and spiritual values at almost the opposite extreme from the attitudes, ideals, and values governing Victorian literature. The old certainties were certainties no longer. Everything was held to be open to question: everything from the nature of the Deity to the construction of verse-forms.' The Victorians acknowledged the rule of the Expert and obeyed the voice of Authority. They fervently believed in the permanence of their institutions. And that too, in spite of their favourite and outstanding singer and poet singing to them the burthen that 'the old order changeth yielding place to new'. In contrast, the twentieth century writers were restless with a desire to probe and question. To the uncanny vigorous Bernard Shaw not only religion but science too was a superstition; for anything that is accepted as a dogma without individual and personal examination is such to him. With his insistence on the trinity, 'Question', 'Examine' and 'Test', he utilized every opportunity to challenge the voice of Authority and contest the rule of the Expert. As Ward remarks: 'With equal assurance he interrogated economists, artists, doctors, educationists, politicians, scientists, religionists, and the effect of his writing was to spread abroad the interrogative habit of mind.' Ward, therefore, characterizes this period—the first phase and the first quarter of the twentieth century literature—as 'The Age of Interrogation'. The questioning spirit developed much strength and bitterness during the first World War. It still further grew as a result of economic and general world conditions upto the autumn of 1939 when the second World War crashed on the world.[6]

Sir J. C. Squire, in his article on the modern period of English Literature contributed to the Fourteenth Edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, begins the period with 1911 and ends it with 1926. The latter date it is quite clear is given by the date of his writing and not by the characteristic of the period. The same perhaps may be said of the former date, which begins the period, as the Eleventh Edition of the *Encyclopædia* was published in 1910. Observing that the time of writing was too close to the period to enable a writer to see in proper perspective the quality of the literature produced in that period, he presents the characteristics of the period as they appear to him. He says: 'There can be no doubt that the period under review was, at

least in what are called "intellectual circles", a period of confusion, of conflict, of doubt manifesting itself here in energetic pessimism, here in fatigue and apathy, here in blind hedonism, here in a desperate search for new creeds, sometimes brutally pagan. "Why should I?" was the dominant note, accompanied by a subtler "Why shouldn't I?"; and often neither awaited an answer."[7]

H. V. Routh speaks of the Edwardian Age and treats the first fifteen years of the twentieth century as a unit period, placing the real change between 1918 and 1920, though a small change was marked in the prominent writers of imaginative literature about 1910 to 1912. He observes: 'The Edwardian consciousness of stagnation and impracticability had been lifted. The proof is that the leading writers—Wells, Conrad, Shaw and others—who seemed to be losing their vision about 1910-12, have regained it about 1918-20.' More important even than this regaining of vision by Wells and others is the evidence provided by Galsworthy's later career. By 1910-14 Galsworthy protested against bigotries and inequalities of the social system without expecting their humanization, though, as Routh maintains, the first need of the century was the humanization of Victorian ideologies. Galsworthy preaches equality of justice. He is essentially a prophet of the twentieth century already; for 'he believes that to draw distinctions is to limit oneself; the widest of sympathies make the best man'. Upto the period of the major change referred to above, he is more significant as an index of the contemporary opinions than its creator. It is worth while noting, as indicative of minor change referred to above, that it was about 1911 that the word 'high-brow' was introduced to denote the current vice of culture and intended as a counterfoil to the old reproach of 'philistine.'[8] From 1914 onwards Galsworthy took up some of his old characters and infused new spirit in them. He portrayed the history of the middle and lower classes during three generations. In doing this he used his sense of equality and of the worth of the human spirit as his guides. Of the mood revealed by these studies, Routh observes: 'Yet these intimate studies, in defiance of the public facts of contemporary history, record a change of mood and outlook such as his older readers must have hoped rather than expected to see'.[9] In the second cycle of the Forsyte Saga, 1924—Soames Forsyte the Victorian is seen quietly seated in the court; the defendant is a young woman; and Galsworthy is the judge. The judge

solemnly delivers his judgement : 'Young woman, in my earlier days it used to be said that your Victorian grandfather is an undesirable person. I am now being very reluctantly forced toward the conclusion, that, compared with you, he was a perfect gentleman."[10]

Wingfield-Stratford speaks of John Galsworthy as surveying the social system of his time and of that immediately preceding it with sympathy which is resigned to helplessness. He remarks: 'He has none of Thomas Hardy's high stoicism in the fact of destiny, none of Mr. Wells's bustling desire to get something done, no Shavian patent medicine of equalized incomes. He is sorry, as a sympathetic observer may be sorry who can blame no one because he understands everything too deeply."[11] For Wingfield-Stratford too, the first fourteen years of the twentieth century, i.e. upto the first World War, is a unit-period to be described as he has done as the 'Victorian Aftermath'.

The historian of taste and fashion, James Laver, treats the first ten years of the twentieth century—to be more specific and precise, the first nine only—as a unit-period showing more or less uniformity in dress-design. In the year 1910, on the other hand, occurred a change in feminine dress, which, in his opinion, is 'comparable only with that fundamental change which transformed the woman of the eighteenth century into the woman of the Directoire period*; and far greater in importance than any change which has taken place since ; for even the adoption of short skirts was of less ultimate significance'. Since the beginning of the century the feminine dress with its S-shaped corset kept fundamentally the same till 1910. He thinks that English life in this decade shows many characteristics never shown before by it. There was 'a new cynicism, a new corruption, a determination to enjoy life, and a general air of unrestraint which is sometimes spoken of as the break-up of Victorianism'. It was *par excellence* the theatre-age, popular dramatists, actors and actresses gaining unprecedented celebrity. It was also the age of woman of mature form and well-rounded contour rather than that of the young girl. Nay fashions were actually against the young woman. Laver summarizes the social activities of the upper classes in the two terms 'Garden Party' and 'Casino'. The garden party is a new and a significant social development, taking men and women away from their homes for convivial purposes. The Casino represents the places of gambling.

* The period from 1795 to 1799 in French History

Gambling is the besetting vice of the twentieth century. It is interesting to note that it begins under the guise of worthier purpose, viz. the pursuit of health. Monte Carlo, as Laver puts it, 'became the Mecca of European society'. And it is really surprising that the English upper classes should have suddenly become so very conscious of the disagreeable nature of the English winter. The illustrated social magazine *Femina*, started in 1900 or thereabout, introduced the element of competition in regard to exhibition and led to extension of social engagements whose publicity value could now be properly exploited.

With the disappearance of the S-shaped corset in 1910, the female figure straightened. The abandonment of the wide skirt and the introduction of the V-shaped neck in 1911 marked a further stage in the emancipation of woman. But the revolution was not complete or the change not full till after the end of the first World War, when 'for probably the first time in history the flapper was free, and it was she who was to dictate the fashion for the next decade'. In the nineteen-twenties woman's dress was extremely juvenile. By 1921 the corset proper disappeared. The corset appears to be a far more significant thing than one is prepared to admit or even one can imagine. Laver remarks: 'It is a curious fact in human history, and one well worthy of more attention than it has received from the social psychologists, that the disappearance of corsets is always accompanied by two related phenomena—promiscuity and an inflated currency.' The disappearance of the corset has followed in the wake of great upheavals as the emancipated woman tries to look as much like a man as possible. By 1923 the effects of this revolution were perfectly noticeable. Motor cycles and motor cars, sexual laxity of the war period and the growing knowledge of the cheap methods of contraception, the dwindling measure of parental control and disregard for the counsels of the old, all conspired to help the growth of amorous affairs. Shortening of female hair through the various stages settled down to what is known as the 'Eton crop'. This kind of hair-cutting, giving the female head the appearance of a boyish head, became most universal about 1927, in which year also girls adopted trousers. The combination of trousers with the 'Eton crop' made it often quite impossible to distinguish a boy from a girl at a first glance.[12]

Adoption of masculine garments by women as an inter-

mittent process had lasted for about a century.[13] And soon the female fashion began to change. The change appears to have been consciously designed by the dress-making interests. By the early thirties women's dress became fuller and longer, distantly reminiscent of or remotely pointing to Victorianism. Laver associates this transformation in woman's costume with the deflation of post-war optimism, interprets it as a partial recognition of social responsibility, a glimmering appreciation that the excesses of the nineteen-twenties were heading them for disaster. Laver notices an awakening of new interest about this time in the great figures of the Victorian epoch, not for the purposes of critical dissection, as was the case in the twenties, but for the stimulation of a quaint yet sympathetic interest. Victorian furniture and knick-knacks were begun to be admired and collected. All this seems to indicate the beginnings of a Puritan reaction, which may or may not develop into Victorianism of the middle of the nineteenth century. As a matter of fact, the female dress in its partial affinity to Victorian costume perhaps suggested that it was a new synthesis, a new fashion which as long as it prevailed may demonstrate sanity and sobriety. Owing to the interposition of the second World War, nobody can say positively what would have been the precise fashion in the female costume between 1937 and today. Nevertheless, the female dress of 1936 studied in relation to other social factors inclines me to the belief that complete Victorianism was out of the question. The following word-picture of the female costume of 1936 and thereabout given by Laver supports this inference. 'If we should photograph a woman's dress of the early nineteen-thirties down to the waist and set beside it a similar photograph of the woman of the early nineties we should find a close similarity, except that the waist is not so small in the later period. The rest of the dress, however, was very different, and it is this difference which may lead us to doubt the easy theory of an early revival of Victorianism.' Further justification of this contention is provided by the ideal of womanhood adored in the nineteen-thirties. It was typified by the mannish figure of the Scandinavian film star Greta Garbo. Laver doubts if at any other time in the history of dress a woman was thought to be beautiful if she had shoulders wider than her hips as Greta Garbo had.[14]

Wingfield-Stratford thinks that the female costume of the Victorian Age with all its changing fashions did not care either for health or freedom of movement of the person but was

guided by the sole test of sexual attraction and that it was not till the nineties that the woman's emancipation movement made its influence felt on female dress. With interest in sport and bicycle for transport, there came in a tendency for costumes 'to become aggressively masculine'. In the early years of the Edwardian period, extravagant ornamentation and accompaniment of plutocratic extravagance made their appearance. Yet the freedom necessitated by interest in sport was not sacrificed. Functionalism ruled routine female dress, while Victorian prestige decided the ceremonial wear.[15]

Romain De Tirtoff-Erte, who contributes the article on modern dress in the Fourteenth Edition of the *Encyclopœdia Britannica,* believes that the evolution of modern feminine dress, which 'provides one of the most captivating pages in the history of modern civilization', corresponds closely to the emancipation of woman. Like Laver, he too notes that the Directoire fashions began to reign from 1910, and attributes to the theatre enormous influence on the fashions since 1912. He credits the masculinity of the female dress in the nineteen-twenties to the influence of sport, adding the information that in 1926 women's felt hats were very similar to those worn by men. He rightly maintains that the influence of male over female dress will continue for a long time as the female has adopted the sweater and the pyjama. He observes that the physical appearance of men in the twentieth century as a result of various details has considerably altered. There have been more or less parallel changes in the twentieth century in various details of dress and coiffure both of men and women, tending to lead them both to a kind of harmony in costume and appearance. In 1928 he finds women much more advanced on that road than men. If sport influenced female dress towards masculinity, the incursion of females into sport introduced colour and variety into man's sport wear.[16]

There is a feature of femine dress known as 'décolletage' which has some significance for our study. Décolletage, in plain words, means opening and thus keeping exposed. If dress is intended to cover and conceal, that feature of it which is called décolletage is intended to uncover and expose. It has been thought proper by woman at various times, in various places and on specific occasions, to expose certain parts of her body. For a long time, as Laver points out—though it is difficult to explain why—it was thought right and proper for females to expose their throats and portion of their bosoms on specially formal or

mountebank, employing the weapon of laughter and ridicule to attack bad housing, bad education, bad conditions of labour and other social evils which troubled him.' If he was considered as a laughing philosopher, he was 'suspect to the Solemn Old of the nineteen-tens', and was 'rejected by the Solemn Young of the nineteen-thirties'. Though he was thus looked upon either as a menace or a trifler, yet Ward thinks that he did much for sane moral and political education of the twentieth century.[19]

Frank Swinnerton, who calls Shaw and Wells 'teachers' of the Georgian period and devotes a whole long chapter to them, considers that Shaw and Wells between them have done more to cultivate the modern attitude towards morals and civilization than most other writers. Regarding the precise nature of their work, he observes: 'While Shaw laughed sentimentality and romance off the stage in his plays, and teased the English for their slowness and pomposity and self-infatuation, and made parents ridiculous and only the young wise and bold, and demanded a new aristocracy of supermen, Wells, ever more impatient of levity than Shaw, looked ahead and planned a clear and orderly future.... Ideas, ideas, ideas, they were in the heads of all the young Edwardians and early Georgians. Shaw and Wells, Wells and Shaw; Chesterton and Belloc and Wells and Shaw—the seeds of disbelief in accepted morals and manners were sown by Wells and Shaw,—while Belloc and Chesterton fought a gallant but losing fight against the forces of science and economics, machinery and the future, incadescence and destruction.' Yet he is not sure that when the future will be built, though it will be on the ruins left by Shaw, it would necessarily be like the one planned by Wells. And he points out that the generations, whose teachers these men were, first of all grasped only the destructive element in their teaching. The youth took Shaw at his face value in his judgement of their parents as fools and proceeded to treat them as such. Having learnt from Wells that it was the privilege of the young to be brave and noble through being free from restraint, they cultivated conscious defiance of all authority in place of humility. 'To the hypocrisy of romantic virtue succeeded the pretence of frank, honest sincerity, which is such a nuisance to others when it is paraded. I do not think Shaw likes the new freedom... I do not think Wells likes the new and self-constituted intellectual aristocracy.'[20]

Routh while appreciating the great service that Wells and

Shaw rendered to the creation of new international civilization based on science and logic, thinks that they failed because, having not grasped the one-sideness of scientific thought, they tried to construct the civilization brand new, and not to reconstruct it out of the old material. Their iconoclasm attracted much notice and became the creed of a school which was itself only half convinced about it. The total result was that they gained in self-advertisement what they lost in influence. Searching for a new character type, they created the man of science and logic in place of the old ideal of a gentleman as the model for the Edwardian period. Wells's ideas as expressed in his novels, after 1910, are thus summarized by Routh: 'Life ought to be made more healthy, more practical, more adventurous, more unprincipled in order that we may experiment with our sensations and appetencies and find out the way to be supermen.' About Shaw, he thinks that his methods of presenting his ideas succeed in creating the illusion that they are the ideas of a wise man who is also an expert. But they do not create the impression on the reader's mind that the author has mastered the truth.[21] That of all literary forms, the novel has become almost synonymous with literature since the beginning of the twentieth century is in itself significant of the age. Yet even more note-worthy is the fact of the novels being photographic after the first World War. This change is the consequence of the cult that commonplace life must be described as it is without any attempt at finding out inner significance. New biography, for which the style was set by Lytton Strachey, may be considered as an aspect of the same cult. For what is done is to call in a Victorian personality, to require it 'to demonstrate not its contact with eternal verities, but its mental weaknesses and errors' and to declare it incomplete and defective.

The conditions of the twentieth century life have not been the subject of experience of one of the great masters, the prophets of earlier times. The reactions and thoughts of the twentieth century imaginative writers to their conditions are such as none of these masters and prophets of the earlier ages have expressed. The result has been, in the words of Routh: 'Culture has lost much of its prestige and the most recent writers are breaking away from its tradition.... It looks as if the new age was determined to stand alone, and would not confess to the reliance on the past. In fact it is often lamented that the present generation is swarming with people who have lost touch

with culture.' Yet Routh thinks that there is a large number of people cultivating their vast inheritance through a wide study of literature. They buy and read entertaining and authoritative books on astronomy and metaphysics, they quote chemistry, they dabble in psycho-analysis. In short, they are studying both classics and science and as a part of the latter they are studying themselves. As a literary counterpart of this phenomenon, Routh mentions the school of 'Introspectionalists' among writers, represented by D. H. Lawrence, Virginia Woolf, Dorothy Richardson, and T. S. Eliot. These writers encourage 'the reader to take himself seriously, and insist on establishing his own identity in a changing world'. Nevertheless, he points out that some of these introspectionalists dwell 'only on man's lower, subconscious, biological nature' and make much of sex instincts. But he sees signs of a reaction already. And as the vanguard of the rebels, he mentions, first, Clive Bell's essay on *Civilization* and, last, Robert Bridge's book, *The Testament of Beauty.* These signs, combined with other books on humanism, have raised high hopes in the mind of Routh which he states in the following words: 'They seem to be reviving an ancient inquisitiveness, because modern man is beginning to regard himself as an unwilling stranger kidnapped by our civilization, the product of over-population, mass-production and scientific management. If these reactionaries persist and unite their forces, literature will again play a decisive part in the revival of culture, and the student will be able to find his clue through the labyrinth in which we have lost ourselves.'[22]

While the educated classes were largely interested in the books on Biology and Physics presenting the interpretations of these sciences in easy language, it must be remembered, that a much larger public was busily engaged in devouring from night to night, the sensational literature of crime and love, of law courts and detectives.

Shaw and Wells, it thus appears, with all their sincerity and their desire to see the creation of a better world, certainly achieved the one result of further unsettling the minds of their generation and in strengthening the flippant tendency of journalistic approach to graver issues of life and civilization. If they best represented the spirit of interrogation and iconoclasm in respect of general ideas regarding morals and civilization, others like D. H. Lawrence and Aldous Huxley, described by Swinnerton as post-Freudian and post-War, particularly after the

first World War, produced both poetry and novels, showing a mixture of horror and flippancy as well as psycho-analysis and metaphysics, which led them into rather abnormal paths." A. C. Ward, pointing out that the new sexual morality, preaching the rightness of sexual union without matrimony, was first put forward in a novel published towards the end of the nineteenth century, maintains that it was H. G. Wells who put the case for freedom in matters of sex in his novels, which compared with nineteenth century works were bright and catchy. D. H. Lawrence, who was tormented and fascinated by sex, regarded a woman in love as one bent on destroying his personality. As his work proceeded, he threw off all restraint of conventions in his treatment of sex and even suggested that the civilized woman's object in loving man was to deprive him of his masculinity and to feminize him. In some of his novels, extreme sexual indulgence is coupled with puritanism. This puritanic vein is the result of the obsession with sex which had created the idea that sexual promiscuity was almost a natural social observance. It is represented in the works of Aldous Huxley. From 1929 onwards, as a reaction to the disappointment that had become dominant, there was a flood of pacifist literature regarding which Ward is doubtful whether it contributed to the growth of pacifist feeling or rather tended 'to habituate readers to horror and to pander to masochistic tendencies'. In the nineteen-thirties, as the European horizon began to darken with oppression, cruelty and murder stalking abroad, imaginative and creative literature too began to be frankly propagandist. Ward tells us that, 'it became a conviction with the younger school of writers that, with liberty, truth, and honour imperilled, no art could justify itself except as the handmaid of politics. This was a principle already firmly established by the totalitarian rulers of Russia, Italy, and Germany, where all artists were bound to use their talents to the sole end of exalting the State' He thinks that though Bernard Shaw, who first renounced the doctrine of Art for Art and practised Art for propaganda, because of his certain qualities was able to produce good literature, numerous writers of the nineteen-thirties, practising the doctrine of Shaw but not having his other qualities, produced only very indifferent literature. On the whole the work of important writers such as Galworthy, Shaw, Wells and Aldous Huxley has been one of demolition rather than of creation.[24]

Gilbert Murray pertinently refers to the particular aspects

of psychology that were predominantly dealt with by the writers of the early part of the twentieth century. He points out that, in scientific psychology, the advance made between the time of Bentham and that of William James was greater than that between Aristotle and Bentham. In imaginative literature, the psychological interpretation registered a similarly great advance, as is apparent in the work of George Eliot and Tolstoy as compared with that of Fielding and Smollett. The advance was in sympathetic and imaginative understanding of the human mind. It made mutual understanding easier, ideals higher and judgements more profound and charitable. But that is more or less the end of the nineteenth century. Thereafter, in psychology as later in biography, the vivisectionist got to work. The vivisectionist psychology, which Gilbert Murray has in view, is the psychology created by psycho-analysis. Though the findings of psycho-analysis and the method itself may be of value, yet a number of its essential doctrines have yet to be tested properly. What it has actually succeeded in achieving, in the opinion of Murray, is only 'a most destructive effect on the cosmos of our moral ideas'. The destructive effect of psycho-analysis is described in his own words thus: 'Impulses, hitherto regarded as unspeakably obscene or fantastically malignant and wicked, have not only been recognized as real, but have received a quite disproportionate welcome from the public. What is almost worse, a number of activities which have hitherto been accounted for as noble or charitable or unselfish are now exposed as so many forms of common cruelty and sensuality and vanity masquerading in the plumes of fabulous virtues.'[25]

If the outstanding contribution to social studies by the great minds of the nineteenth century was the epoch-making biological thought of Darwin, Huxley and their followers and its application by Spencer to the formulation and exposition of Sociology, it must be said to the credit of the twentieth century that the development of the science of human behaviour is its speciality. For though William James wrote his classical account of the human mind in 1891 and thus laid the foundation of scientific psychology, yet the development of the subject as the study of human behaviour—the motive-springs of human action—was the work of the twentieth century. Animal psychology, which may properly be said to have begun with Darwin's account of expression of emotions in animals, was developed by Romanes, by Lloyd Morgan and by L. T. Hobhouse.

And it was mostly from the study of animal behaviour that the concept of instinct, the motive-spring of human action, has been taken up and employed, during the first thirty years of the twentieth century. It was in 1908 that Graham Wallas startled the thinking public by telling them that in the political life of England what moved the people to action was instinct and impulse and not reason. And it was in 1908 that William Macdougall first published his classic account of the nature and number of human instincts and their role in individual and social life in his famous book, *An Introduction to Social Psychology.* The book has been very popular and has so far run into a number of editions. The work of Freud with its new technique, called psycho-analysis, its ideology about the unconscious, the complexes, the censor, and its insistence on the doctrine that the repression of instincts is at the root of many neuroses and psychoses, and with its emphasis that the one instinct repressed in the civilized condition is that of sex, was introduced by Brill to English readers by 1913. In 1915, Martin Conway published his study of the crowd, which stimulated the study of instinct and impulse. About the same time even such a serious student of social life as Graham Wallas wrote of the baulking of instincts and impulses in his *Great Society.* During the first World War, to be precise in 1915, William Trotter, the then famous London brain-surgeon, published his study of human gregariousness under the title *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War.* Curiously enough or, rather ironically, in the same year was published a book, which must be considered to be the classic foundation of social psychology but for the fact that its import was generally missed and was appreciated only in a small circle of devoted votaries of the subject. It is A. F. Shand's *Foundations of Character.* In it Shand clearly brought out the importance of the formation of larger systems of emotions with appropriate conative dispositions, called sentiments, for foundation of character and consequently for human behaviour. The book and that aspect of human psychology which should have put the new concept of instinct in human behaviour in its proper place, with emotion, reason and will occupying their own specific places, went almost unheeded. And the foundations have remained to this day without a super-structure. Small wonder they have failed to affect effectively theory or practice. The World War I brought to the notice of medical psychologists a number of neurotic and

even psychotic cases among soldiers which were the results of shell-shock. Freudian methods were applied and found useful by a number of them. One amongst them, W. H. R. Rivers, applying these methods to certain cases under his charge, came to the conclusion that it was not sex-instinct that was mainly repressed in civilized life but it was the instinct of fear. He put forward this view in his book *The Instinct and The Unconscious*, published in 1920. Though the book was acclaimed at that time as a great contribution, it failed, curiously enough, to make even a small dent on the solid front of psycho-analytic doctrine that it was sex-instinct which alone was repressed in man. About the same time, A. G. Tansley, a well-known botanist, published a highly readable book entitled *The New Psychology*, giving an intelligent account of the contribution made by Freud to human psychology—the concepts of suppression, repression, the sub-conscious, the unconscious, the ego, and the id. This book appears to have been the psycho-analytical Bible of a large class of educated public. In its wake followed many more popular dilutions of psycho-analytical doctrines, toying with sex-instinct which conveyed a smattering of psycho-analytical psychology to a still wider circle. About the same time appeared books giving historical account and enumerating the various instincts characterizing man. Instinct was so much in the air and reason so much in the background that the irrational element in human life had a blank cheque given to it and a charter provided by the writers of imaginative literature as well as psychologists, whether Freudian or non-Freudian. We are now in a position to understand how the evolution of the female dress, how the representation of sex in literature, and how the literary insistence on doing away with inhibitions, as well as the new appeal of journalism, the vogue of the externalization of pleasure and the craze for dancing and the life of thrill, were all of one piece, moved by the acceptance not of ideals, reason and will but of instinct and impulse as the guides to and the governors of behaviour.

Regarding the emotional stimulus that was found necessary by the Edwardians for their cult of thrill, Wingfield-Stratford observes: 'The country was in the grip of a dancing craze that waxed ever faster and more furious as the pre-war period swept to its close.' Waltz was found to be not sufficient for the restless spirit. What was demanded was not delicacy but strength for

which ultimately the dance of the American Negro was found suitable. Laver too notes the new importance which the saxophone as an accompaniment of dancing had come to have and points out the vogue of the night club. His remarks are even more telling than the observations of Wingfield-Stratford: 'One madness seemed to seize all classes: dance-halls and night clubs sprang up everywhere, and the whole world, or that young part of it which, now more than ever set the tone, shuffled round exiguous floors locked in a close embrace to the blaring of a negro band.'[26]

If the daily Press was an important innovation in the mid-nineteenth century and played a significant role in the formation and expression of public opinion, so that it came to be looked upon as the Fourth Estate of the realm, the starting of the newspaper *Daily Mail* by Alfred Harmsworth (later Lord Northcliffe) and Harold Harmsworth in 1896 as a halfpenny daily newspaper is described as 'one of the miracles of journalism, whose significance seems to have been lost on its contemporaries'. R. G. Collingwood, writing in 1938, thus describes his thoughtful reaction to the portent of the *Daily Mail*. 'Then came the *Daily Mail*, the first English newspaper, for which the word "news" lost its old meaning of facts which a reader ought to know if he was to vote intelligently, and acquired the new meaning of facts, or fictions, which it might amuse him to read. By reading such a paper, he was no longer teaching himself to vote. He was teaching himself not to vote; for he was teaching himself to think of the "news" not as the situation in which he was to act, but as a mere spectacle for idle moments.' The role of the newspaper described a complete circle as regards its function. Instead of trying to educate the public it began to flatter their tastes and feelings and taught them to look upon it as an escape-mechanism. Hence followed, as Routh points out, 'the heightened and selective reporting of news, till every item promised a glimpse of romance to be enjoyed between the prose of breakfast and the routine of the office'. So enticing had the newspaper begun to be by the beginning of the twentieth century that even novelists were finding it difficult to compete with it as a purveyor of truth stranger than fiction.[27]

Further development of the newspaper in this particular line was recorded in 1903 with the starting of the *Daily Mirror*, which introduced as a powerful aid to the printed word the practice of giving pictures intended to illustrate the news of

the day. The vicissitudes of this paper are a significant sign of the day. Lord Northcliffe, having succeeded with the *Daily Mail,* intended it to be a superior colleague of the latter, meant entirely for women. It was designed to appeal to the interests of the more serious-minded women, to discharge the same function for women that *The Times* was doing for all. But it was not to be. It proved a still-born venture of Lord Northcliffe and was bought over by Lord Rothermere who, turning it into the first illustrated halfpenny daily newspaper, made it as great a financial success as the *Daily Mail.*[28] The ordinary citizen, whether man or woman, was now looked upon as a matter fit for suggestibility. As Wingfield-Stratford graphically describes the situation of the modern citizen: 'He accepts a melodrama world that is presented to him in a series of violent shocks, as if he were holding the end of an electric wire, of which someone is continually switching on the current, and he reacts with corresponding violence and lack of discrimination.' Nothing illustrates better the tempo of this age than the career of Horatio Bottomley who started in 1906 a penny news-weekly, *John Bull.* Wingfield-Stratford informs his readers that the success of this new weekly was very largely connected with the editor, Horatio Bottomley himself, who stood forth as a man of no dogmas and no inhibitions, a jolly, downright Englishman with a hatred of cant and humbug and a heart as big as a whale. The paper was intended to be a sort of jolly-good-fellowship all round. So great was the success of this new stuff of the jolly-good-fellowship and the want of inhibition and of hatred of cant and humbug that, in the darkest days of the first World War, Bottomley was seriously talked of as the destined saviour of his country. His paper indulged in the publication of open letters to individuals some of which were 'masterpieces in the art of giving pain' and published serial articles exploiting the most violent sentiments against foreign nations.[29] Bottomley's subsequent career only illustrates the enormity of indiscrimination the public showed in making him a success for some time.

Gilbert Murray laments over the change that has come about in the contents of the newspapers as indicative of the chaotic conditions of contemporary times. Newspapers, as he points out, do not report the debates in Parliament. They give equivalent space to crimes, to betting news and to interviews with 'passing celebrities such as cinema stars, athletes, pugilists, jockeys, dancers, and criminals'.[30] The writer of the article on

Newspaper in the fourteenth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica,* himself a noted journalist and a high ranking official in the journalistic associations, supports the contention of Gilbert Murray. He says: 'The modern newspaper caters for all classes. It is severely sectionalized and while the interests touched upon are more comprehensive than they were twenty years ago, the space devoted to the general news of the day is very much less. Except in the case of a few newspapers, speeches are not reported at any length, and politics is treated as a subject of minor interest.' It tries to attract its clientele not so much by attempting to give them news and material for information, thought or enlightenment, not even so much by sensational headlines—though this feature retains its importance—but by offering extraneous inducements of sudden gains and by accident insurance. This last feature of newspaper insurance is described as 'a tremendous factor in the life of the people'. Lest one should be tempted to ascribe newspaper insurance an entirely good purpose, it must be pointed out that it differs from ordinary insurance. Insurance companies desire and hope that their clients should escape accidents and live long. 'Newspapers, on the other hand, seem to rejoice—in headlines—over fatal accidents which befall their readers and boast about the amount of money they pay out. One reader killed in a railway accident brings a hundred new readers into the net.'[31] This commercialization of the lives of its readers by the newspapers represented by their insurance schemes is an aspect of the general commercial spirit of the society and is equally strongly reflected in another aspect of the newspaper—an aspect which is vitally connected with the financial success of the newspaper—viz. advertising.

If advertising is a commercial aspect of some activities of the society and of the newspaper in particular it has itself succeeded in commercializing Art to such an extent that a special department of Art has come to be designated as Commercial Art. Advertising has become an organic feature of modern commerce and a vital qualification for salesmanship. Its use in trade is traced to the introduction of the railway and factory system early in the nineteenth century. But its systematic use has had a parallel development with that of the newspaper Press. By the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century it had attained such importance and developed technically to such an extent that in Great Britain the

Incorporated Society of Advertisement Consultants started a public examination in its theory and practice and issued proficiency certificates in 1925. There are also state-laws and by-laws to regulate advertisements. A particularly attractive form of advertising is what is known as the poster, especially that kind of poster which advertises pictorially. This picture advertisement, called poster or placard, too has its origin in the nineteenth century. Millais, one of the great artists of the nineteenth century, exhibited his picture 'Bubbles' advertising a soap which immensely pleased contemporary Englishmen. Beardsley, who is so well known in connexion with the extravagances of the eighteen-nineties, also painted weird posters. Yet it was in connexion with the first World War that posters assumed a new significance and were successfully utilized in recruiting soldiers in countries where there was no conscription. It is significant that 'in the half century or more since the poster became a popular means of outdoor publicity, women have been predominant in many posters displayed'. While evaluating poster art and its social significance, it must be borne in mind that 'Commerce, the chief patron of poster art, finally judges a design by its value as a link in the chain of salesmanship'.[32]

Wingfield-Stratford, who is very severe on commercial art, opining that 'the artist of any sort who hires himself out for commercial purposes is, in an even profounder sense than the woman who trades in her body, a prostitute', admits that even this commercial activity of Art was not wholly unfavourable to the growth and nurture of the proper activities of Art. It is noteworthy that the New English Art Club was founded in 1886 as an opposition to the Royal Academy. Another group was formed in 1910 to accommodate painters of more modern trend. Though in both these groups the influence to begin with was that of French Impressionism yet at the turn of the century P. Wilson Steer had abandoned it for 'the native English form which derives from Constable and Turner'. Thus was launched a period in British painting which achieved artistic work entitling Britain to a place in the world's Art. Richard Walter Sickert, P. Wilson Steer, Ambrose McEvoy and Augustus John are 'names on which the historian can rest with some degree of certainty'.[33]

In architecture, the great names of this century, men who have enabled their age to wipe out the blemish of the nineteenth

century and resuscitate architecture—W. R. Lethaby, it should be remembered, describes architecture as the matrix of civilization—to its proper and abiding place in the civilizational activity of man, are those of Edwin Lutyens and Herbert Baker. It is a notorious fact that the industrial civilization creating slums and slum-areas, successfully destroyed in England the native taste in housing. We have also noted how in the same nineteenth century philanthropically minded people started movements for building decent houses for industrial workers. The State too was not quite unmindful of some of its duties towards its citizens in respect of dwellings. Kent Wright lists against the year 1868, Artisans' and Labourers' Dwelling Acts and against the year 1890, Housing of the Working Classes' Act. Other Acts were passed from time to time, all of them being consolidated in the Housing Act of 1925. It is not this aspect of provision by society of decent room for its workers and citizens which is under immediate consideration. What I here want to point out first of all is the æsthetic quality of housing. As we have seen, reaction against the neglect in which English domestic architecture had fallen in the nineteenth century was already started by Webb and Morris. In the twentieth century it was led to fruition by Lutyens and Baker.[34] In the work of rehabilitation of the English domestic architecture to its former pre-eminence efforts of these great workers were very significantly helped by another movement started towards the end of the nineteenth century by Ebenezer Howard and propagated and popularized by him and his followers and co-workers, such as Raymond Unwin and Patrick Geddes. The movement is known as the Garden Cities Movement and the Town and City Planning Movement. It was in 1898 that Howard put forward a scheme for building a model town called Garden City. In 1899, was founded the Garden Cities Association, and Letchworth, the first garden city, was established in 1903, the second, Welwyn, following in 1920. The work on the Hampstead Garden suburb was commenced in 1907. The International Housing Congress was opened at Caxton Hall in 1907 and the Town Planning and Civic Exhibition Movement was started in London through the London Town Planning Exhibition held in 1910. In the matter of the Town Planning Exhibition and in bringing to the notice of the intellectuals the importance of the City Beautiful, the work of Sir Patrick Geddes remains significant.

If private individuals like Ebenezer Howard* and Sir Patrick Geddes were creating a consciousness in the public for 'cities beautiful and homes beautiful', the State too, realized its role and strengthened the movement by putting on the Statute-book in 1909 the Town Planning Act. The main object of the Act was control by the authorities of the development of land likely to be used for building purposes. Thereafter, there have been a number of Housing and Town Planning Acts whereby the State has taken more and more upon itself to build decent houses, beautiful houses, and to create beautiful cities for its citizens. The result of all this legislation may be summarized in the words of no less an authority than Sir Ernest Simon. He observes: 'There are about ten million houses in the country; two and a half million of these, or one-fourth of the total, are new houses, built since the war. If we continue the present rate of building, we shall rehouse one-fifth of the population every decade.... If public opinion remains steadily determined to put an end to the slums and prepared to pay the necessary price, if our city councils act with wisdom, foresight, and discretion, we can certainly within a single generation provide for every family a good house in a healthy, convenient, and beautiful city.' The year 1937 is perhaps the most significant for the history of housing in Europe. In that year the housing experts of all European nations and of the United States conferring together, discussed certain investigations carried out by them. The trend of the discussion revealed that as far as perhaps the most important topic of discussion, horizontal versus vertical development of housing, was concerned, current opinion strongly favoured the horizontal development and the single-family house. Vertical housing, it was thought, should be allowed only in exceptional cases. The architect has now come to realize that the city in modern civilization is a complete being not an aggregation of separate buildings.[35]

Externalization of pleasure which, as we have seen, had already made its appearance in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, assumed tremendous proportions in the twentieth century—its ramifications we find treated in Delisle Burns' book *Leisure in the Modern World*—so that it appears to be the leading characteristic of twentieth-century life. Externalization of pleasure and vicarious participation in sports was facilitated

* It is strange that there should be no biographical note on Ebenezer Howard in the 4th edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

by restless spirit characteristic of the age, by better commercialization of sport which the organizers of sport could offer, by the great development of the art of advertising, by the development of the movie and the talkie and most of all by the opportunities which it offered for free indulgence in betting and gambling. I have already quoted Trevelyan's opinion regarding the prevalence of this vice. Delisle Burns too, who is rather a pleader or a defence counsel for the spirit of the twentieth century, has commented on its tremendous growth mainly among women. It is a sign of the times that the State should have come to the help of the bettors. The Betting and Lotteries Act of 1934 established the legality of betting on Football results, which was previously dubious. It is note-worthy that Football Pool betting has become the most popular pastime next to cinema-going. It was estimated in 1936 that the annual turnover in Great Britain for betting and gambling was between £350 and £400 millions with profits of £50 millions. Like many other features of British life this popular betting is a growth of about a century. The crowds of the Cup-tie of the last decade of the nineteenth century are easily thrown into shadow by the stupendous crowds which gathered to see some of the football matches, at Wembly and at Glasgow in the year 1937. At Wembly the crowd was estimated at about 93,000 people while at Glasgow for one match there were 146,000 and for another —an international event—over 149,000 spectators. This vicarious interest in sports though in itself not a healthy sign, indirectly contributed to the strengthening of a desirable tendency and benefited the movement for open spaces, playing fields and parks. The National Playing Fields Association, which began its work about 1925, has succeeded in making available larger and larger areas as recreation grounds, public parks and playing fields. For these purposes in 1936-7, the Ministry of Health had granted loans amounting to nearly £3,200,000.[30]

While the commercial organization of sport helped the tendency towards externalization of pleasure, the introduction of the radio about 1925 ushered in the era of domestic and private circle of entertainment. Good music and instructive talks could be listened to in the quiet happiness of domestic surroundings. The radio opened up possibilities of a part of the æsthetic and intellectual content of culture being conveniently carried to the homes of all citizens at times when they would be ready for such entertainment. The immense potentialities of this mechanism

will be realized when we remember that in Great Britain by 1938 there were issued 8,500,000 wireless licences.[37]

The huge expenditure on the provision of parks and playing fields is only an aspect of the great development of social services that took place in this period. By 1937 more than £500 millions were being annually spent on these social services. The factory legislation of the last century develops through various stages into what is called by Sir Ernest Barker the 'Social insurance stage' of the state social services. Welfare movement for industrial workers is another aspect of the movement for the amelioration of the conditions of factory workers. The total result of the Unemployment Insurance and National Insurance Acts is to make some provision for various contingencies associated with the current economic system. Natural contingencies of maternity, old age, sickness, disablement, widowhood and premature death have also been attempted to be provided against through State help. The Maternity and Child Welfare Act of 1918 and the Widows', Orphans' and Old Age Pensions Act of 1925 may be mentioned as representative of the appreciation by the State of its duties in this regard. Other contingencies such as the physical disability of blindness and mental disability have also evoked the sympathy and support of the State. The Mental Deficiency Act of 1913, the Blind Persons Act of 1920, and the Mental Treatment Act of 1930 are representative of this tendency. Rightly has Wickwar named a whole chapter of his book as 'The Social Service State'. While the State has thus taken on itself the active duty of recognizing the right of the individual to work and to social security, the citizens themselves have shown greater and greater tendency of helping themselves through collective and co-operative organizations. And the State has rightly shown a very active interest in this collective self-help. In this connexion the phenomenal growth of Workers' Educational Association and its activities may be noted.[38]

The most significant feature of this century, from our point of view, is the tremendous growth of public libraries, museums and art galleries as well as of secondary education and particularly of the universities. For these are the institutions which either create civilization and culture or impart the knowledge of civilization and thus are instruments of culture or do both. They are thus some of the seminal institutions from the point of view of the subject of this book. The first Public

Libraries Act was passed in 1850. But progress in the provision of library facilities was slow till 1887. In 1892 the Public Libraries Act was consolidated and it remains the principal Act today. It was from about 1900, when Andrew Carnegie began to make sumptuous grants for libraries in England and Scotland, that rapid advance in the provision of libraries began to be made. The Act of 1919 put the public library finally on its feet, making it a concern of the local authority supported by the State. The Public Libraries Act of 1892, the consolidated act, empowered the authorities to provide not only libraries but museums and art galleries as well. There were, by the end of the nineteenth century, only twenty museums and art galleries in existence. The Public Libraries Act of 1919 affected the museums and art galleries in the same manner as it did the libraries. In 1931 there were 593 and by 1938 nearly 800 museums and art galleries in the United Kingdom.

Though colleges were started in many of the provincial cities of England during the nineteenth century it was not till the beginning of the twentieth century that they began to acquire university status. The University of Birmingham received its charter in 1900 while Liverpool, Manchester and Leeds received theirs in 1903. Most of the remaining modern universities acquired that status in the first few years of the twentieth century. In the new provincial universities, technical and professional rather than general humanistic education was provided for. In Great Britain the number of students at the universities rose by 150 per cent in 1938 over the figure of 1900, there being 50,000 of them in the former year as against 20,000 in the latter. The 50,000 students were being taught by 3,900 teachers engaged as whole-time staff. The progress of the Workers' Educational Association may also be noted, which, under another name, was founded in 1903 and which had nearly 60,000 students enrolled in 1935-6, taking instruction in purely cultural subjects.[39]

Individualism, uninhibited self-expression wherever possible, was not only advocated by writers of imaginative literature but was indulged in by the mass of the people. The consequence of this unbalanced and irrational individualism was a loss of standard which encouraged the theory and practice of living for the moment. On the other hand, the State and also a large body of workers were striving for and created agencies which are

monuments of collectivism. For this reason the final battle between capitalism and socialism was not fought out. It is not because of lukewarmness, as Somervell would have us believe, of the socialistic strivings, but largely because the practice of collectivism successfully blunted the edge of some of the outstanding sufferings, inherent in capitalism. The growth of collective undertaking and the extension of the responsibilities of the State and Local Government towards the citizens led to a large increase in the facilities for culture available to them. The provision of museums, art galleries and libraries carries culture to a large class of the passive participators. Similarly the radio brings certain aspects of æsthetic and intellectual culture to their homes. The homes and the cities have begun to be made more beautiful, thus vitalizing an aspect of civilization and culture, which is bound to lead to better assimilation and enjoyment of culture by all classes of participants. In these matters the twentieth century registers no insignificant advance over the nineteenth century. Particularly in Art and Architecture it fills a void which existed in the nineteenth century. In respect of manners and morals, the account is not quite clear. If drunkenness has decreased, gambling has enormously increased. Reading habits perhaps show a deterioration when compared with those of the middle fifty years of the nineteenth century. The newspaper does not fulfil the promise it had held. There is in general in individual behaviour a loss of standard and increase in irrationalism. It may be said about this period that though on the corporate plane there is an advance in civilization, on the individual plane there is very little evidence of standards, of sense of values and enthronement of reason among the passive participants of culture, which class has fittingly become a large one. The quest of culture, started in the last century, has been fructifying in forwarding facilities for its realization. And a large number of other conditions have yet to be satisfied before the quest of culture can be said to be realized.

In the meanwhile, the really disquieting feature of the period is the increase of irrationalism among and conscious commercialization and journalization of thought by disseminators of culture. We have seen how some small schools of thought led by artists in the nineteen-nineties preached flight from civilization. Some writers of imaginative literature, particularly after World War I, adopted an attitude towards sex, marriage and family which negatived the enduring values of civilization. As

a reaction some of them propagated a mystic view of life tantamount to a flight from reason and civilization.

At a certain stage in the progress of World War I 'Civilization in danger' came to be used as a rallying cry. Establishment of dictatorships, particularly Fascist and Nazi regimes, eclipsed some of the civilizational values. A large number of writers felt that civilization was in danger everywhere. A Prime Minister of Britain had said that a second World War would destroy civilization. An important phase of World War II has ended without destroying civilization which has, however, been put on its trial.* Truly has civilization been in danger during this period.

References

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[4] Swinnerton, pp. 3-16.
[5] Somervell, pp. 234-5.
[6] Ward, pp. 1-6.
[7] *Ency. Brit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 599.
[8] Routh, pp. 215, 246.
[9] ibid., p. 231.
[10] Ward, p. 42.
[11] Wingfield-Stratford, (4), p. 173.
[12] Laver, pp. 96-125.
[13] Cunnington, p. 203.
[14] Laver, pp. 124-39.
[15] Wingfield-Stratford, (4), pp. 314-5.
[16] *Ency. Brit.*, Vol. VII, pp. 656-8.
[17] Laver, pp. 137, 190, 181-92, 261.
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[19] Ward, pp. 25-8, 89, 99.
[20] Swinnerton, pp. 84-5.
[21] Routh, pp. 207, 241, 245, 246..
[22] ibid., pp. 207, 241, 245, 246-51.
[23] Swinnerton, p. 441.
[24] Ward, pp. 12, 14-16, 57-61; Livingstone, pp. 18-20.
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[26] Wingfield-Stratford, (4), pp. 284-5; Laver, p. 128.
[27] Collingwood, p. 155; Routh, pp. 206-7.
[28] *Ency. Brit.*, Vol. XVI, pp. 336, 343.
[29] Wingfield-Stratford, (4), pp. 17, 176, 177, 204, 205.
[30] Murray, pp. 175-6.
[31] *Ency. Brit.*, Vol. XVI, p. 347.
[32] *Ency. Brit.*, Vol. I, pp. 195-9; Wingfield-Stratford, (4), pp. 197-202; *Ency. Brit.*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 318-20.
[33] Wingfield-Stratford, (4), pp. 198-207, *Ency. Brit.*, Vol. XVII, p. 64.
[34] Wingfield-Stratford, (4), pp. 198-207; Laski Jennings and Robson, pp. 472, 478; *Ency. Brit.*, Vol. XI, p. 836; Vol. XX, p. 871.
[35] *Ency. Brit.*, Vol. X, pp. 22-3; Vol. XXII, pp. 332, 334; Vol. XXIII, p. 961; Geddes, pp. 251-375; Laski, Jennings and Robson, pp. 218, 486-90; *Ency. Brit.*, *Book of the Year*, 1938, p. 315.
[36] Durant, pp. 158-9, 180-1, 233-5; Burns, pp. 73-80, 93; *Ency. Brit.*, *Book of the Year* 1938, pp. 260-1, 591.
[37] Burns, pp. 73-5; Durant, pp. 233-5.
[38] *Ency. Brit.*, *Book of the Year*, 1938, p. 590; Wickwar, pp. 2-8; Durant, pp. 229-32; Barker, p. 75; Laski, Jennings and Robson, pp. 484-90.
[39] *Ency. Brit.*, Vol. XIV, p. 7; Laski, Jennings and Robson, pp. 245, 246, 262, 263; Simon, pp. 28-9; *The Political Quarterly*, Oct.-Dec. 1944, p. 286; Durant, p. 245; Peers, pp. 31-2.

* This was written in May 1945.

CHAPTER V

WHAT IS CIVILIZATION?

Clive Bell Answers

Clive Bell published his book, *Civilization*, in 1928. In it he developed an earlier unpublished essay, which was intended to be a part of another book planned long ago. He begins by telling his readers that it was Prof. Gilbert Murray or someone like him who at the time of the first World War, when England was looking for some word or idea to give life to and focus the feelings of the people in favour of the war, suggested that the democracies were fighting for civilization. Now the usage about civilization shows that civilization is considered as a means, and is a particular means to good, as distinguished from general means to good such as sun and rain. And when we speak of a civilized age we want to imply that the society flourishing in that age was civilized. Civilization or civility is thus most commonly ascribed to a group of human beings. Clive Bell thinks that it is less commonly and less correctly predicated of persons. An inquiry into the nature of civilization is, therefore, better conducted by studying the periods generally accepted to be highly civilized. He points out that the position of woman cannot be regarded as a mark of civility nor can sexual morality be looked upon as civilization. Much less can patriotism be looked upon as a civilized virtue. One thing is clear that civilization is something artificial. But that does not mean that the mechanical contrivances which are the appurtenances of civilization are of its essence.

Reviewing the periods of man's history which are admittedly highly civilized, he fixes upon: (1) the Athenian society from 480 to 323 B.C.; (2) Italy, in the fifteenth and early sixteenth century; and (3) France from 1653 to the Revolution as those deserving of the closest study. There is one other period of which there is some doubt, viz. the first and second centuries of the Roman Empire. Therefore, he leaves this out of consideration. Outside Europe there is first of all the Persian civilization. But he points out that there were two periods of high civilization in Persia: first, the Abbasid period with Harun-al-Rashid dominating in about A.D. 800 and the later period with the famous

Firdousi and Omar Khayyam. But he maintains that not enough is known in detail of these periods for him to gather from the respective authorities adequate material to unravel the nature of the civilization of Persia. He, therefore, leaves them out of account. Similarly, there are at least two periods of Chinese history, which are generally considered as periods of high civilization : the first, under the Tang Dynasty from A.D. 600 to 900 and the second, and perhaps the greater, under the Sung Dynasty from A.D. 960 to 1279. He thinks that from the little glimpse that one can get, China seems to have attained a state of exquisite refinement. But here too not enough is known whereby one can depict the ways, manners and behaviour of a cultured Chinese lady or gentleman of those epochs or can say exactly what moved them and how.

On a general comparison and valuation of his 'paragons' in European history, Bell thinks that of the three periods, all will agree with him in placing at the apex, the civilization of Athens of Pericles when civility was at its highest. As regards the Renaissance, he points out that it was not only in art that this age was great but its attempt at founding science too was remarkable. Physics, medicine and anatomy were studied and were brought almost to the point where the Greeks had left them. Geometry and physics were revived. Zoology and botany were taken up again. The men and women of the Renaissance were intensely concerned with spiritual values. That the Renaissance was a superstitious age is no ground against its high civility. Eighteenth-century France, 1653 to 1789, is an age less glorious than that of Pericles, and within it there is a division: the first part being rather a great age and the latter part more a civilized age. Bell insists that 'grandeur and civilization, though by no means incompatible, are not synonymous' and that this is the verdict of common usage.

Bell finds that the chief characteristics common to all these great periods are the 'acquisition of consciousness' and the habit of reflection which, in other words, are much better described as sense of values and enthronement of reason. By sense of values is meant the quality which leads those who possess it to sacrifice the 'obvious and immediate good to the more subtle and remote'. It is through this quality that people deliberately sacrifice comfort and seek beauty for its own sake The possession of this quality urges them to prefer a liberal to a technical education. They want an education which will teach

them how to live a full life rather than how to earn a living. Reason is enthroned in a society when the prevailing opinion insists on a rational explanation and justification of every experience and action. But that does not mean that all the individuals who form society usually and commonly act on reason or feel subtly. He thinks that even a society where large numbers of people are following the grossest superstition may be characterized by enthronement of reason. It must be borne in mind that perfect civilization has not been known actually so far. He maintains that arising out of this main characteristic there are a number of others, which go to make up a high civilization, and of which in human history a few are occasionally grasped and cultivated.

The only quality universally predicated of the Periclean Athenians is that they possessed exquisite sense of values and reasonableness. Greek life of that period exemplifies that ' Reason, sweetened by a Sense of Values ' and 'a Sense of Values, hardened and pointed by Reason ' were its governing principles. The respect paid in Athens to things of the intellect at that time is so well known as to need no further elaboration. Along with intellectuality the æstheticism of the Athenians, which led them sometimes to condone even an abominable crime, is note-worthy. And in both these there is evident an 'unwillingness to sacrifice style to comfort'. He finds that the same qualities were impressed on the lives of the Italians of the Renaissance. The eighteenth century, on the other hand, was not very greatly creative like the age of Pericles or the Renaissance. Yet the eighteenth century was such an appreciative period that it had essentially a highly civilized society. For the rich men and women of the century had cultivated tastes. The care for ease is no ground against considering the period as highly civilized. He describes the eighteenth century as an age ' in which the fire that glowed on the heights radiated to the upper middle class and perhaps just warmed the lower '. And it should be pointed out that perhaps as an offset the craving for knowledge in this century was extraordinary. In the words of Bell: ' Knowledge was the grand desideratum.' The eighteenth century, though it respected art, reserved its finest enthusiasm for things of the intellect. Athens had excelled in literature, the plastic arts, science and philosophy and the Athenians' enthusiasm for all had been boundless. The Renaissance which excelled in visual art and erudition reserved its most fiery

admiration for these. The generous heart of the eighteenth century 'obeying the same instinct thrilled most intensely to the triumphs of the speculative intelligence'. He draws particular attention to the extraordinary success of David Hume in Paris as Secretary to the British Embassy which was only due to his fame as a philosopher.

The first characteristic that seems to flow from the essential attribute of a sense of values is the maintenance of standards, below which things must not fall. In the eighteenth century we find it best exemplified in the standard of prose but the same spirit existed in other aspects of life. He contrasts the state of affairs between a society which believes in maintaining standards and another which does not. A society maintaining standards knows precisely what it wants and insists on getting it. Another not interested in the maintenance of standards does not know what it wants, much less insists on getting it. But it gets something and begins to like it, because it has got it. He institutes a contrast between the food served in England and that in the provincial hotels of France. In the English restaurants even with highly paid cooks one cannot obtain what one gets in the provincial hotels of France, because the clients have no standards. He remarks: 'It is a small thing: but that way barbarism lies.' It is a misunderstanding to think that because of the insistence on standards a highly civilized age is marked by absolute uniformity. What happens is that a civilized age respects tradition, art and such other things. But this tradition cannot dwindle into conventionalism or dead uniformity because the public in a civilized age is bound to be not only conservative but also sensitive. The uniformity marking highly civilized ages, far from being the quality of decadence or stagnation, presumes common sympathy and understanding between the artist and the public.

Insistence on standards fosters another characteristic which is the combined result of reasonableness and a sense of values and that is good manners and politeness. Uniformity and urbanity, characteristics of a high civilization, are reflected in the lives of the younger generation which can be illustrated by a contrast between an Englishman and a Frenchman who are growing in their societies. The life of a superior Englishman or woman has to be one of his or her assertion of personality against unsympathetic or even actively hostile conditions. A gifted young Englishman, therefore, grows more and more conscious of him-

self and into greater and greater isolation. On the other hand, the French youth has the thing made smooth for him through harmonious contact so that daily he is more conscious of solidarity rather than of isolation. As Bell remarks: 'France, in fact, has still a civilization. The English lad grows more and more individualistic....English civilization, or what passes for civilization, is so smug and hypocritical, so grossly philistine and at bottom so brutal, that every first-rate Englishman necessarily becomes an outlaw.' Comparing and contrasting the civilization of France and England still further, he observes that Englishmen have cherished a respect for privacy not to be met with in France. The individualist, the eccentric, the crank, and the genius have been tolerated and allowed to have their own existence. And that is the reason why 'the reputation of England as a nursery of originality and character stands, and deserves to stand high. It stands yet; but it may not stand much longer. There is a movement to undermine it'. He finds that compulsion and discipline are inculcated more and more. He is afraid that if this compulsion and discipline habit is cultivated, England would lose her individualism without thereby gaining civilization. It is clear that in spite of his low opinion of English civilization, Bell admires the English independence of mind and individualism which are prevalent, tolerated and even fostered.

Another characterstic which flows from a sense of values is that the possessor of this quality values knowledge and thought for their own sake and not for any ulterior purpose. He recognizes in them a direct means to good states of mind which are alone the proper ends for man. Disinterested pursuit of knowledge and disinterested inquiry also belong here. In this connexion he praises the utter disinterestedness of the Greeks, who 'sought truth for its own sake, and as a means to culture not as a means to power and comfort'. It is from a sense of values that a desire for liberal education is developed and is a characteristic of a highly civilized age. Vivid and exquisite experiences which are the ends of a civilized desire come from the development of self-expression and that can be achieved by those only who can think, feel and discriminate, who 'let the intellect play freely round every subject*, and the emotions respond appropriately to all stimuli'. Here it is that knowledge fulfils its purpose by enabling the intellect to rise over supersti-

* This is reminiscent of Matthew Arnold.

tion and prejudice. The philistine, on the other hand, wants education because he wants wealth or power through it.

A sense of values leads to individualism, which is also fostered by the enthronement of reason as it breeds a sense of supreme importance in the individual. This is a highly civilized characteristic. The Athenians were called upon quite often to reconcile the rights of citizens with the needs of the city and more often than not they succeeded in preserving the freedom of the personality without sacrificing the social demands. Similarly the Italians of the Renaissance were impressed by the importance of the individual and carried the glorification of personality rather too far. Their cultivation of personality even landed them into egoticism which was not the case in Periclean Athens or eighteenth-century France. One characteristic that is generally born of individualism is, strange to say, cosmopolitanism. By cosmopolitanism is here meant ascendancy over the operation of the herd instinct, which bears absolute sway over the barbarian and the savage. Bell observes: 'A civilized man sympathizes with other civilized men no matter where they were born or to what race they belong and feels uneasy with brutes and Philistines though they be his blood-relations living in the same parish.' The Athenian Greeks showed this characteristic and there are passages in Greek literature evincing their contempt for patriotic limitations. Bell points out that cosmopolitanism is more a characteristic of an individual than of a community and is a 'weapon with which civilization is apt to defend itself when nationalism becomes menacing'.

A highly developed sense of values issues in a sense of humour. It lies in the perception that it is ludicrous to take things too seriously. A sense of values enables a person to fix his attention on ends rather than on means and thereby enables him to develop this perception. It is only when ends are not clearly seen and means are allowed to cloud them that such things as trade, dignity, comfort, reputation are valued with an earnestness fit for ends only. It is in this attribute that the eighteenth-century Frenchmen were superior to the Athenians. But like comopolitanism, a sense of humour is characteristic of a person rather than of a society.

From enthronement of reason the first characteristic that arises is tolerance, that spirit of freedom which prevails alike in public and private affairs. Perennially interesting expression of this attribute of tolerance was given by Thucydides in the speech

which he put in the mouth of Pericles. This tolerance cannot be born of good taste by itself. There must be a belief in reason to enable this characteristic to manifest itself because reason alone can convince us that what we like is not necessarily good and what we believe is not necessarily true and, further, that all questions are open. The result of tolerance is maximum of self-expression for all, while intolerance, which ensues out of the exaltation of one's prejudices into principles, by stopping criticism and thought, curiosity and taste for experiment, does not countenance open-mindedness and thus impoverishes the intellectual life of a society. Bell points out that the Athenians who cared for Beauty and believed in Truth also had a religion which hindered almost nobody from speculating freely. He remarks: 'A formal respect for one or two ancient taboos they would require, but the only morality of which law and public opinion took much account was practical morality. A citizen was required not to commit grossly anti-social acts.' Enthronement of reason does not imply that the society of which that characteristic is postulated, is such that every individual member thereof behaves in a strictly rational way. Nor does tolerance mean that even false beliefs no less than superstitions ought to be tolerated. As a matter of fact, the eighteenth century, the century of enlightenment and reason, waged a war against superstition. Out of tolerance emerges absence of cruelty. Wanton cruelty is not a characteristic of civilization. Thus the laws of Athens forbade torture which was repugnant to the Athenian people. On the other hand, the Renaissance, with its strident individualism, is marred by some of the most outrageous and wanton brutalities. Eighteenth-century France had more humanity than the Renaissance. Enthronement of reason will lead individuals and societies to search their hearts and to put down manifestations of barbarous instincts.

Curiosity is another secondary attribute of civilization arising from the enthronement of reason. Not only discussion of fundamental questions but reasonable leisure and enjoyment of life is the necessary consequence of the enthronement of reason. Good temper and humanity are not necessarily incompatible with serious discussion of fundamental questions. The eighteenth century, with its insistence on the increase of happiness as the test of political life, is a fine example of this.

The first step towards civilization is taken when instinct is attempted to be corrected and guided by reason while the second,

and perhaps the more important, when man deliberately rejects immediate satisfactions with a view to obtaining better ones later on. The characteristics, rather the primary qualities, of high civilization have been found to be Reasonableness and a Sense of Values. We have noticed how Clive Bell traces from these primary qualities the rise of a number of secondary ones which characterize a civilization. They are taste, truth and beauty, intellectual honesty, tolerance, fastidiousness, a sense of humour, good manners, curiosity, a dislike of vulgarity and brutality, absence of over-emphasis, freedom from superstition and prudery, a fearless acceptance of the good things of life, a desire for complete self-expression, contempt for utilitarianism and philistinism and a desire for liberal education. He sums up all these in the two words, made famous by Matthew Arnold, Sweetness and Light.

Civilization considered in another light is an attitude. It is the flavour given to the self-expression of an age. It is manifest in manners and qualities, in conventions and laws, in social and economic organization as well as in literature, and science. A civilization showing the characteristics mentioned above becomes possible when a large number of individuals possessing these attributes form what may be called the civilized nucleus. And when this group influences thought and feelings and lends the colour of its attitude to that of the mass of the population of that generation then we have a civilized age and a civilized society. 'These men and women', therefore, 'are the creators and disseminators, the *sine qua non* of civility.' It is not necessary that these disseminators of culture should have created some important work in order that they may be the disseminators of culture. It is sufficient that in their life they have cultivated these characteristics and that their influence is felt. Bell tries to make a distinction between a civilized man and a good man. He stresses the importance of liberal education, cultivating as it does the disinterested pursuit of knowledge and stimulating, as it necessarily must, disinterested curiosity. He calls education our 'sixth sense'.

Further characterizing a civilized man, he again uses phrases made famous by Matthew Arnold, first describing history as 'the record of what the best and wisest have thought and felt' and speaking of the people showing prudery as those who never see 'steadily the whole of the thing itself'. A highly civilized man, in his opinion, can never get elected to a popular assembly. He

will have peculiar wants and peculiar desires, because he has individual taste and appreciation. As discriminating and conscious appreciation is the aim and creation of valuable mental states and their enjoyment is the end, he will not care for the so-called life of action. Bell remarks: 'Civilization, that elaborate protest of individual intelligence and sensibility against the flock instinct, will never accept reach-me-down standards or bow to the authority of shop-walkers.... Conscious of himself as an individual, he (a civilized man) will have little sympathy with the unanimities of the flock; by educating his mind, his emotion and his senses, he will elaborate a way of life which he will clear, so far as possible, of obstructive habits and passions.'

Discussing the question how to create a civilization, Bell starts with the observation that the only worth-while things are certain states of mind, viz. that of 'creation, contemplation, speculation and being in love'. According to the valuation of civilization, pleasures of intellect and emotion are considered superior to those of the senses. This civilization is desired by some but not necessarily by the large majority because the majority, though it desires pleasures, cannot take a long view. For a society or an age to be called civilized the influence of the disseminators or the civilized nucleus must be felt by the larger body of the general population. That is to say, a fair proportion of the population must show a critical attitude to life and a rudimentary taste for excellence. It is clear from this that if a society wants to be civilized it must assure the production of the civilized, that is, the nucleus of the highly civilized. Bell distinguishes the civilized nucleus by speaking of it as highly civilized as distinguished from the merely civilized, that is those 'who take colour from them'. In order that the highly civilized may exist in that condition a fair measure of material security is necessary. Thus, 'Civilization requires the existence of a leisured class, and a leisured class requires the existence of slaves—of people, I mean, who give some part of their surplus time and energy to the support of others'. Complete human equality according to him is not compatible with civilization but only with barbarism and savagery. A man without security and leisure cannot cultivate the most intense states of mind, which alone are the characteristics of 'completely civilized' men. Without such freedom such men will neither be able to cultivate their

receptivity to the highly valuable states of mind or to put them always in the way of 'Adventure'. Almost all types of money-making activities, being detrimental to the rise of such states, and conducive to the blunting of the intellect, it is clear that highly civilized men must be free from the necessity of such activities. It is in the essence of this liberty that such persons must be in a position wherein they need not consider the consequences of displeasing a person in power or a colleague or anybody else. Bell points out that past civilizations were based on inequality. He thinks 'that only a leisured class will produce a highly civilized and civilizing élite'.

The inequalities suggested above can exist even under a socialist regime. For the cost of maintaining such a leisured class would not be much compared with the expenditure on useless pleasures of the rich. The selection of this leisured class would be based on more rational principles. Perhaps a competitive examination might settle it. The number also may be kept low, just the minimum necessary. Precisely what sum should be paid to each man or woman of this class cannot be immediately decided but he mentions that under the circumstances prevalent about seven to eight hundred pounds a year—the State being responsible for the children—should suffice. Nor can the numbers of this class be fixed though one can say that their present English proportion is inadequate. He would so legislate that it would be impossible for the members of this class to increase their income. He would further remould the whole social organization in such a manner that 'the lower class, the workers, should have leisure and well-being enough to profit by the existence' of these élite. He quotes the opinion of Renan that 'the proper function of a leisured class is to stand aside from affairs and to devote itself to maintaining standards by sacrificing the useful to the comely, and preserving in honour the fine and difficult things of life'. It is also the opinion of Renan that the existence of a leisured class is absolutely essential for civility. He thought of aristocracy as being comprised of two sections, both of them brought up in more or less the same tradition and frequently intermingling. One part of the aristocracy after its training is to be entrusted with government and the other with cultivation of civility. Thus we have an aristocracy divided into an active and a contemplative section, the temporal and spiritual leaders of Comte's scheme. Bell thinks that the civilized élite should have nothing

to do with the exercise of power, which is a corroding influence for the finer sensibilities of man.

To the question, what form of government is most favourable to civilization, Bell's reply is that the form of government is almost immaterial and that the necessity of free institutions is not proved. He thinks that both Bolshevism under Lenin and Fascism under Mussolini may seek to foster the creation and nurture of culture which confers mysterious glamour on a nation, second only to military prowess. He also thinks that the success of these leaders in the capture of power may lead to their example being followed. Regarding the consequences of such a state of affairs, he observes: 'I do not know that civilization stands in the long run to lose by the change.... Few things are more coveted by an upstart Government than prestige.' He is convinced that civilization cannot be imposed by force, it being an attitude to life, which must manifest itself in ways of thinking and feeling. Civilization must be disseminated. He remarks: 'He who would civilize his fellows must allow them to discover for themselves that he has got hold of a better way of life; thus have superior civilizations been transmitted almost always. How often have barbarous, pillaging nations set out convinced of their superiority in all respects to the unwar-like race they were about to subjugate and assimilate? How often has history repeated itself?'

Characteristics of periods of high civilization as detailed by Clive Bell are more or less acknowledged by most writers on civilization and culture, whether they approach the subject from *a priori* viewpoint or from the study of past civilizations. He has been criticized for insisting on the creation of a leisured class of the élite charged with the duty and function of creating culture and maintaining standards. Most of the writers have acknowledged the need for the existence of the intellectuals and the élite for the maintenance of culture. Tawney has, however, objected to the contention that a leisured class is necessary and has pointed out the dangers of a culture of the leisured class remaining a kind of hot-house plant having no roots in the native soil. But appreciation of this danger need not lead one to deny the necessity of a class of élite whose business it is to create and disseminate civilization and culture and whose position is such that it can go on doing this without fear of consequences. It is true that Bell has failed to mention, as Tawney points out, humanism or respect for the dignity of man as a charac-

teristic of high civilization. But one who like Bell insists on the recognition of individuality and individualism and states that enthronement of reason breeds a sense of the supreme importance of the individual can hardly be said to have ignored it. It would be noticed that Bell sums up many of the characteristics of high civilization in the words of Matthew Arnold as Sweetness and Light and that he has not utterly forgotten 'adventures'. Bell while advocating the creation of a leisured class is not guided by a bias in favour of privilege. He proposes free selection of the members of this class and suggests moderate remuneration. For the populace at large he is not opposed to a scheme of socialistic organization. The most surprising part of Bell's thesis is his indifference to the form of government, which he thinks has no relation to culture. There is not only a large body of competent opinion but also a fair amount of evidence that this is not so and that for the nurture of a free culture, free institutions under a democratic regime are essential.

CHAPTER VI

A SPIRITUAL VIEW OF CULTURE

J. C. Powys

John Cowper Powys published his book, *The Meaning of Culture,* in 1930*. In the preface, he tells his readers, that he is not going to attempt the unwise task of presenting a definition of culture direct and asks them to gather their notion of culture from the indirect approaches he proposes to make. However, he feels it necessary to warn his readers against associating culture too closely with academic education and recommends as felicitous one definition of culture which emphasizes this view. It runs: 'Culture is what is left over after you have forgotten all you have definitely set out to learn.'

In the opinion of Powys, the function of culture is: 'Money and machines between them dominate the civilized world. Where these are checked to some extent by a certain public spirit, as in England, or by a certain semi-religious despotism, as in Russia and Italy, or where they produce widespread prosperity, as in America, their practical efficiency forces us to condone their abuse. But, between them, the power of money and the power of machine have distracted the minds of our Western nations from those eternal aspects of life and nature the contemplation of which engenders all noble and subtler thoughts.' What culture is to do is to save the individual from the industrial distractions and brace him up with adequate peace of mind. Culture will engender stoical attitude and enjoyment of life in a noble manner even amidst dim and ignoble surroundings. It is thus a definite orientation of mind and will and is of the nature of religion and love. Nay, it is a modern substitute for old religion, the latter becoming unattainable.

Culture forms the defensive mechanism of man in his attempt to face the grim realities of life in a manly manner, because it implies first, some kind of 'communion with the hypothetical first cause', and second, 'an obstinate determination to be happy at all costs'. The first feature engenders a curiously mixed feeling of gratitude and defiance. Culture leads its

* The book went into its third impression in 1932 and was first issued in the Traveller's Library in 1936 and reprinted in 1938.

votaries to a constant refining of their analyses of truth, beauty and goodness, and ultimately to the direct recognition of the goodness, of the human heart. It thus engenders, or rather must finally do so, 'courteous and compassionate goodness'. It will foster the highly essential virtues of 'imaginative compassion and self-controlled courtesy' towards people who impinge on our solitude. 'Culture and self-control are synonymous terms—no refining of one's taste in æsthetics or in literature can palliate the enormity of being guilty of ungovernable anger.'

In spite of his equating culture with self-control Powys laments that the finest culture very often weakens and even disintegrates the inner core of a person. On the other hand, persons with less culture display a more resolute and resistant core. He maintains that a negative correlation exists between intelligence and will-power. The explanation would appear to be that persons of weak will, that is deficient in the more primitive forces of life, think of and cultivate culture. He suggests that a strong character, which is the result of the toughening of the fibres of one's personality, is antithetical to culture, which involves sensitivizing one's faculties to the subtleties of things. In support of this contention may be quoted his observation regarding practical men. He says: 'In fact it often may be noted that the more competent a person grows in his handling of practical life, the more blunt, opaque, and impenetrable he grows in regard to the imponderable influence of the intellect and the senses.'

The conviction that practical life or life of incessant action is the hallmark of hardened and wilful personalities and the belief that 'contemplation, not activity of any sort, is the purpose of the universe' are reflected in Powys' view of culture. Admitting that for certain natures action brings the most 'subtle and tingling sense of happiness' and that there are persons for whom 'analytical or synthetic thought, free from emotional reaction other than pure intellectual delight, is in itself happiness', he insists that 'the most thrilling happiness possible to man proceeds from pure contemplation'. It is well known that the highest ecstasy of contemplation belongs to the region of love and religion, with which, as already stated, Powys relates culture. He is so convinced about the unity of contemplation with culture that he designates the doctrine of 'service' as the 'new-fangled, commercialized motto' and calls upon culture to beat it off. Indeed, so enamoured of this contemplative ideal of

culture does he get that he is led to remark: 'And every day dream, begotten of pleasant leisure, by well-side or fire-side or window-sill, is a sort of "chewing of the end" of immortal and god-like contemplation, and is worthy of a high place in the order of a good life.'

Finally, he tells his readers that his view of culture, which has much in common with religious faith, which many sections of humanity have preached for over two thousand years, is only one of the possible views. Education plays a comparatively small part in the cultivation of culture. Culture further holds an agnostic attitude towards God and is tolerant of much. It seeks and attains happiness because it constitutes 'a certain secret, mental and imaginative effort of one's own, continued day by day, and year by year, until it becomes a permanent habit belonging to that psyche or inner nucleus of personality, which used to be called the soul'. Culture in order to fulfil its function of being a substitute for religion, to engender a stoical attitude and by rendering its practitioners impervious to the disturbing elements of the reality of life, to generate happiness must cultivate a method for producing the requisite calmness of mind. This calm must not be confounded with the resigned indifference toward misery and pleasure, a certain imperturbableness of mind, which a number of religious systems have preached. The calm of culture proceeds from the recognition of the fact that the 'lamentable differences in good and bad fortune spring entirely from luck'. It is born of our 'legitimate pride in just being what we are'. Recognizing that 'the orientals are adepts at certain spiritual devices by which an inward calm is attainable in the midst of jolting and jarring confusion', he exhorts his non-oriental readers to 'catch the secret of some concentration of mind'.*

Powys takes care to assure his readers that the world which his stoicism contemplates is not 'the mystical "overworld" of oriental philosophy' but it is the actual world of concrete and palpable presences.

Having seen what culture is and what it is designed to accomplish for its practitioners, we shall attempt to understand what repercussions the practice of culture will have on society. How will a cultured man or woman behave? What relations he or she will have in society?

* Readers of the *Bhagawadgita* will remember how Lord Krishna has dwelt on the need of concentration in the endeavour of achieving blissful equanimity and the simple procedure for procuring it he has laid down.

Culture involves some kind of individual philosophy and implies individual thought which are bound to condense and harden into 'a will to live according to one's thought'. A cultured man tries to abide by his own taste. 'With a cultured man there is no gap or lacuna between his opinions and his life. Both are dominated by the same organic, inevitable fatality. They are what he is.' He is like an aristocrat who takes himself for granted and does not bother to justify himself.

A truly cultured man will prefer culture to power, fame, money or prosperous practical activity. Even as regards service on behalf of a noble cause, such a person will effect some kind of a compromise between the demands of the heroic cause and of culture. Culture tends, or rather must tend, to be as serious as religion for which it is a substitute. Like the neophyte of religion the votary of culture 'soon learns to accept as inevitable the world's careless accusations of priggishness and fastidiousness. He is not ashamed of lack of warm-blooded herd instincts which pour persons and their opinions and activities into a mould'. Though highly cultured individuals are known to be extremely gregarious, yet easy sociability is in the generality of cases a hindrance to any deep intellectual and imaginative life. As it is, a good deal of one's time has ordinarily to be spent in earning one's living and if the free moments of one's life are further spent in pleasant social intercourse, there is left hardly any time for self-cultivation. Moreover, such life is in itself detrimental to culture. Powys observes: 'The enjoyment of what is called having a good time is often a far more serious hindrance to an intelligent consciousness of the subtleties of life than the most momentous drudgery.' He thinks that of the total psychic force emanating from an individual only about one-tenth is unique and original, the rest being common. And it is this one-tenth, which because of its nature, is rather delicate, that gets swamped and annihilated in the process of 'ordinary pleasant chatter' of social life.

Culture, being an acquired taste, is opposed to 'the barbarian of tasteless taste', 'evoked by our megalopolitan civilization'. The choice of books distinguishes a cultured person from the barbarian, the difference being of the order of that between 'the children of light and the children of perdition'. The former avoids, 'like the plague, the countless clever witty, lively, lurid, fantastical stories that flood our bookshops and our popular magazines'. This choice is not born of pride but of proper

appreciation and humility; for 'Life is short and the number of books is appalling. It is a kind of insanity to satiate oneself with short sensation-tales and detective-tales and leave untouched the great, slow, deep-breathed classics.'

One of the means by which a cultured person insures his happiness is the strengthening of self-respect and pride of the person. Powys defines pride as 'an integral feeling of self-respect associated with what we may call a person's life-illusion'. Attainment of culture teaches its votary to hold 'in deep contempt all the opinions of the crowd and all objective and worldly standard'. A cultured person thus cannot get the feeling of being a failure. Needless to say, he cannot have ambition which is 'the grand enemy of peace'.

'Compromise is so profoundly of the inmost essence of life, that it might be called life's basic and fundamental law. The opposite of selling one's soul is suicide. The alternative to compromise is death.' Hence it follows that one has sometimes to compromise, to sell one's soul. But while doing this the cultured man does it so frankly and honestly without white-washing or idealizing one's action, all the while trying to reduce the field where he has to compromise. He never takes this business of soul-selling for granted.

The general behaviour of a cultured person towards other individuals in society must be one which would ensue from looking upon them 'as under the absolute domination of fate in all their ways and words and feelings', while looking upon oneself as entirely free regarding one's words, feelings and ways towards others. The supreme role of luck in effecting differences in good and bad fortunes of oneself and others will be fully recognized by a cultured person. Such a realization will teach the votary of culture not to assume superior airs. He will have realized that 'the only superiority worth anything is the superiority of being happier'. The reading of the great classics of literature helps in this process of the cultivation of humility.

The life of culture is like a pilgrimage and has to contend against a number of difficulties which Powys clearly states, some of them being inherent in the very nature of culture. Defeatism, for example, may easily result as a consequence of the intellectual scepticism which is an important component of culture. Clever and smart common sense in literary taste is another obstacle to culture, because 'a commonplace sense of the comic can betray a naive intelligence into the delusion that

what is rare and delicate is unnatural and affected . Sensitive personalities find it rather difficult to strike a balance between standing by their own peculiar tastes and extending them in new directions, particularly as we have plenty of dogmatic guides. Finally, native goodness of heart leads many a would-be votary of culture into active practical life which withers away the flower of culture. Want of leisure and solitude is a common hindrance to the cultivation of culture and is of social making.

I shall close this brief summary of a highly literary book with an important passage occurring almost at its end which states the writer's view on the relation between public opinion and culture. 'Public opinion is always trying to democratize culture—in other words, to prostitute it and change it. Public opinion led by affected rhetoricians—is always seeking to encourage the latest fashions and obsessions in thought, religion and taste. Against all this, culture stands firm ; founding itself upon the eternal elements of Nature and human nature.'

There is much in Powys' view of culture which is common to the views on culture of Arnold and Russell, particularly its being a kind of religion very helpful to individuals in their routine conduct of life as well as on occasions of crisis. Yet Powys' view is much more spiritual than theirs and that is why Powys cannot merely rest on right reason but has to stress the need for finding out ways and means of engendering controlled and calm state of mind. In recommending withdrawal from very active life Powys goes much beyond Arnold, thus making his view of culture rather sicklied. Emerson's view seeks to establish balance between society and solitude such as will not wither away culture but will make it effective and fruitful.

CHAPTER VII

WHAT IS CIVILIZATION?

Whitehead Answers

Alfred North Whitehead published *Adventures of Ideas* in 1933. As he explains in his preface, the book embodies a study of the concept of civilization and represents the author's endeavour to understand how civilized beings are formed. He has not clearly defined the concept of civilization, which, as he tells his readers towards the end of the book, is very baffling. There he remarks that civilization suggests 'a certain ideal for life on this earth, and this ideal concerns both the individual human being and also societies of men'. He points out that though the adjective civilized is, and can be, applied both to an individual as well as a whole society, the sense in the two cases is not identical. He has not particularized the distinction in meaning between the two usages. The general notion, according to him, is elusive but particular examples are fairly easy He mentions the Greeks and the Romans at the best periods as the standards of civilization looked up to and imitated by the Western peoples. Further on, instead of a general definition of civilization, he states the five qualities which, in his opinion, a civilized society exhibits, to which I shall refer later. Joint realization of these qualities in social life constitutes civilization.

In the earlier part of the book in following the adventures of certain ideas in the march of human progress, he has drawn upon human history from about 1500 B.C. onwards to contemporary times. In his own words, he is discussing the later phases of human history when 'civilization has reached its modern height, a period of three thousand years at the most'. In this review naturally are utilized Mesopotamian, Hellenic, Hellenistic, Roman and Christian periods of the history of the Asiatic and the European peoples. Perhaps, his idea of what constitutes civilization may also be gathered from a few remarks about the period when civilization in his opinion appears in its later phases. He observes: 'Thinkers have now arisen. The notion of duty has dawned and received some definition. Above all the notion of a psyche—that is, of a mind—has dawned.' Of the two obvious characteristics of Nature, power and beauty, the

latter dawned upon human intelligence later than the former. That is why in all stages of civilization the popular gods typify the brutalities of early life and religious feeling develops with their progressive denunciation. 'The keynote of idolatry is contentment with the prevalent gods.'

Apart from the qualities that he later on postulates of civilized society and the characteristics of the later phases of civilization incidentally mentioned by him and noticed above, his remark about civilization, stressing one important characteristic of civilization, is the nearest approach to his definition of that concept. It is: 'Civilization is the maintenance of social order, by its own inherent persuasiveness as embodying the nobler alternative.' The other alternative is force which, however unavoidable, is 'a disclosure of the failure of civilization, either in the general society or in a remnant of individuals'. There is always an element of unrest in a live civilization, wherein, because of the nobler alternative, a number of minds are ever sensitive to new ideas. If civilized order survives such unrest, it does so because of its inherent merits, which make it by far the more desirable alternative, and also because in a civilized society people recognize the inevitability of imperfections. In the last part of the book, where Whitehead discusses the qualities of a civilized society, he identifies civilization with art, whose aims are identical with those of civilization. He observes: 'For civilization is nothing other than the unremitting aim at the major perfections of harmony.'

Civilization is constituted out of the following four elements: (1) technologies, (2) patterns of belief, (3) patterns of emotion, (4) patterns of behaviour. Technologies are not the subject-matter of the book though it is the action and interaction of all the four elements, that constitutes civilization. Of the three remaining elements, patterns of behaviour are sustained or modified by patterns of emotion and of belief. And patterns of emotion and belief are the primary business of religion. In this connexion, he points out as a result of his survey of the adventures of ideas, that new general ideas can acquire an appropriate emotional pattern of some intensity only very tardily. It is, therefore, much easier to destroy emotions centred round general beliefs and ideas than to generate them. General ideas impress very faintly on the human mind. This fact explains the situation that even trained minds find it difficult to comprehend

fully ideas expressed in diverse phraseologies. That also will explain to some extent the fact of 'religion' being so often equated with 'hatred', though 'the great social ideal for religion is that it should be the common basis for the unity of civilization'. That is why civilizations can be understood only by those who are themselves civilized. He points out that holding up the standard of the Greeks is not only backward looking but limits the vision of Western people to one type of social excellence. In the circumstances of today when knowledge has altered the proportions of things, the particular example of an ancient society, however great, is bound to prove too static and narrow as an ideal. Therefore 'the definition of culture as the knowledge of the best that has been said and done' is not only incomplete but dangerous.* It is likely to foster decadence without our realizing it. And let it be remembered in this connexion that the Greeks themselves, who are so much admired, were not copyists. A living civilization though it requires learning lies beyond it. Adventure and originality are its life-blood. Adventure enables it to avoid stagnation, which will otherwise set in because of the needs of routine and uniformity.

Regarding the roles of understanding and routine in social life, Whitehead observes: 'Now it is the beginning of wisdom to understand that social life is founded upon routine. Unless society is permeated, through and through, with routine, civilization vanishes. So many sociological doctrines, the products of acute intellects, are wrecked by obliviousness to this fundamental sociological truth. Society requires stability, foresight itself presupposes stability, and stability is the product of routine. But there are limits to routine, and it is for the discernment of these limits, and for the provision of the consequent action, that foresight is required. The two extremes of complete understanding and of complete routine are never realized in human society. But of the two, routine is more fundamental than understanding, that is to say, routine modified by minor flashes of short-range intelligence. Indeed the notion of complete understanding controlling action is an ideal in the clouds, grotesquely at variance with practical life.'

Discussing the development of the doctrine of freedom and the history of its application, Whitehead stresses the importance

* Readers of Matthew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy* will recognize in this reference to his insistence but will also remember that he does not advise us to be content with knowledge of the best that has been written.

of tolerance as a requisite of high civilization. He refers to the speech of Pericles as reported by Thucydides and observes: 'It puts forth the conception of the organized society successfully preserving freedom of behaviour for its individual members. Fifty years later, in the same social group, Plato introduced deeper notions from which all claims for freedom must spring. His general concept of the psychic factors in the Universe stresses them as the source of all spontaneity and ultimately as the ground of all life and motion. The human psychic activity thus contains the origins of precious harmonies within the transient world. The end of human society is to elicit such psychic energies. But spontaneity is of the essence of soul. Such in outline is the argument from Platonic modes of thought to the importance of social freedom.' Whitehead, therefore, urges general tolerance on two grounds: 'The duty of tolerance is our finite homage to the abundance of inexhaustible novelty which is awaiting the future, and to the complexity of accomplished fact which exceeds our stretch of insight.'

While social tolerance is a characteristic of high civilization, civilization can itself exist in a particular type of population. A majority of the population must possess, achieve or cultivate the fortunate mutual adaptation between their emotions, purposes and actions. Such adaptation and co-ordination, unfortunately, is not manifest in any society in a minority of individuals, while in the case of most men some of their actions are not completely co-ordinated with the social norm. That is to say, as previously stated, there is always some amount of unrest. And the unfortunate fact that 'a minority of adverse individual instances when unchecked, is sufficient to upset the social structure' makes it impossible that unrestricted individual liberty can be allowed in a society that desires to be not only highly civilized but even merely civilized. Hence as Whitehead points out : 'There can be no evasion of the plain fact that compulsion is necessary and that compulsion is the restriction of liberty. It follows that a doctrine as to the social mingling of liberty and compulsion is required.'

This issue in his opinion is being adjusted in contemporary Western civilization in a manner which for its effectiveness 'presupposes a wide distribution of institutions founded upon professional qualifications and exacting such qualifications'. This presupposes the turning of occupations into professions.

A profession is an avocation which is subjected to theoretical analysis and is modified in accordance with it. The purposes of the avocation and the suitable methods for their attainment are the basis of such adaptation. The precise antithesis of a profession is an avocation carried on through customary activities and influenced only by individual experiences. Whitehead calls such an avocation a craft. He emphasizes the distinction between the ancient civilizations and modern life by observing that the former were dominated by crafts while the latter is depending progressively on professions. This distinction between crafts and professions is not quite clear cut and the dominance of abstract mentality in the lives of individuals is not a sure criterion for ranking this type of man as higher. On the other hand he observes, 'a due proportion of craftsmanship seems to breed the finer types'. He instances the disproportionate brilliant ability observed in Europe, in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries. This insurgence of ability suggests that the best harmony between craftsmanship and professionalism was achieved in those centuries. Avocations modified into professions and consequently organized through self-governing institutions change the problem of liberty and achieve the due qualification referred to above. For the institution has the liberty but it exercises control over its constituent individuals, without immediate reference to the State. He further points out that this form of liberty was exemplified in the guilds of the Middle Ages. He also notes that in the Middle Ages there was 'remarkable growth of civilized genius'. Two other institutions of the civilization of the sixteenth century are the Catholic Church and the Universities. The Church was almost already in decay, the middle classes, whether scholars or traders, having nothing to do with it. The Universities too were secondary, and the great thinkers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were not connected with the Universities. The Universities slowly shrank to the national proportions, yet survived the changes that came about during these centuries. The Church too was no longer European but became national.

It was not till the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in spite of the rampant individualism of their political philosophies, that there was a growth of institutions based on modern intellectual interest which were, nationally speaking, impartial. Whitehead observes: 'These were the centuries in which science

triumphed and science is universal. Thus scientific institutions though in form national informally established a catholic league. Again the advance of scholarship, and of natural science, transformed the professions. It intellectualized them far beyond their stage of advance in earlier times.' These professional institutions, though they are national, are international in their foundations and loyalties. There is a complex interweaving of Universities and more specialized institutions. Regarding the function of these and interrelation between them on the one hand and the State and the general community on the other, Whitehead points out that it really turns on the problem of freedom. The State representing the general wisdom of the community possesses an experience broader than the respective topics of the various sciences. Its role, therefore, must be limited to the formation and execution of a general judgement on the activities of these institutions. Thus it can and should ascertain whether the institutions rank high among similar institutions throughout the world, whether they welcome and foster ability, etc. But it cannot legitimately choose to decide on questions which come within the purview of various sciences or professions. And this will be all to the good. Taking the example of the teaching profession, he points out that the young students cannot be left to be taught whatever the whims of the individual teachers dictate. Claims for such freedom for individual teachers is nonsense. On the other hand, 'the general community is very incompetent to determine either the subject matter to be taught or the permissible divergences to be allowed, or the individual competence. There can be only one appeal, and this is to general professional opinion as exhibited in the practice of accredited institutions. The appeal is catholic'. The importance and significance of the Universities and specialized professional institutions is thus summarized: 'In the more important fields of thought, opinion is free and so are large divergencies of practice. The community is provided with objective information as to the sort of weight to be attached to individuals and as to the sort of freedom of action which may safely be granted. Whatever is done can be subjected to the test of general professional opinion, acting through this network of institutions. Further, even large freedom can now be allowed to non-professional individuals. For the great professional organizations, so long as they are efficient, should be able to demonstrate the dangers of extravagant notions. In this way,

where sudden action is not in question, reason has obtained an entrenchment which should be impregnable.'

By freedom generally is meant freedom of the press, freedom for religious opinion and freedom of thought while freedom of action which is primary human need is not prominently thought of. Whitehead thinks that 'the essence of freedom is the practicability of purpose' and that 'mankind has chiefly suffered from the frustration of its prevalent purposes'. The best expression of this aspect of freedom in his opinion is presented by the economic interpretation of history. It is a significant fact that this interpretation is so recent. Whitehead's explanation of this fact is that in all ages the intellectuals generally belonged to that fortunate section of their society whose basic human wants were amply satisfied. This fortunate circumstance of a preponderate number of intellectuals not only blinded them to the life of the masses, in which their basic needs being not satisfied, the frustration of prevalent purpose could have been manifest, but also led to the salutary absence of dominance of basic needs in their thought. The latter consequence of the fortunate position of the élite is described as salutary because it enabled the growth of taste. The consequences of the fortunate circumstances of the élite of all ages to civilization are thus described: 'The motives which stir the fortunate directing classes to conscious activity have a long-range forecast and an æsthetic tinge: power, glory, safety in the distant future, forms of government, luxury, religion, excitement, dislike of strange ways, contemplative curiosity, play.' The abstract interests of the minority were thus fostered. The masses, excitable and partially unstable, could be made to subserve these interests. Yet the facts of economic life with its requirement of minimum satisfaction are there. The ends pursued by the minority, good and bad, permeate the intellectually quiescent masses. It is for the pursuit of these general ends, a combination of ideal and economic policies, that freedom is demanded. Such an order, such an epoch, such a civilization proceeds on its course till it is upset, till the excitability and instability of the masses and their instincts quickened by economic urge are harnessed to some simple ideal end by intellect, when such ardour passes away. Freedom thus means that, of the many types of character 'within each type the requisite co-ordination should be possible without the destruction of the general end of the community. Indeed, one general end is that these variously

co-ordinated groups should contribute to the complex pattern of community life, each in virtue of its own peculiarity. In this way, individuality gains the effectiveness which issues from co-ordination and freedom obtains power necessary for its perfection.' And Whitehead is convinced that though 'this is the hope of the statesmen, and the solution which the long course of history is patiently disclosing', yet 'it is not the intuition which has nerved men to surpass the limitations of mankind'. In this conviction it is clear that Whitehead is thinking of some freedom which is on a different plane and absolute. He himself tells us it is the freedom at which Plato was groping, which the Stoics and Christians received from Hellenism. That freedom is entirely different from the freedom which we have been so far discussing and the limitations to which arise only from our fellow men. There are the laws of physical nature which bind man and even frustrate his purpose and imprison the soul. It is the freedom from birth and death, heat and cold, hunger, disease and separation that is the ultimate freedom which Whitehead has in view.

There are two types of ideas required for successful civilization. First, there are necessary philosophic ideas of high generality; and second, particularized ideas of low generality. Through the former, each ideal end is realized in the immediate present and adventure towards novelty—which is an essential characteristic of civilization—is guided. Through particularized ideas, the fruit of the particular civilization is enjoyed in the living present. Among the ideas of high generality are those that are concerned with the conception of the nature of things, of the possibility of human society and of the aim that shóuld guide the conduct of individuals. The cosmological outlook, that is, the conception of the nature of things, is reflected in the current motives of action, but derivative ideas from this attitude are more lively as the intellectual strife generally centres round them. Other generalities pertain to purely mundane affairs. One such generality is the idea of the human soul, and the humanitarian ideal flowing from it is the ideal of the essential rights of human beings irrespective of other considerations. This generality is more conveniently termed the notion of Freedom and Equality. It is seen, in the history and progress of this idea, how the general idea, in fighting its way against the current ideas and consequent structure of society, gave rise to a whole literature on the

subject which as Whitehead observes, 'explains how inspiring is the general idea and how slight need be its effect in disturbing a comfortable society'. It also demonstrates how, 'a general idea is always a danger to the existing order'. The ramifications of the general idea provide a programme of reform and at any time the smouldering discontent of mankind seizing on some aspect of the programme may initiate a rapid change. It should be noted that the triumph of this general idea has been very slow.

Nevertheless, the slow fructification of general ideas into practice is not entirely due to defects in human character. The defect is inherent in the nature of the problem and the social life of man. The difficulty is this: 'It may be impossible to conceive a re-organization of society adequate for the removal of some admitted evil without destroying the social organization and the civilization which depend upon it.' Another difficulty may be: 'There is no known way of removing the evil without the introduction of worse evils of some other type.' It must, therefore, be borne in mind that 'the final introduction of a reform does not necessarily prove the moral superiority of the reforming generation'. It may only mean that the conditions in the reforming generation have changed. 'A great idea is not to be conceived as merely waiting for enough good men to carry it into practical effect. That is a childish view of the history of ideas. The ideal in the background is promoting gradual growth of the requisite communal customs adequate to sustain the load of its exemplification.' There are two sets of factors and agencies which drive mankind from its old anchorage to its new havens. The role of the senseless agencies, the physical factors, is not the subject-matter of Whitehead's book. It is the function of consciously formulated ideas, the beliefs and aspirations of mankind, which is the other agency of change, that is treated in it. And, as we have just seen, these aspirations and ideals are divided into two classes by Whitehead. The purpose of the ideas of high generality has been so far adumbrated and the *modus operandi* of this functioning is also partially stated in the last quotation. Now it only remains to add that this happens in no mysterious way. The process as described by Whitehead is this: 'The ideals cherished in the souls of men enter into the character of their actions. These interactions within society modify the social laws by modifying the occasions to which those laws apply.' It is, therefore, that Whitehead fittingly describes these

ideas as, 'gadflies irritating and beacons luring the victims among whom they dwell'.

The need of routine in social life has already been stressed. The role of general ideas and the slow process of their fructification is now emphasized. If routine is four-fifths of life, there must be some part which must be the element of novelty. This element and its precise proportions in the life of any society has varied in the history of mankind from time to time. In the present age the element of novelty is too prominent to be missed. An understanding of the growth of new general ideas may be facilitated by a study of the reaction of man to the elements of novelty. If this knowledge can be gathered. our understanding of the process can be projected—we would be, in short, provided with what Whitehead calls Foresight. Foresight, the understanding of social trends, is the counterpart of routine. The role of foresight is studied in relation to commercial relations. Whitehead takes up commercial relations for consideration because, first, Commerce, has been one of the principal activities of European mankind from the age of Charlemagne onwards; second, the ideal of commercial activity was followed in the nineteenth century as the main occupation of perfected civilization; and third, of the three chief activities of mankind which have promoted the dominant characteristic of civilization, viz. persuasion, the practice of Commerce is very important. Success of business entirely depends on foresight. And to have that foresight one must understand, 'the entire internal functioning of human society, including its technologies, the biological and physical laws on which these technologies depend, and the sociological reactions of humans depending on fundamental psychological principles. In fact, the general topic is sociology in the broadest sense of the term, including its auxiliary sciences. Such a width of understanding is, of course, beyond the grasp of any single man. But no part of it is entirely foreign to the provision of foresight in business. Such a complete understanding is a co-operative enterprise.' The necessity of foresight for continuance of civilized life will be best appreciated if it is remembered that our sociological theories, political philosophy and political economy, educational theory and business maxims are derived from a tradition which is continuous from the fifth century B.C. to the end of the nineteenth century. This tradition is based on the assumption that 'each generation will substantially live amid the conditions governing the lives of its

fathers and will transmit those conditions to mould with equal force the lives of its children', whereas, as Whitehead pertinently points out, 'we are living in the first period of human history for which this assumption is false'. The history of civilizations reveal that no civilization has been self-supporting and that a civilization that has been born has culminated and decayed. The cause of such decay Whitehead traces to the inherent defects of cities. Here is field for foresight, which has provided the necessary endeavour against their inherent defects. The result has been that the opposite tendency for cities to rear civilization has been observed in the immediate past. The recent trend in technology makes it possible to obviate the concentration of industrial activities in dense cities and conglomeration of its population in its immediate suburbs. What is the consequence of this for cities and for civilization? Whitehead believes that though the sociology necessary for this foresight is beyond the grasp of any man, the 'habit of general thought undaunted by novelty, the gift of philosophy', if applied to the survey of society may be of great use.

Commerce is important as an index of the quality of civilization. For in Whitehead's opinion, a society can only be understood by knowing 'what sort of people undertook what sort of functions in that society'. He points out that both China and Persia at the height of their prosperity nurtured social life of greater grace than contemporary European. And yet in spite of their commerce which existed in ancient times, these civilizations remained stunted. He suggests that the explanation perhaps lies in the difference of attitude towards commerce which characterized Chinese and Persian civilization on one side and the European on the other. It is clear that a simple motive of success leads to a short-sighted policy in business relation and proves in the long run detrimental to prosperity. The business community of a society is an important and an integral part of that society. The quality of the business mind is strongly impressed on the behaviour of the society. Whitehead, therefore, defines a great society as 'a society in which its men of business think greatly of their functions'. Further, 'low thoughts mean low behaviour and, after a brief orgy of exploitation, low behaviour means a descending standard of life'.

Whitehead also mentions, slightly mystically, the growth of reverence for Nature, for ideal ends, as the culmination of the process of civilization. We think that it is the

same thing as some kind of religious spirit, some kind of spirituality which is concerned with our reactions to our intuition into the ultimate mystery of the universe referred to by him elsewhere. Suffice it for our purpose that mankind at the present moment is standing at a juncture from where the future course depends upon, 'the calm reasonableness arising from a religious public opinion'. It is noteworthy that Whitehead already sees the initial triumph of the incursion of religious spirit in public affairs of men in the successful negotiations that took place in April 1931 in India between Mahatma Gandhi and Lord Irwin. This is the new reformation that he speaks of. Therein, in his opinion, Christianity has a significant role to play. He therefore urges upon the leaders of religious thought to concentrate upon the Christian tradition and its historical origins in order that Christianity may be popular and effective. He says, 'the great social ideal for religion is that it should be the common basis for the unity of civilization'. Yet it is not mere Christianity or even religion, that is to say, one of the widely prevalent creeds, that Whitehead has finally in view as the culmination of civilized life. For he hearkens back to Plato and his vision called 'virtue'. He observes : 'Mankind is now in one of its rare moods of shifting its outlook. The mere compulsion of tradition has lost its force. It is our business—philosophers, students and practical men—to re-create and re-enact a vision of the world, including those elements of reverence and order without which society lapses into riot, and penetrated through and through with unflinching rationality. Such a vision is the knowledge which Plato identified with virtue. Epochs for which, within the limits of their development, this vision has been widespread are the epochs unfading in the memory of mankind.'

At a few places Whitehead has introduced the concept of progress which is only an aspect of civilization. As he conceives it, 'progress consists in modifying the laws of Nature so that the Republic on Earth may conform to that Society to be discerned ideally by the divination of Wisdom'. For progress both speculation and scholarship are necessary. Speculation is superficially sceptical and is ranged against established tradition. It is grounded in the faith of omnipotence and supremacy of reason. Scholarship, on the other hand, is superficially favourable to belief and is based on accepted methodology. The tone of mind, however, in which it flourishes is fundamentally

oriented towards negation, the scholar not being very kind to any speculation trying to establish connexion between his province of knowledge and that of his neighbour. At all periods of culminating greatness in human history the usual strife between speculation and scholarship is replaced by a happy balance. But at the peak of achievement, excessiveness in favour of speculation becomes apparent. In this excessiveness Whitehead discovers, 'the reason for the tragic transience of supreme moments in human life'. If a proper balance between speculation and scholarship cannot be struck, scholarship is to be preferred; for 'pure speculation, undisciplined by the scholarship of detailed fact or the scholarship of exact logic, is on the whole more useless than pure scholarship unrelieved by speculation'. In the history of the adventure of the idea of the inherent worth of the human individual, Whitehead finds that, 'successful progress creeps from point to point, testing each step'.

The question of the ideal State is of no mean significance for the discussion of the basis, nature and content of civilization. Whitehead seems to record his inclination in favour of the democratic State and points out the supreme condition of its success. In this connexion, he refers to Plato's idea that the ideal State cannot be established till philosophers are kings. He fundamentally approves of the idea but points out that in an age of democracy, 'the kings are the plain citizens pursuing their various avocations'; and the success of democratic society, he maintains, will not be possible till these 'kings' are provided with a philosophic outlook through education.

Above are brought together some of the ideas and opinions of Whitehead regarding the nature, content, development and decay of civilization, scattered through his book. Now I shall present a very brief summary of the adventure of one important idea which has made civilization what it is. The general conception of the status of the individual members of society without reference to their special status is a fundamental idea that affects almost every detail of activity in that society. The old civilizations, Hellenic and Hellenistic Roman, were based on the universal assumption that a large slave-population was essential to their upkeep. And this assumption was so common that great persons, however different their views on other matters and however different their activities might be, whether it was Pericles,

or Cleon, Plato or Alexander, Marius or Sulla, Cicero or Cæsar—all universally believed in that assumption. Yet it was Plato who first conceived the notion of basing the ideal relations between individuals on intrinsic attributes of human beings. But neither he nor anyone else led a campaign against slavery. His ideas manifested themselves through the humanization of treatment of their slaves by Athenian masters. Similarly, the Stoic lawyers of the Roman Empire introduced legal reforms largely motivated by the principle of the essential rights of human beings, with more or less similar consequences. The ethical ideal of the dignity of the human soul and of the essential rights of human beings was fermenting for nearly six centuries without removing the chief blemish of slavery, characteristic of the Mediterranean Civilizations. Whitehead, therefore, speaks of this 'ideal of the intellectual and moral grandeur of the human soul' only as 'the faint light of the dawn of the new order of life'. Christianity assimilated the Platonic doctrines and insisted on their absolute application without any thought of the preservation of society, till 'in the Middle Ages institutional Christianity was honourably distinguished as a driving force towards grander institutions'. But after a short period of progressive energy Christianity became quiescent and conservative. And humanity had to wait till the eighteenth century which, with its sceptical humanitarianism, resuscitated the notion of the essential greatness of the human soul. The final overthrow of slavery as an institution came only in the nineteenth century.

The vicissitudes of the idea of the essential greatness of the soul and the tardy success which it achieved in the matter of the abolition of slavery, cannot be properly understood without reference to the current theories of social life, to the relation between the individual and society. The variations of emphasis between 'Individual Absoluteness and Individual Relativity' have had great effect on social life. In no period of history do we find the supremacy of one of the two over the whole range of social activities—whether the welfare of the individual members is to be the sole guide or the welfare of the State. The theory of social life itself and of the relation of the individual depends to a large extent on the quality of social life which in its turn is determined by the predominant modes of functioning of human nature. Whitehead distinguishes three constituent elements of human nature: Instinct, Intelligence, Wisdom.

Instinct pre-eminently is the mode of experience given by inherited factors. Intelligence, though intellectual activity is itself an inherited factor, is predominantly non-instinctive and works on the instinctive experience so as to integrate it into a coherent whole. It is an irony of human nature that this intellectual co-ordination of primary experiences is rendered easy of achievement by selection of primary data. Man's intelligence, therefore, has a natural tendency towards screening out and even obliterating instinctive experiences, which are not easy of integration. Intelligence thus tends to act as a selective, delimitative and, therefore, narrowing agent. The function of Wisdom is to modify the co-ordinated experience so as to produce a clear issue. It is evident that the efficacy of Wisdom in formulating these issues is proportional to the evidence placed at its disposal through intellectual co-ordination. Wisdom is something which represents the whole or rather which possesses the conception of the whole over and above instinct and intelligence which must be considered only as partial processes. It is because the quality of any issue depends on the quality of Wisdom that the so-called clear vision of some of the clear-headed intelligent people fails of its purpose. Which of the three factors predominates in the working of the minds of the individual members and what is the quality of wisdom and intelligence brought to bear on their experience largely determines the quality of the life of the society formed by them. As Whitehead observes: 'In judging social institutions, their rise, their culmination and their decay, we have to estimate the types of instinct, of intelligence, and of wisdom which have co-operated with natural forces to develop the story.' In the early societies, with preponderance of inherited institutions and their instinctive appreciation, social co-ordination was more in evidence and individual relativity was stressed more than individual freedom. In the Athenian society, on the other hand, freedom of contemplation and freedom of behaviour are much more stressed. In the Middle Ages again the key-note of social life was co-ordination. In the Italian Renaissance and in the eighteenth century there is an outburst of individualism. Such was the success of individualism that as Whitehead remarks, 'the notion that every action is at once a private experience and a public utility had to be born again'.

I shall end this brief summary of Whitehead's study of the adventure of the idea of the essential greatness of the human

soul with his own analysis of the factors which govern the fate of human groups based on his rapid survey of the rise and fall of civilizations. First, for all civilized life and its upkeep, the entertainment of some transcendant aim is absolutely essential. Second, the physical needs of food, shelter and clothing limit the modes of social existence. This control can be mitigated only through an adequate understanding of the interaction between man and Nature. Third, a compulsory domination of man over man, while securing the necessary co-ordination of behaviour for social welfare, is beset with danger lest it should transcend the minimum limits for such co-ordination. Fourth, in all progressive societies persuasion has substituted force as the basis of individual and social life. There are three chief activities of mankind which have promoted the growth of persuasion. They are: 'Family affections aroused in sex relations and in the nurture of children, intellectual curiosity leading to enjoyment in the interchange of ideas, and...the practice of Commerce.'

Civilization, which is defined as 'nothing other than the unremitting aim at the major perfections of harmony', is in other words declared to be 'joint realization in social life', of the five essential qualities of Truth, Beauty, Art, Adventure and Peace. A civilized society must exhibit these five qualities. Truth is the conformation of Appearance to Reality and has a variety of degrees and modes. Science is predominantly the conscious pursuit of Truth. Beauty is a wider and more fundamental notion than Truth for it is concerned not only with the relations of Appearance to Reality but also with the interrelations of various components of each of the categories. Truth thus functions in the service of Beauty and apart from it is neither good nor bad. Art is still wider and more fundamental as it is the purposeful adaptation of Appearance to Reality. Art thus has an end. The traditional aim of Art is represented by the trinity of Truth, Beauty and Goodness. In Whitehead's scheme of things, Goodness, being a qualification inherent in Reality, is not given a place in the complex aim of Art. The purpose of Art is only Truth and Beauty; and the perfection of Art consists in Truthful Beauty, attainment of either Truth or Beauty indicating partial success. Art dealing with 'perfections attainable by purposeful adaptation of appearance' must be seasonable. Hence though 'morals in danger' is the battle-cry of people who seek to rally stupid

opinion on their side against change, yet the contention that devotion to, or the pursuit of, or the attainment of the perfection of Art cannot be advanced as a refutation of the charge of immorality levelled against some Art. Nay, it would seem that there is an almost inherent antagonism between Art and morals to some extent. For whereas 'the effect of the present on the future is the business of morals', Art may neglect 'the safety of the future for the gain of the present'. This function of morals also lends its colour to the present, and generally ranges the champions of morality on the side of the opposition to new ideals. Art, on the other hand, incidentally tends to be adventurous. The role, therefore, of the champions of morality, however reactionary they may appear to be, is significant to social life and civilization. For as Whitehead observes: 'After all we can aim at nothing except from the standpoint of a well-assimilated system of customs—that is, of *mores*. The fortunate changes are made "hand in hand, with wand'ring steps and slow".' Art renders service to civilization by making finite some perfection in Nature and thus widens and enriches the field of human achievement. In a way, therefore, Art, in so far as it involves a persistent aim at perfections, is itself civilization. Art with its pursuit of Truth and Beauty, and Science with its pursuit of Truth give rise to a number of professions and institutions representative of the spirit embodied in these pursuits. Thus Trade, Law and Medicine, Churches and Rituals. 'Monasteries with their dedicated lives' and 'Universities with their search for knowledge' represent human endeavour for civilization.

In every civilization, during its culminating period, we should find a large measure of realization of a complex perfection varying in details. The culmination, the peak, can keep its height if minor variations are introduced from time to time to keep the complex perfections fresh. If these variations are not forthcoming, the perfection owing to its repetition loses its vividness. Before, however, 'a learned orthodoxy suppresses adventure', as Whitehead puts it, there is a flicker of originality revealed through satire, which 'flourishes upon the outworn features in the social system'. Satire thus is not decadence itself, nor is it culminating civilization, though it has originality. It generally marks the end of an epoch. As illustrations of his contention that satire is the end of an epoch, he cites first, Roman culture after the deaths of Pliny and Tacitus, with its satirist

Lucian; second, the close of the Renaissance period; third, the eighteenth century with its Voltaire and Gibbon; and fourth, the nineteenth century culture ending with the first World War with its English satirist Lytton Strachey. When owing to lack of originality, freshness vanishes and bitterness sets in, there is a slow decline of civilization. It is at such a time that the greatest need for Adventure is felt. For, as Whitehead remarks, 'quick transitions to new types of civilization are only possible when thought has run ahead of realization'. Without adventure, civilization may keep on but it is the civilization which is already in decay. Whitehead illustrates the significance of adventure and of its lack in the life of civilization from examples in human history. Regarding the Greek civilization, he states that its ideal was an immense advance over other ideals. As regards its achievements, he observes, 'it [the ideal of perfection] was effective and realized in a civilization which attained its proper beauty in human lives to an extent not surpassed before or since'. That was Hellenism. When perfection was attained and Adventure ceased, learning and learned taste replaced inspiration. That set in the Hellenistic epoch with its stifling repetition of an achieved perfection. The Byzantine civilization continued in such a moribund condition for a thousand years. In spite of the mental and physical shocks given by Buddhism and Tartar invasions 'something of this sort' happened to the Chinese civilization for a thousand years. For the preservation of zest, for the sustenance of the intensity of its first ardour, civilization requires first of all the small variations which render achieved perfection fresh without fundamentally changing its type. But this exploration by itself will not suffice. What is ultimately needed is Adventure or the bold search for new perfections.

Peace is the fifth and the last quality which must characterize civilization. And by Peace Whitehead means 'a quality of mind steady in its reliance that fine action is treasured in the nature of things'. Absence of this quality indicates lack of 'some essential quality of civilization' making it hard and ruthless such as the Italian Renaissance. It is difficult to characterize this quality, being essentially of the nature of a very superior mental state, of the nature of something that is either the result of deepest contemplation or is itself that. But one thing is quite clear, that it must be conceived of as a positive feeling. The short description of this quality that Whitehead gives reminds

one of the description of *Brahma* attempted in the *Upanishads.* Whitehead observes: 'It is not a hope for the future, nor is it an interest in present details. It is a broadening of feeling due to the emergence of some deep metaphysical insight, unverbalized and yet momentous in its co-ordination of values. Its first effect is the removal of the stress of the acquisitive feeling arising from the soul's preoccupation with itself. Thus Peace carries with it a surpassing of personality.' Peace is 'the removal of inhibition', a feeling of extreme ecstasy; and its experience is largely beyond the control of purpose. In other words, 'Peace is self-control at its widest—at the width where the "self" has been lost and interest has been transferred to co-ordinations wider than personality'. Of the interests beyond personality in which humanity has taken interest, fame, and power are well known but they are, however valuable, only a continuation of self. There is no real transcendence of personality. Love that is engendered in the relation of marriage and in the parental and filial relations partakes, to some extent at least, of the nature of the transcendence of personality. But Peace is much wider than this in its scope; one of its fruits being the love of mankind. High aims and strong interests tend to become impersonal, leading men well beyond the field of personal gratifications. 'The love of a good job well done' brings Peace; and the personal gratification which arises, must be looked upon as having arisen from aim beyond personality.* The inherent significance of aims beyond personality, both for the individual and the society, is clearly brought home to us by the fact that all moral codes and religious beliefs and institutions emphasize the doctrine that 'the perfection of life resides in aims beyond the individual person'. Health of societies has been taken care of by these codes and institutions. Vigour of civilized life has been maintained when high aims, that are worthwhile, are widely cherished and persevered in. Though the various codes of morality reflect the respectively special circumstances of their societies, there is underlying them two general principles: one is the generality of harmony and 'order', and the other is that of the importance of the individual and 'love'. While 'order' is impersonal, 'love' is personal. But the personal and the impersonal though antithetical coalesce into a unity when it is realized that it is only the strong indi-

* Students of the *Bhagawadgita* will be reminded of its doctrine of *Karmayoga* and its description of a *Karmayogi* or a *Sthitaprajna.*

viduals that can foster a high-grade type of order. Whitehead remarks: 'The essence of Peace is that the individual whose strength of experience is founded upon this ultimate intuition, thereby is extending the influence of the source of all order.'

Whitehead has not distinguished between various grades of civilization. It cannot be maintained that a mere beginning of the process of substitution of persuasion for force or its prevalence in some life-activity means the achievement of high civilization. Nor can it be asserted with justice that only the constant realization of all the five qualities including Peace can entitle a period of history or a society to be considered civilized. Whitehead finding the quality of Peace lacking in Renaissance Italy simply observes that it was lacking in some essential quality of civilization. It only means that the civilization of Renaissance Italy was not of the highest grade. That it was a high-grade civilization all students of civilization have agreed. It is necessary to recognize, therefore, grades of civilization depending on the number and the intensity of the various qualities that ought to characterize civilization.

Whitehead's insistence on the value of foresight and the associated quality of adventure of ideas and practice brings out the essentially dynamic nature of civilization. But his praise of that foresight and persuasion in place of force as associated with commerce is neither borne out by history nor substantiated by logic. Ideal foresight necessary in commerce may be vast, but as Whitehead himself maintains, cannot be attained. Actual foresight shown by men of commerce is rather short-range and almost always intensely selfish, being centred in the motive of immediate and proximate profit. In history, if commerce has begun with persuasion and has established cultural relations between two widely separated societies more often than not it has brought force and subjugation in its wake. As Whitehead himself states, the quality of a civilization will depend on the measure in which its men of commerce carry on their activity as a function, which most students of man's activity will admit they have not shown a tendency to do. Decrease of the traditional commercial spirit and its substitution by the professional spirit is perhaps the surest index that a civilization has started on its career of culmination.

CHAPTER VIII

REQUISITES OF CIVILIZATION

VIEWS OF RUSSELL AND LASKI

BERTRAND Russell in his *Education and the Social Order*, published in 1932, stresses the need for appreciating the difference between education intended for the cultivation of the individual and that meant for the training of the citizen. He thinks that the elements in the current systems of education which cultivate individual culture are likely to be substituted more and more by training for citizenship. Then it would be necessary to insist that education for citizenship should contain the best elements which form part of the education for individual culture. Individual culture can contribute much to citizenship, but unfortunately only men of wide individual culture can appreciate the extent to which this is possible. And he laments that in contemporary society men of wide individual culture tend to be replaced more and more by people of executive ability or by mere politicians. He thinks that modern education is on the whole reactionary. The elements of good citizenship wherever they are emphasized are not necessarily the best elements, patriotism in a militant form being its dominant note. The most important point in which individual culture conflicts with education for citizenship narrowly conceived is the attitude towards doubtful questions. Under the latter regime scientific attitude becomes difficult of cultivation. Education for citizenship on the whole forbodes grave dangers. But it has one advantage over education for individual culture, viz. that it tends to produce social cohesion.

The increase in industrialism requires increase of co-operation not only on the national but also on the international plane. International cohesion, looking upon the whole human race as one co-operative unit, is increasingly necessary for the continuance of civilization. If this ideal is to be achieved the establishment of a World State will be a desideratum with a world-wide system of education intended to inculcate loyalty for the World State. Such a state of affairs would entail certain curtailment of the finer impulses, intellectual and æsthetic, but the persistent and immediate need for the continuance of civilization by

the inculcation of an operative sense of citizenship of the world, demands that education for citizenship must be considered to be the goal. When world unity is achieved 'it will be possible for individual culture to revive'.

Three different purposes of education have been staunchly held in three divergent theories. One is concerned with education for individual culture and development of individual capacities. Another, which is the oldest theory, conceives the purpose of education to be in relation to the community to train useful citizens. The third, which is the latest, looks upon education as an agency providing opportunities of growth and removing impediments thereto. Russell believes that a proper theory of education would combine in due proportion the three purposes separately sponsored in the three theories. While discussing the relative theory of education, as he calls the third theory, he deals with the process of formation and strengthening of the will in the individual and wisely observes, 'the strengthening of the will demands a somewhat subtle mixture of freedom and discipline and is destroyed by an excess of either'. He brings out the importance of judicious discipline in this connexion and exhorts that 'difficulty in success as an ideal should be presented to the mind of the young if they are not to become wayward and futile'. It should be remembered that abstract knowledge is loved only by few, though the existence of civilized communities depends on the growth of such knowledge. The problem of education under modern conditions is the problem of rearing human beings who developing free intelligence combine a happy disposition with it. As regards the role of the home in the total process of education he considers that it provides a useful corrective to certain aspects of school life. Yet the question between the home and the school cannot be finally settled unless we possess comprehensive knowledge of the formation of sentiments—the part of instinct and the part of training that goes into their making.

Democratic education by itself is almost as bad as the aristocratic one. In this connexion he points out that the traditional concept of culture has come into disrepute because of its narrow content, which looked upon the knowledge of the past as a component of culture but refused to include a knowledge of the Russian Revolution as necessary. His idea of culture is as follows: 'Genuine culture consists in being a citizen of the

universe not only of one or two arbitrary fragments of space-time; it helps men to understand human society as a whole, to estimate wisely the ends that communities should pursue and to see the present in its relation to past and future. Genuine culture is, therefore, of great value to those who are to wield power, to whom at least it is useful as detailed information. The way to make men useful is to make them wise, and an essential part of wisdom is a comprehensive mind.'

Russell is positively against the competitive spirit in education, as the world needs more co-operation than competition and the emotions connected with competition are those of hostility and ruthlessness which are far from being creative and integrative. It goes very difficult with minds brought up on competitive systems to conceive of the organic unity of society. As regards higher instruction he opines that what should be aimed at is to teach the spirit and the technique of inquiry and the knowledge of facts not as answers to questions. Contemporary social structure increasingly depends for its help and functioning on trained intelligence and well-informed minds. He attempts to estimate the prospects of education in the U.S.S.R. and on the whole opines in favour of that system as it 'destroys that separation of the school from life which the school owes to its monkish origin and owing to which the intellectual, in the West, is becoming an increasingly useless member of society'. Substituting as it does co-operation for competition it records a solid moral advance in harmony with similar advance made in its economic system.

Reiterating his belief that a sense of social co-operation and cohesion is very vitally needed he still maintains that it should be secured 'without too great a diminution of individual judgement and individual initiative'. A satisfactory individual life must be based on 'an internal harmony of intelligence, emotion and will and an external harmony with the wills of others'. The same is true from the point of view of the society. Present education is defective in both respects. In the former respect the defect can be easily remedied but not so easily in the latter.

In Praise of Idleness—so called after the first essay in the collection—has a number of articles published from 1928 onwards together with a few new ones, was published in 1935. The essay *In Praise of Idleness* was first written in 1932 and is meant to emphasize the fact that the gospel of work is the preaching of the people, who being able to live in comfort-

able idleness, have tried to impose work on others. He points out that work is not necessarily good and that leisure within limits has been made possible by modern technology for a much larger number of people than was formerly the case. Leisure is becoming a right to be evenly distributed in society. The conception of duty he finds has historically been the means of power used by the privileged classes to keep up their idleness. That is not to say that leisure thus gained by a privileged class has not done good. The Athenian slave-owners made contributions to civilization of a permanent nature. He observes: 'Leisure is essential to civilization, and in former times leisure for the few was only rendered possible by the labours of the many. But their labours were valuable, not because work is good, but because leisure is good.' It is quite clear, therefore, that what is desired through the gospel of work or through the theory of duty is leisure for the few. And leisure is an essential feature in civilization.

Now that leisure is becoming more and more a right of the many, the use to which leisure is put is becoming even more important. And the wise use of leisure can be a product of civilization and education. It is contended that much leisure that may be made possible by the application of technology will rather hang heavily on a large number of people. Increasing leisure, therefore, would create a social problem rather than solve one. Russell thinks that such a state of affairs spells condemnation on the existing civilization. 'There was formerly a capacity for light-heartedness and play, which has been to some extent inhibited by the cult of efficiency. The modern man thinks that everything ought to be done for the sake of something else and never for its own sake. Serious-minded persons, for example, are continually condemning the habit of going to the cinema, telling us that it leads the young into crime. But all the work that goes into producing a cinema is respectable, because it is work and because it brings money profit. The notion that the desirable activities are those that bring a profit has made everything topsy-turvy.'

As leisure is desirable he suggests that the working hours should be reduced to four and that a large part of the leisure may be intelligently utilized for enjoyment. His idea of enjoyment is active, as is evident from the following observation: 'The pleasures of urban populations have become mainly passive; seeing cinemas, watching football matches, listening

to the radio, and so on.' This results from the fact that active energies are fully taken up with work; if they had more leisure they would again enjoy pleasures in which they took an active part.

In the past when there was a small leisured class and a larger working class he has no doubt that the leisured class contributed nearly the whole of what is called civilization. The arts and sciences were cultivated by that class. Philosophy and refinement of social relations were also their work, nay even movements towards the liberation of the oppressed were inaugurated by its members. Rightly, therefore, he observes, 'without the leisured class mankind would never have emerged from barbarism'. Yet whatever the past achievements, the scheme of a hereditary leisured class is wasteful and the present scheme of things for creating and developing civilization is to be much preferred to it. At the present time the universities are supposed to provide much more systematically for what the leisured class formerly achieved as a by-product. He admits that although this is a great improvement it has its drawbacks. The first drawback is that life in the university being very much different from life in the world, academic people tend to be unmindful of the problems and cares of ordinary men and women. Secondly, the manner in which academic people express their opinions is so technical that they lose much of their popular value. Thirdly, studies being organized, originality is likely to be discouraged. He concludes: 'Academic institutions, therefore, useful as they are, are not adequate guardians of the interests of civilization in a world where everyone outside their walls is too busy for unutilitarian pursuits.'

He thinks that in a world, where no one need work for more than four hours a day, there will be enough scope for not only enjoying happiness but also for contributing to the creation of civilization. Kindliness is bound to increase in such a world. The taste for war will die out, people being less inclined towards mutual suspicion. I may conclude Russell's *Praise of Idleness* by pointing out in his own words the importance of good nature which is expected by him to be the one consequence of his four-hours-a-day working world: 'Good nature is of all moral qualities the one that the world needs most and good nature is the result of ease and security not of a life of arduous struggle.'

The essay *Useless Knowledge*—first contributed to this book and not published before—is a plea in favour of non-utilitarian

knowledge. Russell points out that it was in the hey-day of English Renaissance that Bacon revolted against the utilitarian conception of knowledge. But in contemporary times knowledge has come to be regarded not as an end in itself nor as a means 'of creating a broad and human outlook on life in general', but as an aspect in technical skill. This is due largely to military necessity and the growth of scientific technique. There is also greater economic and political interdependence making for greater social pressure being applied to compel a man to that work which his neighbours think useful. There is greater awareness of one's fellow citizens. People do not like others lazily enjoying life, whatever the refinement. There is thus hardly any leisure of mind to enable one to acquire any knowledge that one thinks important. Russell is convinced that whereas useful knowledge is necessary and has already done much good, traditional cultural education with its emphasis on Greek and Latin was rather foolish. He prefers modern languages and history as the subjects giving more culture. Science too when properly taught will contribute to culture. If utility is conceived broadly, and similarly culture, utility and culture will not be incompatible. Till then it is very necessary to maintain that education should have other aims than utility. He thinks that some of the worst features of the modern world will disappear if non-utilitarian knowledge is fostered more and more.

The role of such education in the modern world with increasing possibilities of leisure for all, where already people tend to spend their leisure in 'inactive observation of the skilled activities of others—though such amusements are much better than none', is very important. It is likely to provide a range of interests not connected with work and having intellectual bearing. He repeats his conviction that for a leisured population to be happy it must be a population educated not only in technical knowledge but also in knowledge that contributes to mental enjoyment. One advantage of non-utilitarian knowledge or knowledge for culture, is that it helps the formation of a contemplative habit and the world requires the use of this habit in great abundance. In support of this contention he observes: 'Hamlet is held up as a woeful warning against thought without action, but no one holds up Othello as a warning against action without thought.' Even in the life-economy of an individual himself the contemplative habit of mind has certain advantages. It enables one to face some of the inevitable human ills with not only forti-

tude but with good-natured patience. This education for culture has perhaps its greatest triumph when it comes to a question of the individual facing the greater evils of life such as pain, cruelty and final death. In this respect culture is a substitute for religion. Russell observes: 'For those whom dogmatic religion can no longer bring comfort, there is need of some substitute if life is not to become dusty and harsh and filled with trivial self-assertion.... It is from large perceptions combined with impersonal emotion that wisdom most readily springs.' To fit a person both for private and public occasions it is necessary to develop his will and intellect and the habit of constant interaction between the two. Such is the result of the study of some subjects which are generally classed as non-utilitarian knowledge. Finally as human nature is constituted, two universal desires are power and admiration. Socially speaking, it would be much better to have them satisfied through culture. For 'culture gives a man less harmful forms of power and more deserving ways of making himself admired'.

In the essay on *Western Civilization*, appearing here for the first time, he begins by stating that the first essential of civilization is forethought. Another element essential to civilization is knowledge. And the definition of civilization, according to him, is 'a manner of life due to the combination of knowledge and forethought'. Civilization begins with agriculture and domestication of ruminant animals. The distinctive Western character of the civilization begins with the Greeks who contributed deductive reasoning and pure mathematics, as their absolute contributions to civilization. The Romans contributed the art of government with their passion for duty to the State. The relation between Government and religion was contributed by Christianity. And thus Western civilization continued till the Middle Ages, though it was by no means the best in existence, both the Mohammedan and the Chinese civilizations being superior to it. Why the West thereafter started on a rapid upward path is, to a large extent, a mystery. Looking about for the explanation of this mystery, Russell finds that it turns on the adventitious circumstance of the availability of a small number of individuals of transcendant ability. This means that progress by itself and in itself is not assured. It is ever dependant on the supply of a small number of eminent individuals.

Representative Government, which is the legacy of the Middle Ages, has become a characteristic of Western civilization.

The growth of industry as the last phase of Western civilization has changed the tempo to such an extent that the situation is potent with serious consequences. Russell observes: 'It seems not improbable that the movement towards individual liberty which characterizes the whole period from the Renaissance to nineteenth-century Liberalism may be brought to a stop by the increased organization due to industrialism. The pressure of society upon the individual may, in a new form, become as great as in barbarous communities and nations may come increasingly to pride themselves upon collective rather than individual achievements.' The question whether civilization produced by collective effort would be of the highest quality is disputable. And Russell points out that it is possible that in both art and science co-operation may produce better results but collective working will inevitably curtail individual liberty which would be bad for men of genius.

In the past, the family acted as a check on individualism; and generally speaking, what the family has lost the nation has gained. But Russell does not find any hope that the same transfer can take place from the nation to the world. World-Government, therefore, appears to him an impossibility except as the result of a conquest by one nation or a group of nations. The elements that have distinguished Western civilization from those of China and India are energy, intolerance and abstract intelligence.

Discussing the cynicism of youth in 1929 he thought that it could not be cured by preaching or even by presenting better ideals. The only cure lay in the intellectuals finding them careers embodying their creative impulses. It is the same remedy which Disraeli preached, viz. 'Educate our Masters'. The education will have to take some account of cultural values in preference to the utilitarian desire to produce goods.

The essay on *Homogeneity* was written in 1930. He points out that wherever one goes one cannot get away from civilization, which has produced uniformity not only in material aspects of life but also in matters of thought and opinion. Of all the forces making for this uniformity the cinema is the most influential not only in America but in almost all countries of the world except the Soviet Union. In his opinion 'the emotions in regard to love and marriage, birth and death are becoming standardized', in obedience to the opinion of Hollywood in the

middle west of the U.S.A. He even thinks that one day the language of Hollywood would be the universal language. This tendency towards uniformity is neither wholly good nor wholly bad. Its good aspect lies in the fact that it creates a population ready for easy co-operation while the disadvantage lies in its making a population prone to the persecution of the minorities. And the way in which uniformity is achieved largely determines the preponderance of the one aspect over the other. Italian schools have succeeded in curing the Southern Italians, proverbially known to be prone to murder, graft and æsthetic sensibility, of their last quality, leaving the other two, the only dangerous and bad tendencies, unaffected. Russell observes: 'This illustrates one of the dangers of uniformity as an aim: good qualities are easier to destroy than bad ones, and therefore uniformity is most easily achieved by lowering all standards.'

The result of uniformity so far achieved in America is not wholly good. Merit or genius achieves eminence and is admired much more than anywhere else. Yet the path to certain kinds of eminence is very difficult because of the intolerance of all eccentricity. Many of the eminent types are, therefore, importations from Europe. Standardization, though disadvantageous to the exceptional individual, probably contributes to the greater happiness of the average man, in addition to its promotion of national cohesion. He expects similar standardization to be current over the whole of Europe in the future. To criticize American standardization, therefore, is to range oneself against an inevitable and universal trend in civilization.

The role and importance of culture in the life of an individual and of a society are very well stressed. Non-utilitarian knowledge and its pursuit are given their due place as components of this culture. The fostering of such knowledge and the creation of civilization are mainly the work of a leisured class. To provide this class through the personnel of the universities is declared to be a practical ideal in this age. Russell's criticism of this practical ideal on the ground that the cultural heritage of the university men largely remains a sealed book to the mass of the people for want of leisure to peruse abstruse books is not really valid. For if the university men do create civilization the difficulty of transmuting it into the culture of the general populace may not, for some time to come, be unreasonably carried on by another class of popularizers. Sooner or later, as Russell himself contends, the general populace itself

will have large leisure at its command. It can then afford the luxury of cultivating such culture through its own efforts without the intermediary of a class of popularizers. The important task for the present is to cultivate and maintain at some centres the nuclei of the pursuit of non-utilitarian knowledge at the highest level. And universities are the only proper places for this end.

In 1930 Harold J. Laski published his book *The Dangers of Obedience*, which is a collection of a number of essays previously published elsewhere. The book takes its name from the first essay in the collection. Emphasizing the insistence on one's private experience as against traditional values for the fulfilment of a full life, Laski points out that experimenting with taboos is a characteristic of Western civilization and that suppression of originality characterizes a stationary society with its dull uniformity and absence of individuality. He associates freedom with self-expression. And the secret of freedom is courage. Owing to the growth of power and the nature of its organization the individual citizen is too afraid to venture out of his little corner and express his progressive opinion. The result has been a great decline in liberty. A private citizen, if asked to be a pioneer in progress, will look upon that adventure as foredoomed to failure. His spiritual urge will strike his contemporaries as either egotism or stubbornness. Thus the plea for inertia is always a powerful one. And yet the whole chance for tyranny lies in the lethargy of a people. It is necessary, therefore, for private citizens to protest; for men who do not regard particular injustice as their responsibility become slowly but surely unable to resent any injustice whatever.

It may be contended that if the right of the private citizen to protest and to assert his opinion is insisted on, it would lead to anarchy. If it is insisted that a man must act according to the dictates of his conscience it is tantamount to undermining the foundations of social welfare. Laski thinks that the argument has no force. The desirability of peace must depend on the purposes which are intended to be fostered through it. And it must be remembered that 'the price of our freedom is an ultimate courage to resist. We owe no State or Church a blind or unreasoning obedience.' From the point of view of the State and the Government it should also be realized that their best ability must be founded in the conscience of their citizens and

that in the long run there is no 'adequate substitute for the individual exercise of active minds'. If social organizations were wholly reasonable there would be no necessity to plead for tolerance. But by the very imperfect nature of social organization such pleading is rendered necessary. He thinks that Russia, Italy and Spain are only extreme instances of an attitude which in other States is fostered through subtler methods. He has no doubt that this is the road towards stagnation and decay of freedom. His discussion may be wound up in the following memorable words: 'High purposes in any community require citizens high-minded enough to appreciate them; and men who have been modelled to a pattern are incapable of intellectual stature. Men whose minds have been put in fetters cannot exert that energy of the soul which is the motive power of great achievement.'

He begins the essay *Can Business Be Civilized?* with a quotation from Bernard Shaw to the effect that the universal regard for money is 'the one hopeful fact in our civilization, the one sound spot in our social conscience'. He points out that a successful business man is the truly representative type of the age. Not that a business man did not exist in the past but that he emerged from his previous obscurity into a prominent position in the nineteenth century. He has become not only the model of the character of his time but also the regulator and dictator of the spirit and tone of his age. Successful business men are sure of being treated idolatrously whatever their past. It is the essence of a successful business man that for him the economic effort is a desirable end in itself irrespective of any further ends which that effort may or may not satisfy. Profit and gain, money and its consequence power are the absorbing business of his life. That does not mean that business men do not make admirable husbands or dutiful parents. Only they are the slaves of routine. It is necessary to read Laski's description of a typical business man in order to be able to understand his concern regarding civilization. 'He is grossly ignorant of our intellectual heritage; he rarely reads at all; and, if he does, it is rather to drug himself than to enlarge his mind. For the most part he is incapable of conversation about principles. His talk consists of gossips about his business, scandal about his neighbours, his scores at bridge or golf and the exchange of queer facts he amasses as information to none of which can he attach a scheme of values. As he conducts his life most of the essence of civilized existence

escapes him.' All this, as Laski points out, is the consequence of the fact that in the contemporary society all activity is judged by its capacity to procure or produce money or wealth. This profit-making motive as the sole guide of life has led to a number of evil consequences; adulteration, over-production, hypertrophy of advertisement, waste of material resources and so on. And literally it has been becoming clearer that 'the supremacy of the profit-making motive is inconsistent with the achievement of an adequate life'.

The present generation is slowly realizing that it is foolish to enthrone the business man as the model or as the regulator. People have begun to ask the question whether with such leaders civilization can endure at all, whether with the dichotomy of rich and poor which the present practice leads to will in the end not destroy civilization itself? And civilization to Laski is a 'condition of social life in which men have leisure for noble ends'. How is this to be achieved? First, by insisting that all property shall only be a return for creative work and second, by all property rights being considered in terms 'of men's equal claim to the common good'. Business must be organized as a profession. To achieve this end we must first change the character of the owner of wealth; and secondly the character of the controlling business. Third, production must be socialized, being mainly organized for the well-being of the community. If we can succeed, as Laski believes we can, in professionalizing business in this manner we would have civilized it in the process. And such a programme he insists need not necessarily—and he at least does not mean it—imply that private property is an utter evil or that it should not be allowed to be used for the expression of personality. He makes it quite clear that property 'must never be so large in amount that its possessor exercises power merely by reason of its magnitude; and it must never be so small that its possessor is bound hand and foot to a material appetite'. Nor need the removal of profit-motive and socialization of production lead to a uniform bureaucratic dominance or a single-patterned society. There will be enough room for diversity of types, only with a change in the scale of values. He ends the discussion by an appeal to the thought of some of the greatest minds of the nineteenth century. He observes: 'It is not an insignificant thing that every thinker of the modern time to whom the prophetic gift has been vouchsafed, Emerson and Carlyle, Thoreau and Ruskin, Marx and Tolstoy,

has been driven by his inner vision to demand transvaluation of our values if the gift of civilization is to be preserved.'

In 1940, under the title *The Danger of Being a Gentleman*, Laski published in book-form a number of essays which were published elsewhere. The first essay, which gives the name to the book, written in 1932 is styled *The Danger of Being a Gentleman: Reflections on the Ruling Class in England.* Laski informs his readers that to most Englishmen the idea of being a gentleman appears to be peculiar to England. He maintains that as an ideal it has the merit of simplicity. And what is the ideal? In his words, 'the gentleman is, rather than does'. He is not interested in anything in a professional manner. He has hobbies and eccentricities but in practice he has no vocation. The sordid business of earning a living is beneath his dignity. At least for three generations none of his relations must have been engaged in trade; preferably he should have entered one of the so-called public schools and essentially must have been in residence either at Oxford or Cambridge. He must be a sportsman. He must be a member of a club and in his political colour he must be a member of the Conservative Party. In winter he must go to the Alps and in summer he must go to his country place in England. There are certain corollaries as regards his intellectual and emotional alignments, the authors he likes, the music he patronizes and so on. He plays most games but abhors professionalism in sports and he is not to be a teetotaller. His knowledge about foreign countries and political economy is next to nothing and his attitude towards Bolshevism is one of horror. He is convinced and conscious of the greatness and merits of his Empire. Even his travel should not change his outlook. On the side of manners Laski points out that with men of his status he is prepared to show the sporting spirit. He is generally tolerant excepting where his interests and prejudices dictate otherwise. He is deferential to females of his own class. He is a gambler but he is very punctual in the payment of the debts—incurred in that sport. His views are all short-term and he rarely pushes a claim too far. He is averse to parading either his vices or virtues. The one quality he possesses without any qualification whatsoever is courage. He has a sense of humour. He can laugh at himself. These two qualities enable him to extricate himself from a dangerous situation. He is graceful in commanding and he enjoys his power. He is rarely corruptible. This is the type who governed England

till about 1920. Before World War I Englishmen felt that Matthew Arnold was not right in asking them to temper gentlemanly tradition by social equality. Laski thinks that the future historian writing of England of the nineteenth century will have to expatiate largely on the dangers of being a gentleman, for the difficulties of the present are, in his opinion, the outcome of his leadership. Neither of the political parties of England since the nineties of the last century was able to work up a programme for attracting working classes. The gentleman has failed to realize that political democracy will certainly demand social equality. Thus has come about a cleavage between labour and the leisured gentleman. The gentleman has not realized the problems of the new world, the urgency of the common man to more education and to more light. In short, in the presence of modern democracy he is 'as bewildered as Pilate before the spectacle of Christianity'. Another effect of his influence is that the average Englishman has developed a curious humility towards his social superiors. The so-called English snobbery Laski thinks is only a collective inferiority complex. It is the result of the gentleman's rule for over two centuries.

The gentleman has become a public danger now because he has no function and he is too costly an appendage to civilization. Yet the passing of the gentleman Laski thinks deserves some regret. In his hey-day he was a better ruler than most of his rivals. And what is more important is that it is not certain that he will be replaced by a more admirable type. The leader of the future is likely to be a ruthless man ruled by one idea who neither believes in nor has the time for the open mind. He ends the essay with the following warning: 'The gentleman scourged us with whips. We must beware lest our new masters drive us to our toil with scorpions.'

In the essay *Nationalism and the Future of Civilization,* first published in 1932, Laski points out the dangers that lie in the path of civilization owing to the development of national consciousness. Nationalism must secure itself from attack. It must, therefore, have armaments and proper frontiers. It has to develop markets and seek an outlet for its population. No longer, therefore, can we look upon the enthusiasm of the nation for the State as the acquisition or the acme of emancipation. The annihilation of distance, the contraction of the world that has taken place as a result of scientific advance combined with this national enthusiasm has created a situation where the law of

the jungle is likely to prevail among the various States. Insecurity, fear and hate have become the dominant feelings between state and state and nation and nation. This state of affairs naturally raises the question whether nationalism is compatible with civilization. In Laski's opinion the principle of self-determination must be set certain definite limits. If the quest of the nineteenth century was nationality and the institutions implementing nationality, the pursuit of the twentieth century must be internationalism and the organs necessary for its functioning. The impulses of nationalism are profound but irrational. The world has become a market; it has become interdependent; it naturally requires a World-Government to implement these ideas. As regards the form of government he is convinced that democratic government is the only political device likely to fulfil the conditions needed for civilization. But in order that democracy may discharge its function its full implication must also become operative; and that is equality in every aspect of life. In a note, added to the essay in 1939, he reiterates his conviction that what is needed is a replacement of privilege by equality of social relations.

In the essay *Teacher and Student*, he describes some of the problems of university education. A university does not design 'the transformation of undergraduates into fountains of information. It does not seek to make men expert in their life's career. Its business is the very different task of teaching the student how facts are converted into truth'. A university thus seeks to convey a certain kind of training of the mind which thereby becomes 'receptive to novelty, capable of wisdom, inclined to moderation'. Perhaps the best test of the adequacy of any university education is the success it has attained in creating a wide-spread curiosity in books. Of course a large part of this success will depend upon the personality and quality of the university teachers as well as on one's entering the university with a genuine pride in one's vocation. On the side of the student the ideal can be successful if he has joined the university not only for the material advantage of a university degree but also with a genuine love of knowledge and of the training of the mind. With these conditions Laski thinks that university education will promote love of knowledge for its own sake and secure 'that relentless curiosity of the mind which insists upon truth because it cannot do otherwise'. It is this love

and this knowledge that have been 'the parents of all that is most precious in the common life of civilization'.

In the essay *The Academic Mind,* almost the same topic is continued. Laski begins the essay with a statement that the protecting agent of Western civilization is 'Useless Knowledge', in furtherance of which large endowments are made. And in these endowed universities flourish the so-called academic minds. The practical man endeavouring ostensibly to acquire useless knowledge appears to be a strange phenomenon. A little deep thought proves that the academic mind serves the practical man supremely well. He is generally ready to prove that though reform may be necessary and desirable the present is never the proper time for it. That is not to say that really queer academic minds do not exist. As he observes: 'If a University contains queer Professors so driven by the impulse of curiosity that nothing in the world matters save the satisfaction of their hunger, they must find the truth and proclaim it. Knowledge and the implications of knowledge do generally mean more to them than comfort, dignity and security. Like the artist and the poet and the musician they have in them some demon which must be satisfied. They have raw facts about them and they must somehow find an explanation which satisfies those facts. They rarely care very much for the consequences which follow from their explanation.' The academic mind of this sort performs a wholesome function of challenging. At the same time it must be admitted that a really great academic mind is rare. Regarding the functions of a university and the academic minds attached to it as well as those which are independent, Laski observes: 'If an industrial civilization can leave the universities genuinely unfettered, the academic mind has, at its best, a great part to play in the future of civilization. Its business is to do what practical men have never the time nor the knowledge to attempt—the cutting of fundamental principle from the raw material.... Once practical men begin to meddle with university, mediocrity is given its opportunity. Orthodoxy becomes its ideal in any subject of social import.... The university, at the best becomes a semi-technical school; and, at the worst, a graceful academy where the sons of practical men learn that modicum of cultivation which social success demands. But the university that is free builds an atmosphere of creativeness for the great thinker who finds place there and the generations that are to come in response to the measure of his thought.'

Laski in his *Faith, Reason, and Civilization*, published in 1944, dwells on the need of a proper faith to guide the policies of nations after victory is won to make that victory a worthwhile achievement. He is impressed by the way the people of England have been drawn towards one another and have behaved as almost a single unit under the stress of very trying circumstances in which they found themselves during the last war. He finds in the doings of a number of people the evidence of latent but real heroism in the bosom of ordinary man and woman called forth in situations which, in normal time, would have been usually ignored. Action under these circumstances has involved such a self-denial and self-sacrifice as would have been thought impossible but for its actual occurrence. It is not only the people of the British Isles who have stood the supreme test of unity and self-effacement and self-sacrifice but also the people of the U.S.S.R. in their heroic and titanic struggle against Germany. What is the reason of the sudden upheaval of these unsuspected powers of devotion and self sacrifice? The answer is clear, viz. that it is a kind of faith, the right of the nation, in the suprème need, to stand united, if certain values are to be preserved. It is the realization of oneness, of unity. In order that this victory like the victory of the first World War may not be wasted without its fructifying into better social integration, into harmonious society, what is needed, therefore, is a kind of faith which will appeal to the minds of the people and lead them to discard the profit-motive in social life in favour of the motive of service, motive of function. The faith required to regenerate the human mind in this fashion cannot clearly be one of the religions—contrary to Christopher Dawson's contention that Christianity forms the basis—but the kind of faith which has inspired the citizens of the U.S.S.R., viz. 'the passionate affirmation of the right of each human being to fulfil his individuality'.

One of the effects of the present war is to bring a number of human beings up against ultimate issues so that very few people now believe that the old economic system can achieve prosperity for the masses. One of the characteristics of the first thirty years of the century was the marked division between the rich and the poor. The main preoccupation of the rich was how to invest the money they could not spend and thereby secure political power. The problem of the poor was how to secure the money to provide for themselves their daily needs. Power

and the arrogance of power on the one hand and fear and envy on the other were the predominant feelings in society, making society 'not a fellowship of equals, but a collection of masters and slaves'. Regarding the quality of the rich, Laski observes: 'We have only to compare, say, the conception of freedom in the Funeral Oration of Pericles or the Gettysburg speech of Lincoln with the habits of the wealthy class in our plutocracy to see that the pursuit of perfection is omitted from their concept of life.'

A careful examination and a proper understanding of the contemporary situation will reveal its similarity to the declining days of the Roman Empire. And a student of the Roman civilization in its decline will find in the struggles of Christianity to conquer Europe and in the contempt shown to it by the rulers of decadent Rome as well as in the final triumph of Christianity in this agonizing struggle much that is similar in the contemporary situation and will learn the lesson that what is required as a balm is a recovery of faith. He will also recognize that the substance of this faith was that of victorious Christianity during Roman decline. In that period only a faith that was capable of making an appeal to the masses, 'which, ignorant and poor, felt bitterly the injustice of a world in which blind fortune seemed to reward neither effort nor virtue' could succeed. And Christianity was such a faith which instilled into them the hope of a better future, nay, of final salvation. Just as in Rome attempts were made to appease the masses with bread and circuses so that a small class may continue to live in fantastic luxury, in contemporary times social services are the bait offered by the rich to take away the minds of the poor from situations that would create dangers for the existence of the rich classes. Laski finds that the contemporary schemes of values had broken down by the time Mussolini and Hitler had become the heads of great nations. First America ceased to be a land of promise. Socialist parties all over the world giving up their idealism became realistic.

In the inter-war period, 1919-39, there is little in the literature preparing the people for any creation or reconstruction like the one upon which we must embark if we are to obviate the disillusionment which set in 1919, if we are not to throw away a splendid opportunity as humanity did in 1919 and later years. Laski finds this unpreparedness or rather the disinclination to create preparedness significant and poignant

because, in the past, great disturbed periods which have been followed by greater creative periods, have had an interim period which was marked by supreme literary creativeness which not only prepared the people for the next creative period but actually led them on to it. Thus, after the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, flourished writers of imaginative literature, of philosophy and of other serious literature, who laid the foundations for the new spirit. Laski mentions Paine, Godwin and Bentham in politics; Blake, Burns, Coleridge and Wordsworth in poetry in England; Sainte Simon and Laplace in France; Goethe and Schiller in German literature; Kant and Hegel in philosophy, German and European, and Wolf, Niebuhr and Savigny in philology, Roman history and jurisprudence respectively. He further observes: 'No one, even in the hard years of reaction after 1815, can fail to see that the outline of a new universe had already been shaped in the womb of the old. In the years between 1919 and 1939 it is difficult to seize that sense of a dawning renaissance.' He admits that there are a few internationally important figures no doubt. New vistas are opened up in physics, bio-chemistry and medicine. But 'it is difficult to see in those twenty years any figure in philosophy or poetry, in the novel or in criticism, much less in the field of social studies, whose achievement marks a new epoch. The profusion of talent is great; and there are moments when it almost seems as though some school of thought is going to make a permanent impact on the generation.' Yet the mark is missed. The age is a silver age and not a golden one.

Laski has to admit that there are philosophers of eminence such as Moore and Santayana, Russell and Cassirer, Bergson and Whitehead but it does not appear to him an exaggeration 'to say that their meaning was reserved for a specialized audience': for they, in his opinion, did not address an audience which represents the civic-minded bulk of the population as Carlyle or Mill or Ruskin in England, Michelet or Renan in France, Emerson and Mark Twain in America did in their time. As typical representatives of writers of imaginative literature during the later war period, Laski mentions T. S. Eliot, Sinclair Lewis, Sigfried Sassoon and William Faulkner, whose work demonstrates to him their own lack of faith in themselves and thus proves them to be the representatives of their period. The contrast that Laski thinks exists between the second and the third decades of the nineteenth century on the one hand, and the

third and the fourth decades of the twentieth century on the other, is symptomatic to him of a profound tendency. He sums up his estimate of the intellectuals of his epoch in the following words: 'What is, I suggest, quite certain is that in our present phase of development there is no section of the intellectuals in whom the chance of a revitalized faith can be recognized. For whether we take the poets or the novelists, the dramatists or the critics, the main feature of their outlook is its negativism. And that feature comes from nothing so much as the anxiety to achieve perfection of form, and to avoid content lest this be regarded, as in the Churches, as taking sides in a conflict where the artist's duty is to remain above the battle.' This is particularly significant because the literature of an age not only expresses the problems of that age but also suggests their solution. He supports this contention by drawing attention to the work of the French Encyclopœdists and to the writings of the great Victorians who applied their creative energy to define the issues of their ages in their own way. They did not cultivate any detachment.

To Laski the tragedy of our time is that its intellectuals have either shown relative indifference to one of the greatest battles in the history of civilization or have ranged themselves on the opposite side. He points out that Dickens, Reade, Ruskin, Matthew Arnold and William Morris warned their contemporaries of almost all the evils that were cropping up or were already rampant. The pity of it is that their warning having gone unheeded, these evils worked as poisons to contemporary civilization. Laski believes that while a few intellectuals were unaware of the battle that was raging, the majority of those who were conscious joined sides with the reactionaries. Occasionally a poet here or there sings in angry tones but the outstanding influence is that of T. S. Eliot. Eliot, according to Laski, has a horror of the common man. His fastidious sensitiveness makes him shrink from contact with the masses. To him 'whatever is democratic' is 'in its nature vulgar, and ugly and barbarous'. Laski thinks that he purposely cultivated remoteness from ordinary people and addressed himself to the élite. He remarks: 'There was no spontaneity of feeling in what he wrote but rather a mannered disdain for a world in which the overwhelming majority would have no more chance of understanding his poems than they would of following a paper by Einstein or some development by Littlewood of the

mathematical theory of inequalities.' What is true of poets like Eliot is much more true of a novelist like James Joyce. But he himself points out that as James Joyce was a deliberate escapist from reality, he cannot be regarded as a typical representative of intellectuals writing imaginative literature. Nevertheless, he contends that 'it is at least fair to note that the supreme artist in the field of fiction in the inter-war years, could only, as it were, meet the issues of life by refusing to face them at all.' Similarly another intellectual of this age, full of learning, endowed with skill and with scrupulosity, Aldous Huxley, condemns the culture he sees round and succeeds in creating despair and disgust for the comfortable middle class and the intellectuals. Naturally enough, Huxley's positive suggestions, his pacifist doctrine, his insistence on the inseparability between means and ends are not at all helpful. He thinks that the burning issues are never squarely faced by Huxley. Regarding the failure of the poets and the novelists to see things squarely and to offer solutions boldly he observes: 'The poet and the novelist of our time, both lack that [Victorian] sense of inner confidence, and they are mostly afraid to attack the evils of their age lest they stir up those dangerous scourges which let loose upon a society a revolution of which they cannot predict the outcome.'

Laski thinks that in the last half century and more particularly in the last twenty-five years, scholarship has been divorced from life as much as poetry and the novel. The scholar has specialized to such an extent that he can only write for the scholar and not for the ordinary cultivated man. And Laski feels that large part of that specialization is rooted not in the nature of the subject-matter but in 'the scholar's desire to avoid large, general issues, and especially those amongst them which seem relevant to the crisis of our time'. He thinks that great creative work in the humanistic field can be undertaken only when there is a sense of security. When the scholar feels that his work will plunge him into controversy and particularly during the insecure times, it is very likely that he will avoid the issue and thus secure his position and even win approval. The result has been that 'the literature of scholarship has turned from the high-road lest its practitioners find that they are led to challenge the existing order'. It is in the field of history that he finds this characteristic most clearly demonstrated. Whereas in the epoch that closed in 1914, Mr and Mrs Hammond bore the lights that

showed the path in the economic history of Great Britain, today it is Sir J. H. Clapham with his class bias. This is a woeful tale if it be true, for, as Laski has rightly pointed out, in Europe during the last four centuries, since the time of Martin Luther, the scholar's humanism has played an important role in raising the status of the common man. Nearer our times, again, in the period between the death of Matthew Arnold and that of William Morris 'the labours of the scholar played their part in giving its definitive character to the mental climate in which the masses lived and thought and felt'. In contrast to this he maintains that 'the main body of humanistic scholarship in the inter-war years largely lacked a wisdom that was in any serious degree proportionate to its massive learning'.

Among other characteristics, Laski points out, that 'the greatest feature of the inter-war years has been the organized externalization of pleasures, in sport, in dancing, in the cinema'. This feature is significant because with this development, individuality in recreation ceases. Mass recreation has a tendency to increase because generally greater the mass, greater the profits for the managers. 'This, in its turn', as Laski points out, 'has meant that few people have heard any voice which cannot make its message heard by the sheer loudness of its utterance.' He maintains that the generation of people which has grown up since the Treaty of Versailles has only a small portion of its knowledge which is common to its predecessors. It is not only that its knowledge is more secular and less religious but it has learnt that material pleasures sought in an external and collective way are the sauce of life. Classic novels, such as those of Jane Austen or Dickens, are known to the people of this generation through films rather than through the originals. The world situation being tense and uncertain, a conviction grew upon them that to seize the swiftly passing moment was the best part of wisdom.

He thinks that during this period, violence and unreason, expression of wild passion and contempt for law, progressively gathered strength. As an example of the increase of the irrational element, he particularly instances the advent of Hitler to power. Regarding Italy and Germany, he states that gangsterism in partnership with privilege has succeeded in breaking down all civilized values. The combined result of the training and the dominant tendencies of the period is to be seen in 'the rapid degeneration of a world in which reason, standards, the power

to plan one's future and to enjoy the prospect of security, had been the normal lot of, at any rate, the class which attained to the position of rulers, into a world in which unreason was king, in which the possession of standards was obsolete Victorianism, in which there was neither power to plan nor, often enough, even the hope of security '. Small wonder then that the younger generation of this period assumed that ' an important film star, a crack aviator, a great golfer or a famous cricketer, had a glory the splendour of which was far more real than that of the statesman or the philosopher, the scientist or the artist '.

In spite of all this Laski believes that in this period ' a passionate yearning for some common basis of life which offers it security and a hope of happiness ' is discernible and persistent. The actual years of World War II have made the yearning much more explicit and even operative. The heroic struggle, which Russian patriotism waged against Hitler's hordes, has convinced the common man that there was a magic in the Russian Revolution of 1917, which alone enabled the Russians of 1941 and 1942 to withstand the attacks of German militarism and German technology. The common man believes that the magic of the Revolution of 1917 can be adapted to his circumstances.

The Russian Revolution offers, in Laski's opinion, the substance of faith which he, on behalf of the common suffering man, is in search of. It satisfies the conditions which any new system of values must fulfil if it is to replace the decaying values of the old world. It secures to the common man a rising standard of welfare. It enables him to see that his standard depends on his productive effort. It has the great merit of making function determine the place of individual in society. It is thus analogous to what Christianity was in the decadent Roman world. He grants that in trying this experiment of the Russian Revolution, there was error, and even persecution and cruelty. The remembrance of these may create despair and despondency in the minds of men of great nobility of temper.

Appreciatively referring to Whitehead's statement that civilization is mainly the movement from force to persuasion, he observes that the vital problem of the present world is the finding of ' a new system of values which enables men to live together in peace '. He denies that any supernatural religion has power to build that tradition. It is only the idea of Russian Revolution that is capable of performing that function. It has proved a source of strength in adversity and has demonstrated

its extraordinary vitality in its growth from the philosophy of a handful of people to the practical philosophy of large masses of Russian mankind. Laski compares the revolutionary generation of Russia with the Athenians of the Periclean Age or with the Elizabethan Age of England. He remarks: 'Year in and year out of its history, men and women, both young and old, have found in it the inspiration which made them feel that they were a part, however small, of the great world-purpose which has the future on its side. And that inspiration has affected not merely the great man, the powerful man, the citizen of representative capacity. It has touched the humblest too.' If it be contended that twenty-five years of revolutionary Russia has not produced great literature that was produced in Czarist Russia by Tolstoy, Dostoievsky, Tchekov and Pushkin; if it is pointed out that no great musical composer has arisen or no scientist of the first order flashed on the horizon and if, therefore, one finds the scale of the individual achievement to be rather disappointing, Laski submits that the phenomenon is mainly due to the insecurity in world politics that Russia has been placed in and also to the fact that her energies, remaining over from her struggle for survival, have been utilized in the transformation of an illiterate peasant community into a modern economy.

He points out that this war which has penetrated more deeply into the lives of the people than the last war may reduce the power of reason as the arbiter in individual and social life even more than was the case at the end of the last war. It is possible that in the exhilaration of victory people may forget all about new social values. The breakdown of recent culture he points out is due precisely to the very phenomenon at the end of the last war.

Approvingly quoting a passage from Whitehead's *Adventures of Ideas* that the vigour of civilized societies is kept up by the sense of Peace which arises from aims beyond personality, he states that the Soviet Union has discovered the secret of this vigour through the provision of a common faith engendering such Peace amongst its citizens. The leaders of the U.S.S.R. are attempting to re-shape the behaviour of man through the channel of social organization. A society has faith when its members have it. For all practical purposes contemporary acquisitive society cannot be said to have that faith because it fails to evoke it in its members. A literary proof of this phenomenon is provided by the fact that before this war the predominant

expression in literature was that of satire. And Laski believes that 'it is when a society is seeking to preserve a system that has in fact gone beyond the power of renovation that satire becomes the most natural expression of its art.... Satire is the refuge of the artist or the thinker who cannot pass beyond the boundaries of disillusion into the realm of positive faith . . . the satirist is the artist who cannot find inner peace because he cannot accept the values which the society of his time seeks to impose on him, so that he rises in fury against them as a denial of the harmony which permits creativeness'.

Laski's estimate of the creators of imaginative literature in the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century can be perceived, from our characterization of that literature on the authority of more than one literary critic and historian, to be unduly harsh. His attempt to stigmatize that period on the ground of the literary weapon of satire being used cannot be accepted as convincing. Whitehead gives us his opinion based on his study of the past civilization that satire marks the end of one epoch and has many times ushered in the new epoch. The contribution of Shaw, Wells, Galsworthy and others like them as well as of the earlier Anatole France and Tolstoy towards the promulgation of new ideas of an equalitarian and in the case of the last of a spiritual nature is very considerable. Laski's generalization about lack of great writers preparing their audience for a new world falls far short of the truth. As for serious literature it is really surprising to note that he should have forgotten the fact that some of the theoretical background and actual practice of the Russian Revolution was given to the world by no less a man than Lenin and that some of his works were translated into French, German and English between 1915 and 1920. In England the writings of G. Lowes Dickinson, Bertrand Russell, J. A. Hobson, Webbs, Graham Wallas and R. H. Tawney were too widely and well received to be relegated to an entirely subordinate place. Bell's work on Civilization, published in 1928, and Murray's work published in 1929 both earnestly urging the educated people of England to restore standards of taste, intelligence and behaviour were, really speaking, in the direct line of descent from Matthew Arnold. Part of Wallas's contribution, that on liberty, was even more so. To have missed these attempts in one's generalization about the period is to have missed a full understanding of it. Laski himself in his earlier works, summarized above, in insisting on the individual's right and duty to

arrive at correct opinions and to pronounce them and if need be even to act up to them, was definitely contributing to this type of serious literature and in the endeavour was carrying on the tradition of Morley's *On Compromise.* In referring to the work of Ruskin, Mill, Renan and Emerson, as addressed to the civic-minded bulk of the population in contrast to the writings of Russell, Santayana, Bergson and Whitehead he is carried away too much by the desire to bring out the contrast to remember that after all the so-called popular work of Mill, *On Liberty,* was published in 1859 and a great part of the work of Ruskin and Renan too fell in the latter part of the nineteenth century. A number of Emerson's essays and addresses and his great work, *Representative Men,* were published after the middle of the nineteenth century. Mill published his stimulating essay, *On the Subjection of Women,* in 1869, in which year too appeared Matthew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy.* From 1860 Green was teaching at Oxford and laying the foundations of idealistic ethics and advancing the cause of ameliorative collectivism in politics. Some time after 1870 was published Morley's book, *On Compromise.* Green's posthumous book, *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligations,* comprises the lectures he delivered in 1879-80.

I have narrated in two chapters, one on the nineteenth and the other on the twentieth century, the achievements in the ameliorative, preventive and formative fields of social life of these periods—to be more precise, of about three-quarters of a century up to the beginning of World War II. They are no doubt the result of the awakening and effective working cf the moral conscience of the community largely whipped into action by the writings of a galaxy of authors from Carlyle to Tawney. The fact is that to attempt to view the twentieth century as a separate period from the whole of the nineteenth century is to conjure up a rather distorted view of social and individual life of the period. The point of view presented here is that the period from 1880 onwards to 1939 is more or less a unit showing in individual lives, in social activity, and imaginative literature more or less the same predominant scene, while a large part of the serious literature from 1837 to 1939 was striking a different note, which was listened to only partially.

From Emerson to Laski all the serious writers whose views on civilization and culture are presented here, either in large

summaries or in the body of the text itself, insist on the importance of development of individuality without sacrificing sociality, on the paramount need of cultivation and inculcation of standards in reasoning, in taste, and in serious and even jovial behaviour.

Laski's earlier attitude to the truly academic mind fostered in the academic atmosphere of the universities is not only refreshing but true in contrast with his insinuation that it has given up its function during the inter-war years, which will appear rather unfair to those who remember that G. Lowes Dickinson, Graham Wallas, and Sydney Webb were at the universities and wrote from there and Tawney, G. D. H. Cole and Laski himself are there and are writing from these institutions. His insistence on the pursuit of non-utilitarian knowledge and its fundamental significance for civilization may particularly be noted. The universities are the only places where such knowledge is cultivated. He rightly stresses the need for the independence of the universities in order that they may be able to fulfil their fundamental role in civilization.

CHAPTER IX

CIVILIZATION, A COLLECTIVE ENTERPRISE OF HUMANITY

The first World War was fought by the Allies for the protection of the rights of small nations and to end all wars. Lloyd George exhorted his countrymen to fight for the same end adding that he was going to make Britain fit for heroes to live in. The rallying cry was that of fight for civilization, someone having expressed the opinion that civilization was in danger. The American President, Woodrow Wilson, when he brought his nation into the fray on the side of the Allies, framed the issue in terms of an international appeal. Future wars were to be prevented by the provision of an international machinery for bringing about international amity, which was known later by the name of the League of Nations. The whole world was agog with the ideas of progress to be made possible at the end of the war. General Smuts declared that humanity had struck its tents and was once more on the march. At the end of the war British intellectuals such as R. H. Tawney, propounded schemes of educating the whole British nation on a free basis. Brailsford, Wolf, and G. Lowes Dickinson wrote about the evil effects of economic imperialism and the causes of World War. All this was indeed done with a view to bettering the British nation but also with the wider aim of fitting it for reception of the international ideal.

James Harvey Robinson's book, *The Mind in the Making*, published in 1921, is a powerful plea for a concerted and strenuous attempt to produce an intelligent, critical and open-minded generation of men and women who will meet the unprecedented situation with uniquely equipped minds. More direct attempts were also made to prepare the future Britisher, who is proverbially insular, for the international ideal. Maxwell Garnett proposed a scheme of education in a ponderous tome, entitled *Education and World Citizenship* (1921). The content of that education which would prepare persons taking it to appreciate the idea of international fellowship was to be widened. He thought that if the conscious or the unwitting co-operation of different races and peoples of mankind that had

taken place in the process of human culture is brought home clearly to the 'minds in the making' it would be feasible to foster the feeling of international amity, which alone could be the foundation for a League of Nations. In the same year Graham Wallas published his book, *Our Social Heritage*, discussing the kind of training imparted and the need for its change as well as the desirability of an international organization of co-operation on the world scale. His appraisal of the problem is worth noting. He says: 'Unless, therefore, an attempt is now made, in many countries and by many thinkers, to see our socially inherited ways of living and thinking as a whole, the nations of the earth, confused and embittered by the events of 1914-20, may soon be compelled to witness—this time without hope or illusion—another and more destructive stage in the suicide of civilization.'

F. S. Marvin had published in 1913 his view of the development and unity of Western Civilization on the background of Egyptian and Babylonian history, meagrely treated, in his book *The Living Past*. The book ran into its second edition in 1915 and in its fourth in 1920. Rostovtzeff's work, translated into English and published in 1925 as, *A History of the Ancient World*, dealt with Greco-Roman civilization on the background of the civilizations of Crete, Egypt and the Near East. Across the Atlantic, Breasted, the great Egyptologist, who was already known as the wise and successful author of *Ancient Times*, in which he had traced the development of Western civilization from the early palæo-lithic stage through that of the Egyptian and Mesopotamian to the Greco-Roman, expanded that book and published it as *The Conquest of Civilization* (1926). J. H. Robinson, whose *Mind in The Making*, had evoked the unstinted admiration of H. G. Wells, expanded his book *Mediaeval and Modern Times* and published it the same year under the title *The Ordeal of Civilization* as the second volume of Breasted's book. These brilliant writers were still thinking in terms of Western civilization and were concerned with establishing its unity as well as its continuity and development from that of the Egyptians and of the Mesopotamians.

Of different order was the work of H. G. Wells entitled *An Outline of World History* in which are embodied his research in and meditation on human history from its proto-human beginnings to contemporary European and American development. It was published in September 1920 and went into its

second impression in February 1921. Wells' book registers a great advance over the viewpoint of Marvin in this that human civilization is here viewed as a whole, of which the contemporary European and American developments are only the culminating stages. Civilization is presented as a more or less collective enterprise of humanity as a whole. Not only are the earlier civilizations of Mesopotamia and the Near East, which with their basic contributions to the civilization of Europe in the light of advancing archaeology have earned an honourable place in a general history of civilization, but also are the civilizations of India and China, though they are culturally rather remote from the European civilization of proto-historic and historic periods and militarily unspectacular, treated as almost an organic part of the whole. It records the appreciation that these civilizations, too, are significant not only for the history of human civilization so far but also for its future course. In short the book concretizes the aspirations of those intellectuals and statesmen who desired and worked for international amity and world-peace through a League of Nations, a world-state and a world-culture. His appreciation of the worth of the Indian Emperor Asoka is particularly significant of the new attitude.

Will Durant began his story of civilization with two volumes on the civilizations of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, India, China and Japan entitled *Our Oriental Heritage* and published them in 1935. He was clearly impressed with the contribution of India, China and Japan and brought up the story in regard to them to contemporary times as Marvin had brought his story up to contemporary Europe. The legacy of the East to the West having been discerned and described, the author gave his view of the contribution of the West in the book *The Life of Greece* (1939). The chief interest in and the motive-spring of the world history has thus clearly shifted. It is no longer only the Near East that is a part of the 'living past' but also the Further East and the Far East. The whole human world is an heir to the 'living past' and is the fashioner of the coming future. Realization of the collective nature of the human enterprise called civilization is seen to be the first step towards international amity, towards the future moulding of a world-culture.

Hardly any theoretical discussion about culture, civilization or the objective towards which humanity is striving is to be

noticed except in J. B. Bury's *The Idea of Progress.* Perhaps the Germans having monopolized *Kultur,* culture had fallen into disgrace. More likely, the concept till then more familiar was progress which was commonly believed to have been a fact achieved as well as a trend positively known. The idea of progress was thus the first to be brought before the court of justice of historical knowledge and scientific analysis with the first shock of World War I by J. B. Bury who started his inquiry in 1914 and published its results in 1920. Examining the origins of the theories of progress, of the idea that civilization was getting more and more and better and better and their history over nearly two centuries, he opined that there was hardly any consistent progress which could be proved but that the idea had served perhaps a useful purpose. Silence of students of civilization on this aspect was also a temporary phase. For an intellectual who starts with the project of studying the human past with a view to unravelling the respective roles of the various peoples and races of mankind in creating modern culture and civilization is bound sooner or later to plunge into a theoretical discussion of what civilization and culture are. In a word, when books about 'the living past' emphasizing the co-operative nature of human culture are written, the atmosphere is bound to be surcharged with civilization and culture. In 1928, Clive Bell published his book, *Civilization.* He tells us that the book was written much earlier. The exact time of its publication is not very important. What is significant is that the book discusses what constitutes civilization. The author tries to analyse and lay bare the characteristics of a highly civilized age. He discusses the very theoretical problem which arises, once studies on the co-operative nature of culture are undertaken. In the same year Wingfield-Stratford published two large volumes entitled *The History of British Civilization,* giving a much more comprehensive and descriptive account of civilization in Britain than was available for a society which has played an important role in the making of contemporary civilization.

J. C. Powys analysed the concept of culture and showed its application in his book, *The Meaning of Culture,* published in 1930. His idea of culture is fundamentally spiritual. In the same year John Dewey in *Individualism—Old and New* stated his criticism of American culture and made a strong plea for the serious consideration of the 'crisis in culture'. Whitehead made

an historical, spiritual and philosophical study of the requisites of civilization and published his conclusions in 1933, in the book entitled *The Adventures of Ideas,* whose main conclusions from our viewpoint are briefly given elsewhere. In 1934 J. D. Unwin published in *Sex and Culture* the results of his long study of the relations between the state of culture of a society and the regulation of sex-behaviour current in it. His conclusion is that, generally speaking, a high state of culture is associated with continence in sexual behaviour. In the same year were published three, out of the twelve projected, volumes by Arnold J. Toynbee entitled *A Study of History*—three more were out in 1938—dealing with the origin and development of civilization and the particular contributions of the known civilizations of mankind. The ponderous work is significant not only for its stupendous learning but also for its utter comprehension. H. A. L. Fisher, reviewing the first three volumes, characterized the author as 'a universal historian' and highly recommended the book.

Written about 1933, though actually published in 1937, the work of Rudolph Rocker reflects the bias introduced in the study of civilization by the activities of Fascism and Nazism. The book, *Nationalism and Culture,* as its title indicates, is concerned with tracing the relationship that exists between nationalism and culture. Rocker in his review of older civilizations is impressed by the decay of culture under Fascism and Nazism, and comes to the conclusion that wherever nationalism flourishes culture languishes. Rocker's contribution to the study of culture is less important than that of Bell. But the approach of both these authors is almost wholly historical and analytical.

The impact of the first World War and the situation that developed in the depression period had led some European writers of note such as Aldous Huxley in England and Romain Rolland in France to seek refuge from the West into some kind of mystic unison with the spirit of the East. This is not a novel phenomenon. Escape from the contemporary situation into something, either past or distant, has been a well-known phenomenon in social history by way of solution of present difficulties. Some of the nineteenth-century literary figures shocked by the squalor and misery created by industrial civilization harkened back to the times when artisan industry flourished. More recently Chesterton and Belloc with religious

fervour preached a return to the Middle Ages. The chief point of distinction in the position adopted by Huxley and Rolland is that it is a Westerner's proposed change over to the Eastern method of life. This influence affected not only such imaginative minds as Huxley and Rolland but caught hold of even more serious scholars who, being in the meanwhile horrified at some of the events in Soviet Russia and the events after 1933 in Germany, Italy and later in Spain, sought refuge in the promulgation of the doctrine of religious resuscitation. H. N. Spalding, in *Civilization in East and West*, published in 1939, studying human progress and fully utilizing the knowledge of the civilizations of China, India and of Holy Russia, comes to the conclusion that what is required for the peace of humanity is a synthesis of the cardinal principles of all civilizations. He observes: 'Yet every one of the great civilizations, even at its best, is incomplete, and would still be so even were it to attain its ideals; each has great tracts of Reality that it does not see, great gaps in its experience that have still to be filled up. Thus this-worldly civilizations supplement each other—Chinese and Nordics may learn from each other how better to conduct the affairs of this world—both have still more to learn from the other-worldly civilizations. The "Vedanta" and Buddhism and Orthodoxy may reveal to them other worlds of which at present they hardly dream. Similarly India and Russia, learning from each other, need to go to school with this-worldly civilizations to learn how to conquer poverty and to combine order with freedom.'

The purpose of the study of many of those who from 1913 onwards wrote on human civilization was primarily to demonstrate the interdependence of mankind in the creation of the early and recent civilizations. As a result of the first World War fear regarding the future of civilization took hold of the intellectuals. They widened their study so as to enable them to probe into the nature of civilization, to discover the qualities and the conditions essential for its rise, growth and culmination. Some of them realized the need for the Western European and the American sections of human civilization to take stock of their sciences and the consequent spirit. Many of the events happening between 1920 and 1933 on the continent of Europe were actually jeopardizing the values of civilization which were more or less tacitly accepted before. While scholars and intellectuals were trembling with fear for the stability of

civilization, while the fate of civilization was thus to be in balance, the second World War began. Yet the discussion of the great problem did not cease. From 1940, a continuous and ever increasing stream of books and pamphlets has been appearing, some devoted to post-war reconstruction and *inter alia* to the topic of civilization and culture, others continuing the study of periods of high civilization.

Of the latter class at least three important books may be noticed here. Joseph McCabe's *The Golden Ages of History* (first published in 1940, ran into the second and third impressions in 1944) runs through fifteen periods in human history, beginning with the Golden Age of Egypt, which the author considers as the Golden Ages and believes most experts would deem to be the most brilliant and progressive. He is principally concerned to show that the present age, far from being a decadent period, has great achievements to its credit. On the other hand, most of the remaining fourteen Golden Ages are characterized by a marked lack of restraint, whether in the indulgence of sex or of other passions. Having thus shown to his satisfaction that lack of sexual morality and presence of cruelty and violence were not detrimental to the creation and maintenance of great and golden ages in man's history, McCabe has no difficulty in insisting that the blemishes of modern European civilization, with Nazism and Fascism, should not be considered very seriously. If the modern age has something on the negative side which it possesses in common with many past great ages it has with it on its positive side something which is almost unique. There are two great constructive forces working in this age. The first of them, the production of wealth, is immensely greater than it was at any time before; and is also used for much broader purposes than formerly. The second force is that of humanitarianism through whose working the first force comes to be employed for broader purposes. I have briefly indicated the great achievements made possible by these forces in England during a whole century and I think McCabe has rightly stressed the existence of these forces. But he insists on something more than this. He is convinced and wants his readers to believe that 'all history and contemporary experience show that their operation is independent of religious creed or refinements of the sex-ethic'.

Ralph Turner in *The Great Cultural Traditions* (1941), passes through the cultural history of man from the time

his physical evolution had stamped him as man to the beginning of the sixth century A.D. and is highly impressed by the way the culture of one people has dovetailed into that of another. Civilization is in essence a co-operative process. While bringing out the broad-based contributions of earlier cultures he shows the emergence of various apexes of new peoples, who have absorbed elements from some of the previous and existing cultures, by the beginning of the sixth century. His conclusions are: 'In the foregoing pages the development of cultural traditions from the beginnings of culture as recognizable in the sparse data of prehistoric archaeology to the opening of the sixth century of the Christian era has been sketched. By that century the cultural traditions which, except as elaborated by new peoples or as disturbed by recent movements, still organize human life, had been consolidated. Their patterns had been fixed in enduring structures.'

The Creative Centuries (1944) by H. J. Randall records the reflections of the writer on those periods which by their creative activities advanced civilization either permanently or for a long time. It is clear that the author has only European history or cilization in view. Excepting for the role of Christianity he has, therefore, confined his creative periods to those cultures which flourished on European soil. It is strange that an author who believes that 'civilization has gathered all these elements [created in the various creative periods] into its body' and that 'they have become integral parts of the life of man', should have begun his book only with the description of the battle of Marathon. That such a historian, after so many books were written on World History, should look upon European civilization as a separate unit to be studied in isolation in the year 1944 must be painful to many a well-wisher of humanity. Naturally the mid-few years of the nineteenth century in England form the last creative period. The prime intellectual creation was the concept of Evolution and all its application, affecting many subjects including history in which 'the centre of interest shifted from the achievements of the individual to the slow development of civilized life, to movements and tendencies and growth'.

Scholars could not remain wholly confined to a view of the past as the din of the cracking of civilization grew apace. A number of serious-minded intellectuals turned their insight into culture to the planning of the future, an aspect of intellectual

endeavour which was implicit in a large number of works such as that of Graham Wallas or of James Harvey Robinson.

Karl Mannheim's *Man and Society* (1940), discusses a number of problems connected with both culture and planning from an analytical viewpoint. He sets out to analyse the effects of contemporary social disintegration on the development of culture, a concept which he does not directly define. But he states that the production of culture is directly dependent on certain social factors. Similarly the use made of culture and the type of people who cultivate it depend on certain social conditions. Cultural life and social structure are thus interrelated. The social process consists of two parts, one unregulated and spontaneous and the other regulated through various organizations; and both these aspects mould the intellectual and cultural life. In the liberal societies this goes on informally. The intellectuals of that society create the living culture in different spheres of life. The quality of that culture will depend firstly on the way in which the members of that society spend their leisure, and secondly on the manner in which the intellectuals are recruited. With the intellectuals having at their disposal more than average amount of leisure, the society creates a dominant cultural group which in its turn creates and slowly diffuses culture through the other classes of society. The crisis of culture in the liberal democratic society today is due to the fact that the social processes which favoured the rise of creative élite do not operate smoothly, as larger sections of the population whose social conditions are unfavourable to cultural activities participate in them. It is this phenomenon that leads to the diminution or the dilution of the cultural tradition. It is the large influx of the lower middle class into the class of élite that has brought about the situation. This is not to complain in a snobbish manner against the intrusion of masses, nor to grumble in the fascist way against liberalism and democracy but to press the fact that the democratic method of organization has not been carried to that state wherein it can produce 'the organic articulation' which a vast and complex society needs.

The immediate task, according to Mannheim, is to organize human impulses so as to enable their total energy to be applied towards development in the desired direction. For this purpose, the kind of social psychology that we require is different from the psychology which till now concerned itself with the human mind in general and in the abstract. We must not investigate the

human mind in general, but a mind in particular, say, the mind of a child, the mind of an adolescent, the mind of an adult and, further, the mind of a proletarian adult or the mind of the unemployed or even 'the minds of the various occupations'.

With regard to freedom and planning, he is positive that unless the democratic and parliamentary form of control can be maintained in a planned society, its planning would be a disaster. On the other hand, the combination of planning and democratic control with incorporation of safeguards for freedom is the only solution for the evils of society at the present stage.

John Dewey's book *Freedom and Culture*, published in Britain in 1940, discusses a number of problems which affect culture in a planned society. He examines the relation of science to free culture. The old simple faith that science will produce free culture is no longer possible. Science in its recent developments rather tends to help combination and total control in such a manner that indirectly it militates against free culture. It is necessary to control science in more senses than one.

Christopher Dawson in *Judgement of the Nations* (1943), diagnosing the disintegration of Western civilization finds reason to believe that its failures are due to the loss of ethical basis of political and international life. He thinks that the origins of European disunity lie in the fact that the two main types of European Protestantism represent two opposite concepts of natural law. He uses the word culture as a wider and more inclusive term than civilization. Civilization to him is a particular type of culture in its 'higher and more conscious manifestations'. In this he follows the anthropological usage of the words culture and civilization. Culture being thus a wider term it is impossible to separate man from culture. Similarly it is impossible to separate culture from religion, for the farther back in human history we go, the more closely related the two appear. In the more primitive cultures man's control over nature being narrowly limited he develops a sense of dependence much greater than is to be seen today and requires the help and services of mysterious powers to lend him confidence and offer him hope. Higher cultures represented, for example, by Buddhism or the culture of India, too, have not effected separation between religion and culture. Perhaps Chinese culture in the third century B.C. was partially secularized and definitely Roman culture in the last age of the Republic. But

the phenomenon in each society was more or less restricted. He finds that the contemporary phenomenon of secularization of culture is world-wide. The separation of the Church from the State has lent a powerful help to this secularization. Liberal culture of the nineteenth century tried to avoid the danger of complete secularization by its insistence on individual freedom which protected the human personality from the inroads of secularization. But the whole tempo of the milieu has been so strongly secularized that a possible source of religious and spiritual realization has been unable to fulfil its function. It appears, therefore, that the progress of Western civilization, brought about by science and its application to power, tends to destroy both religion and freedom. The discipline of the machine reduces the human being to a mechanical process. A society planned strictly on scientific basis must, therefore, result in a static and inert order which by weakening human will, will sterilize culture. The development in a totalitarian state depends on the exploitation of the irrational elements of human nature and thus is opposed to the whole tendency of humanity wherein to capture and tame the irrational elements through the agency of the rational ones has been the chief aim. Secularized culture, Dawson thinks, cannot escape from this dilemma either by humanitarian idealism or by a religion of personal spirituality. His remedy for these ills is the restoration of a Christian order to which end culture must be planned.

He points out that the conception of a planned society has a tremendous effect on social thought and political action and yet its full significance is not completely realized. The idea of planning a society marks a greater change in human civilization than anything that has occurred since the rise of the ancient cultures of the East. Finding that the discussion regarding the effects of planning has hitherto been confined mainly to its political and economic aspects he takes up for discussion the problem of planned culture. A planned culture opens up rather an unpleasant prospect for the ordinary man who has not much regard for rationalization of life. For others it appears that such a culture will not afford scope for satisfaction of some of the highest elements in human nature. Similar views about rationalization, about an ideal society based on abstract principles, the aim of the French Revolution, were advanced by Burke and others at that time. They thought that the promulgation of such a type of life would only be purposeless and empty. Dawson

thinks that their criticism was based on a sense of historical realities, and that they had no better views of culture than the philosophers whom they criticized. Nevertheless it is a problem whether a scientifically planned culture can have that vitality and variety which culture growing up through the ages has possessed.

Modern planned society reveals two weaknesses. First, it has very little scope for personal freedom and second, it ignores spiritual values. These defects are much pronounced in the totalitarian states but are more or less equally prevalent in other societies as well. In support of his contention, he points out the standardization of life in democratic societies. Whereas the older unplanned culture left a lot of freedom but created hardly any equality, today 'there is a lot of equality and hardly any freedom'. If the older culture was deficient in power the present lacks in its very essence the cultural values and spiritual standards. The older culture showed, therefore, a much better sense of style than the present one. The disintegration of culture that has come about rather makes the planning of culture an insistent issue. For if culture is not planned, it gets a subordinate position and is planned not for its own ends but for economic ones. That is to say it would be planned as a means and not as an end. And Dawson is convinced that 'the civilization which concentrates on means and neglects almost entirely to consider ends must inevitably become disintegrated and de-spiritualised'. In the totalitarian planning, culture is degraded. In the democracies where it has been left unplanned to private initiative though impoverished it is free.

When we think of planning culture the most important question that arises is whether a free culture can be planned at all. Or to put it the other way about whether a planned culture will remain free. Dawson points out that this is exactly the question which Mannheim has discussed in the final chapter of his book *Man and Society*. In the opinion of Mannheim it can be done through 'a free co-ordination of all the social elements. It only requires a proper legislator or co-ordinator—a problem which is unsolved'. Mannheim's remedy for it lies in the creation of a new science of Social Psychology. The function of this science is to guide the legislator in the matter of his co-ordination and also in regard to further transformation of human nature. This transformation seems to be as important to the scheme as the formation of the special science and its use by the legislator

since 'it is only by remaking man himself that the reconstruction of society is possible'. Dawson points out that there are difficulties in the way of the solution suggested by Mannheim. First, the science of Social Psychology, which Mannhein postulates, is at best only in its rudimentary beginnings. Secondly, a more fundamental objection to the scheme lies in this that the remoulding or transforming of human nature postulated as necessary is a stupendous task which, if entrusted to the State, will surely result in the total effacement of human freedom. On the whole the planning of such a culture will be taken up in a dictatorial manner.

Dawson can only think of the planning of culture being undertaken in a really religious spirit. As the earlier culture was directed by religious aims, similarly the new culture must be guided by spiritual ends. A planned culture will be the necessary object to restore the balance of social values in a world of planned economy. Thus only can the non-economic functions and ends be enthroned and made the objects of desires.

If it is religion that is needed to revitalize culture, to Dawson it is naturally the Christian faith which is the religion that will do it. He thinks that the recent attempt to dispense with the Spirit is becoming so oppressive that 'it must inevitably produce a reaction of resistance and revolution'. He asks the various schisms to close up their ranks and unite themselves on the fundamental principle of the Church of the Living God and thus achieve its appointed end. While he thus exhorts the Christians to unite into a Christendom rejuvenating and resuscitating culture with its spiritual and religious values, he has the faith that the schism is already passing. If it is thought that by his insistence on the unity of Christendom and its proposed role in the rejuvenation of culture Dawson is only thinking of Western Europe or of the Christian nations of the world it would be wrong. For to Dawson it is quite clear that Christians have a twofold responsibility and mission in the present crisis of culture. They have not only to look to Europe and rejuvenate it with Christian influences but Christianity with its conception of spiritual society transcending all States, peoples and cultures can make it their mission to regenerate the world with its values.

As we have seen, to Powys culture is almost a substitute for love and religion which has to function because religious feeling and the needed faith are lacking in modern society. To Whitehead too, a highly civilized state conveys the notion of a blissful

existence of the order of religious or spiritual ecstasy. Spalding has insisted on the need for the other-worldly spirit of Hindu and the Holy Russian civilizations being grafted on to the modern European civilization. Dawson pleads for the special brand of spiritual values typified by Christianity as being the sole saviour of mankind. It is really strange that the recrudescence of religious and spiritual values should have taken an exclusively Christian complexion after four years of the second World War. In contrast it is desirable to remember that Graham Wallas at the end of World War I was thoroughly disillusioned about the role of Christianity as a force for international unity. He ends his book, *Our Social Heritage,* with the conviction that 'the special task of our generation might be so to work and think as to be able to hand on to the boys and girls who fifty years hence, at some other turning point of world-history, may gather in the schools, the heritage of a world-outlook deeper and wider and more helpful than that of modern Christendom'.

CHAPTER X

CULTURE AND UNIVERSITIES

Some of the great minds of the nineteenth century, finding that man was losing his soul, preached the practice of culture as the worth-while end of individual life and as the liberator of the individual and social life from the chains of the material aspects of civilization. Some thinkers of the twentieth century, discovering that civilization was in danger and realizing that the appreciation of the co-operative nature of the enterprise could alone save civilization from its utter destruction in the near future, attempted to lay bare the conditions of civilization. Most of them used the term civilization as equivalent to culture. Yet some thinkers looking upon culture as a somewhat separate entity dwelt on the nature and saving function of culture. We have already stated that culture is civilization assimilated and made operative in individual minds and practice. Powys, Mannheim and Dawson in particular have dwelt on the recent and present crisis in culture because they are convinced that culture is an end in itself which is also a solvent of the present crisis. Dawson's insistence on the role of Christianity in the planning or regeneration of culture cannot be accepted to be helpful as Laski has shown and as the history of civilization establishes. The general view of culture that emerges is that its content must be universal. In the light of the great thoughts summarized above we have now to discuss the ways and means by which civilization and culture can be created and maintained at a high level.

There are two main aspects of the problem. First, how to create and maintain high cultural values? The second aspect, which has been the crux of the problem, is how to enable the large class of passive practitioners of culture, in terms of our classification, to turn civilization into culture. That this large class, first of all, requires economic security and increase in leisure will be granted by most clear thinkers. The economic planning that is suggested and undertaken in a number of nation-communities has social and economic security of these classes as one of its ends. The question treated here refers to the process by which civilization is to be turned into culture and not to the method by which to provide leisure necessary for it.

Herein comes society with its institutions and organizations for fitting up every new generation into the mould by handing its civilization to it. As John Dewey points out : 'Social institutions, the trend of occupations, the pattern of social arrangements, are the finally controlling influences in shaping minds."[11] Shaping the minds means passing on the ideas and ideals, beliefs and practices, attitudes and interests in various degrees according to the receptivity of the individual minds and the capacity of the disseminators. The association of the family, with its intimate relations among the various members constituting it, serving as a training school in the qualities of love and sacrifice, with its established norms of behaviour, performs some significant part of this process. The religious organizations do their own part by preaching principles of right conduct on the basis of one's relation to the supernatural. The family and the religious organizations between them handle the emotional side of the growing individual while the intellectual side is taken care of, or is intended to be taken care of, by the educational institutions of a society. There is a kind of occupational psychology which too has its share in this process as Dewey has mentioned. But apart from the fact that the general distribution of occupations, the varying respect attached to different occupations, the economic and social hierarchy which exists among them, affects the creation of a general atmosphere which colours the civilization and culture, the direct influence of occupational trends in this process of transmuting civilization into culture for the individuals comes rather late in their lifetime. Owing to this it is bound to be less potent than that of the other institutions which take up the individual far too early.

In the general educative process in any society today there are various factors. First, through the radio the spoken word can reach children, adolescents and adults in their homes, in their parks and playing fields or in their schools and factories. Whatever its potency for transmission of culture, it is well known that its capacity for propaganda is great, as explored by the Nazis and even more so by the rulers of the U.S.S.R. In many societies it is a monopoly of the State.

Then come the movie and the talkie with their ocular as well as auricular appeal in crowded, closed and fairly dark places, in short in an atmosphere where even a developed mind is ready to exhibit de-intellectualization, to receive vivid impressions, and is sensitive to emotionalism. Children,

adolescents and adults, as is well known, visit the places, where movies and talkies are running, in every country in numbers which are staggering. What the film, therefore, shows and talks about goes to create impressions on the growing and the formed minds in an effective manner. It is no secret that the fashions of today are becoming the dictations of the whims, likes and dislikes of the film-stars. The cinema industry is highly organized and commercialized, is owned and run by persons whose intellectual culture, with due deference to them, must be declared to be not very high. In most societies, on the other hand, there is some sort of censoring of films. Censoring is after all a very inefficient and ineffective way of countering the effects of the cinema. The cinema is thus a very potent influence determining what items of civilization shall be transmitted to the minds of the individuals to form their culture. And yet it is a privately owned industry. In spite of censoring and any other arrangement that exists in the matter of films, their production and their exhibition, it is agreed on all hands, that the influence of films on the process of transmuting civilization into culture is not necessarily healthy. And all well-wishers of society, all students of culture, must some time or other apply their minds to this question of the influence of the film on culture and must devise ways and means whereby the cinema will be as willing and helpful an ally of culture as it is a natural one. This is a topic which though important is not proposed to be pursued here. It is sufficient for our purpose to indicate the great significance of the cinema to the process of transmuting civilization into culture for the large class of passive participators.

The newspaper press which is the third agency of enlightenment has been looked upon rightly as the fourth estate of the State. The early enthusiasts of general education put forward their schemes of education of the people and entertained very high hopes about its effect on the make-up of the mind of the populace. They expected that the education which they proposed imparting to cultivate the mind of the people would be received to such an extent that the educated public would be able to apply their minds seriously and cogently to the problems of economic and political life presented to them and to take decisions which would be rational and correct. Similarly, when the newspapers were started they were expected to fulfil a high social purpose and discharge a necessary function. As a

matter of fact, journals such as the *Spectator* and the *Tatler* had played their part in the criticism of the manners and customs of their contemporary English society in such an effective manner that they were changed for the better. The newspaper press was, therefore, expected to lead public opinion on all matters of importance, economic, political and social. Its function was believed to be not merely to inculcate opinions but to teach the people to arrive at rational and proper conclusions on important matters presented to them for their decision. But, as we have seen above, the history of education and journalism has belied the objects and expectations of the early apostles of education and the early sponsors of journalism. Thus G. M. Trevelyan observes: 'More generally speaking it [popular education] has produced a vast population able to read but unable to distinguish what is worth reading, an easy prey to sensation and cheap appeals. Consequently both literature and journalism have to a large extent been debased since 1870, because they now cater for millions of half-educated and quarter-educated people whose forbears not being able to read at all were not the patrons of newspapers or books. The small highly educated class no longer sets the standards to the extent that it used to do and tends to adopt the standards of the majority. Whether in the twentieth or twenty-first century the lower forms of literature and journalism will completely devour the higher has yet to be seen. If they do not, it will be due to improved secondary and higher education forming a sufficiently large class to perpetuate a demand for things really worth reading.'[2] The irony of the situation is vividly brought home to those who remember Emerson's statement regarding the high esteem in which the newspapers were held in America about the middle of the nineteenth century, leading the people to take care not to burn any scrap of newspaper lest some important piece of knowledge should thereby be destroyed and contrast it with the estimate of the newspaper press made by his countryman John Dewey about seventy to eighty years later, in 1940, condemning it as an agency for sensation-mongering.[3] The newspaper press can play its proper role only if its patrons demand a higher standard from it than at present it has attained.

It is manifest from this discussion that for the creation of higher literature which will stand comparison with some of the best literature that was produced in the past, as well as for enabling the press to perform its proper

function, viz. of giving news in a non-sensational manner, of refraining from merely giving opinions and of leading its readers to form their own reasoned judgements, it is necessary that the system of secondary and higher education of a society should be sound. Those who take advantage of it will go out into life with a mind that is well formed, a mind that is impervious to mere propaganda, an intellect which refuses to be satisfied with catch-words, in short, a balanced and intellectual mind. Appreciative practitioners of or participators in culture can come only from such a class of people. The persons who will work this kind of educational system will have, therefore, to be of a higher calibre than represented by appreciative participators. They must represent the class or the group which we have called the appreciative disseminators of civilization and culture, some of whom will also be its adventurous creators. It is particularly the higher system of education, by which is meant education at the university stage, on which devolves the most important task of fostering this class of people. Their sole business will be not only to disseminate civilization and culture with appropriate attitudes and interests but also to create future culture, that is to say, in the words of Whitehead, to be ready with adventures of ideas.

It is no wonder then to find not only university teachers in conference but also others individually devoting their time and attention to the problem of post-war reconstruction of education, particularly at the university stage. Maxwell Garnett in *The World We Mean to Make* (1943), presents us with his scheme of complete education in which he stresses the need for religious education even though all education is meant to create citizens of the world. The problem of education, according to him, is threefold, to inculcate the habit of reasoned thought, to nurture bodily skill to harness the emotions and desires into the service of both and to cultivate a will determined to utilize all these to the well-being of all the good citizens. In the fulfilment of this purpose, he believes, religious education has an important part to play, particularly as far as the emotional and moral part of the problem is concerned. On the intellectual side, in his opinion, a free university should provide an honours course of study in natural and social philosophy. The foundation of such a course should be laid by a study of natural science. The social side of education is to be safeguarded by insisting on every student that he shall reside in a college or hostel, during at least

one year of his study. Religious education is to provide more or less a working philosophy of life. Maxwell Garnett is not satisfied that the Russian way of uniting the three functions of education in their theory and practice of life is a stable method. He observes: 'The Russian way of life has linked up the will, the feelings and the understanding of the average Russian and has also linked average Russians to one another. It has created single-mindedness and like-mindedness among the people. It has had the effect of a religion. . . . But we cannot help observing that much the same thing happened to the French nation a century and a half ago. . . . French democracy, founded upon a quasi-religion, has not proved so sound and tough as the more Christian democracies of the U.K. and the U.S.A. It may be that the Russian experience will resemble the French. But it is more charitable and, in my view, more reasonable to suppose that the Russians will retain the integration of living, feeling and thinking which has made them such good citizens, but that godlessness like Military Commissars will cease to be the rule in Soviet Russia as that country works more closely with the British and American Commonwealths.'[4]

Sir Richard Livingstone in *Education for a World Adrift* (1943), points out that the present generation may be called 'The Age Without Standards' and observes: 'The life without standards exists in all epochs, but it is the peculiar danger of a rich society at whose feet every kind of facility, distraction and pleasure are poured in indiscriminate profusion. Commercialism helps the chaos. For the aim of commerce is not to sell what is best for the people or even what they really need but simply to sell: its final standard is successful sale.' The task of our generation, he thinks, is a double one: to create a new order and to train human beings to adapt themselves to that order. This task can be performed only through a proper educational system.[5]

The educational system of a society is thus our prime concern as the foundation for the civilization and culture of that society which in its turn is expected to create a favourable atmosphere for international amity in view of its universality. Function and schemes of university education demand our closest scrutiny. Function of university education was a topic that was raised and discussed even in the early part of the nineteenth-century England, when the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge had just begun discharging their proper function

of giving mental training to the students put under their charge. Controversy between liberal education and practical education was raging. The charge brought against the university education was that the studies it encouraged were remote from the duties and occupations of life and were thus futile. There were other controversies about education centring round religion. In regard to all these matters of university education—the purpose of university education, its content, the subjects and the studies that should be fostered and imparted at the universities—all that was authoritatively considered by Cardinal Newman in his lectures delivered in 1852 and published in *The Idea of a University.*

Newman categorically states that Liberal Education is 'simply the cultivation of intellect as such, and its object is nothing more or less than an intellectual excellence'. And it is the business of a university to make this cultivation of the intellect or intellectual culture its direct scope and function. Towards that end the university must make all knowledge—Science and Humanities—its province. It must enlarge the range of studies professed and pursued within its precincts ; for though the students under its charge 'cannot pursue every subject which is open to them, they will be the gainers by living among those and only those who represent the whole circle'. In discharging its large and important function a university provides 'the great ordinary means to a great but ordinary end ; it aims at raising the intellectual tone of society, at cultivating the public mind at purifying the national taste, at supplying true principles to popular enthusiasm and fixed aims to popular aspiration, giving enlargement and sobriety to the ideas of the age, at facilitating the exercise of political power, and refining the intercourse of private life'.[6] The idea of a university as delineated by Cardinal Newman is that it is a seat of universal learning professed and cultivated for intellectual culture and calculated to become the source and centre of civilization and culture of society.

The inroads of science and a call for useful and practical education, however, were insistent. We learn that an eminent member of the senate of the University of London, Sydney Webb, writing in 1903, lamented the dwindling of the Faculty of Arts in that University. A. F. Pollard, speaking in 1904, stressed the need for strengthening the study of history in that University and discussed the question whether there should be a school of

history in the University College. In making his plea for the inclusion and development of Modern History in that college he quoted the definition of University College, evidently from its deed of incorporation. It declares it to be 'a place of teaching and research in which wide academic culture is secured by the variety of the subjects taught in different faculties'.[7]

Lord Haldane, in his rectorial address, delivered to the students of Edinburgh in 1907, entitled *The Dedicated Life,* reiterates more or less the opinions and ideas expressed by Newman fifty years earlier, tempered or strengthened by his knowledge of university education and its role in Germany and Japan. It will suffice here to quote in his own words his idea of the true function of a university. 'It is a place of research where the new and necessary knowledge is to be developed. It is a place of training where the exponents of that knowledge—the men who are to seek authority based on it are to be nurtured and receive their spiritual baptism.' Regarding the life of the teachers and the purpose of the scholars flocking there, he observes: 'Nothing but the passion for the excellence, the domination of a single purpose which admits of no foreign intrusion, can suffice for him who would reach the heights. As the older man moulds his life in order that he may pursue his way apart from the distractions of the common place so it is with the best students in the University. They live for their work and as far as can be for that alone.[8]

James Bryce has expressed his views on different aspects of university education in at least four different lectures delivered between 1907 and 1911. In his address delivered to the University of Chicago, he strongly protests against what he calls the signs of arrogance of science, trying to push the study of language, literature and history to a secondary place. He insists that every individual over and above his ordinary life devoted to the purpose of his avocation should cultivate a second or inner life of the intellect. It is in connexion with this pursuit of intellectual pleasure which is involved in the cultivation of inner or personal life that the humanistic studies of Literature, History, Philosophy, Psychology and Ethics have specific importance. For 'when we turn from thinking of our active life in the world to the inner or personal life, it is the *human* subjects which are best fitted to nourish it and illumine it'. In his address to the University of California delivered in 1909, he speaks with satisfaction of the reasonable limits within which

the University of California had kept its passion for athletics, sports and competitions 'which has been pushed to excess in England and Australia and which in some American Universities goes so far that the only kind of distinction that students value is that which attaches to proficiency in these competitions'. In his opinion this is 'a strange inversion of what might be expected in a high civilization and a strange perversion of the true spirit of university life'; for civilization means the enthronement of the mind over the body. A university is the embodiment of the homage which the State pays to learning, and has 'the function of reminding the people by its constant activity how much there is life beyond material development and business success'. In his address to the Johns Hopkins University delivered in 1911 he again returned to the subject of respective claims of Science and Humanities for cultivation at a university. He observes that it is no longer necessary to plead in favour of the deductive and experimental sciences. The time has come, on the other hand, for the vindication of the rightful place in education of the Humanities. He concludes: 'The error of those who a century ago deemed a grammatical and literary curriculum sufficient was no greater than is that of those who now dispute and seek to exclude the human subjects; or who hold that any single branch either of the human or of the natural subjects is enough to inform the mind or to develop and polish it to its highest efficiency.'

Abraham Flexner in *Universities* (1930), after a study of the American, German and British universities, presents the idea of a modern university. A university like other social institutions is naturally part and parcel of the general social fabric. It is 'an expression of the age, as well as an influence operating upon both present and future'. The very existence of universities implies that there is something in the heritage of the past which is worth-while preserving for itself and utilizing for furthering the civilization of the future. The influences of science and democracy are creating conditions of which universities must take account though a university should never be 'a weather-vane, responsive to every variation of popular whim'. On the other hand, it is the duty of a university sometimes to stand firm when it finds that certain values are at stake. Flexner insists that 'a proper amount of critical resistance, based on a sense of values, should save them [the universities] from absurd, almost disastrous blunders'. Recent advances have been so

rapid that empiricism is unable to provide adequate and proper basis for the necessary adjustments that societies must make. This proper basis, if it is to lead society to a happy adjustment to the rapid tempo of the changes, must be evolved by the rigid application of intelligence. And it is the business of a university to throw all its weight and prestige in favour of the application of intelligence in the exploration of the proper adjustment. It, therefore, follows that 'the modern university must neither fear the world nor make itself responsible for its conduct'. Naturally in this process of the exploration of a proper adjustment between social life and a changing tempo, the social sciences have to play the chief rôle. In order that the social sciences should be able to discharge their function satisfactorily they 'must be detached from the conduct of the business, the conduct of politics, the reform of this, that and the other, if they are to develop as sciences, even though they continuously need contact with the phenomena of business, the phenomena of politics, the phenomena of social experimentation'. The development of science at the universities has been great enough to demonstrate its utility and its right to be cultivated irrespective of its application. To maintain some sort of cultural equilibrium under these circumstances, the cultivation of humanistic studies becomes greater rather than of less importance. The function of a modern university is thus to concern itself wholly with the advancement of knowledge, with the study of the problems and the training of men—'all at the highest level of possible effort' The stabilizing role of a university in the intellectual life of the people is best brought out in some aspects of the history of the Oxford and Cambridge Universities which have played and still play an important part 'in maintaining sanity at a time when vocationalism and practicability endanger all sound educational conceptions'.[9]

Ernest Barker, writing of universities in Great Britain, quotes with approval the opinion of Bacon that philosophy and universality are fundamental studies and remarks: 'Philosophy and Universality remain the alpha and omega of British universities; it was in this that they began and it will be to this that they will always necessarily return.'[10] Kotschnig and Prys editing a symposium, to which different scholars of Europe and America have contributed articles on their respective universities, point out that the essays 'appear to be studies in national psychology rather than essays on the common essence of the

universities'. They are, therefore, not prepared to answer in the affirmative the question whether the New Universities will be 'united by one idea of knowledge and a common ideal of man'.[11]

The lack of universality in the idea of a university in the symposium referred to above has been, strangely enough, raised into a desirable objective recently by Julian Huxley. Discussing education as a social function, he points out the futility of the pretension to universality in education which the governing classes had so far managed. He believes that the culture tried to be fostered through that education was the selective culture of the leisured class and is not suited to the modern conditions of life. Therefore education 'must give up the pretence of being based on absolute or universal cultural values'.[12] This opinion regarding the futility of cultural education for the working classes is flatly opposed to that of the stalwart radical thinker, J. A. Hobson, who exhorted the workers to see that they were not baulked of cultural education.

Huxley's opinion restates the old opposition between liberal, technical and vocational education in the new setting which is particularly unpleasant. It demonstrates very well the danger here pointed out as looming large on the horizon and threatening the culture of the future as the foundation of international amity. Disbalance of university studies in favour of technology is likely because the claims of technology for primary consideration are based on the background of the technique of war as Huxley has done. Hobson already comments on the double policy of university education which had come to prevail in England with the establishment of the provincial universities in the beginning of the twentieth century. He points out that whereas the older universities retained their curriculum which was designed to impart intellectual culture, the newer universities, to which flocked large numbers of the lower class students, overstressed the applied sciences to the detriment of broad personal culture. He sees in this a natural method of turning the bulk of educated lower class into a new variety of hewers of wood and drawers of water being harnessed to the yoke of profiteering industry and denied the knowledge which leads to analytical and fundamental reasoning. He rightly warns democracy to prepare itself for two struggles in the domain of education. They are: 'One against the attempt to keep down to a low level the public expenditure upon humane and social culture,

while making provision for scientific and technical institutions of a distinctly utilitarian order: the other against the degradation of such personal and civil culture as is provided by the insertion of sedatives and stimulants devised for interested purposes of class "defence".'[13] Huxley's arguments against education with universality as its end will hardly appeal to any one who cares for intellectual culture or for international amity. His insistence on one aspect of education, which stands out in marked contrast to his opinions about other aspects, requiring a modern society to 'abandon the false and inadequate utilitarianism which sees in education solely or mainly a method for securing a job or doing a job better' deserves to be noted.

The symposium entitled *The Obligation of Universities to the Social Order,* held under the auspices of New York University in 1932 and published in 1933, embodies the views of some well-known and highly placed educationalists of the U.S.A. and Britain on this very problem of the relations between the universities and the social order, on the role the universities ought to play as leaders of educational and curricular thought, on the function of the universities as the centres and sources of the culture of society, on the part the university men and women should or may play in practical life consistent with their duties, on the place of research in the universities, on the need for freedom of the universities if they are to discharge their functions honourably and effectively and lastly on the question of spiritual values as an inherent part of university education.

Regarding the demand for the expansion of professional, vocational and technical education in the universities to meet the changing needs of modern society and the inroads which the restless tempo of modern life has been making into the quiet and calm atmosphere of the universities, James Rowland Angell, President of Yale University, who is generally inclined to be accommodative towards the new demands, is convinced that 'the universities cannot become mere weather-vanes, whipped about by every passing breeze of circumstance, and it is of the essence of their social obligation to discern and reject the superficial and ephemeral and to fasten their attention upon the more enduring and the momentous. Furthermore, they have at all times the paramount obligation to render society that indispensable and continuing service which they imperil the moment they abandon the detached and disinterested pursuit of the highest intellectual

pursuits.' Sir James Colquhoun Irvine, Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of St Andrews, speaking on the relative claims of the pursuit of pure knowledge and of the applied sciences on the universities, emphatically states his conviction that the fields of a university and a technical college are utterly distinct, demanding and nurturing different types of minds and having very little common ground. As he puts it: 'there is a vast difference between the technically trained mind and the educated mind'. In his opinion, one of the functions of the universities is to train and lead the public to want the right things. He further mentions his experience that the dictation of problems by the factories has gradually begun to alter the university atmosphere making it progressively less suited to the conduct of truly scientific inquiry. In more or less the same strain runs the pronouncement of Samuel Paul Capen, Chancellor of the University of Buffalo, who defines a university as 'an institution in which the advancement of knowledge is deliberately and officially fostered, an institution which is committed not only to the higher forms of instruction but also to research, and which rests its reputation on the quality of its scholarly output'. In the words of Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, 'The university is a society of scholars, endowed with the privilege of conferring academic degrees, whose purpose and ideal is to conserve knowledge, to advance knowledge and to interpret knowledge' and it does this through search for truth.[14]

Both Sir James Irvine and Butler state categorically that universities cannot fulfil their mission without freedom or autonomy.[15]

Angell, President of Yale University, and Coffman, President of the University of Minnesota, both look upon the university as primarily dedicated to the evoking and disciplining of the highest intellectual energies and thus to the liberalizing of the human mind and the freeing of the human spirit. Consequently in the words of President Angell, 'the university stands at the very centre of civilization, and the maintenance of its nobility of purpose is of paramount consequence to all mankind'.[16]

The views briefly summarized above of some of the leading contemporary educationalists are almost in harmony with those of Cardinal Newman, excepting that during the period of eighty years that separates the two sets, the universities have registered a notable advance in their right of being the centres of research,

which Newman was not prepared to grant.[17] In taking up research as an important part of their legitimate activity, the universities have only fulfilled the expectations raised about them in their usual definition as centres of advancement of learning and of furthering of knowledge. They have strengthened their claims to be the society's centres of civilization and culture, thereby becoming the mothers of adventures of ideas.

Brian Simon, who presents the modern British students' point of view in his book, *A Student's View of the Universities* (1944), wants university education to be broad and related to life so that it helps to realize cultural values. He points out the deficiencies of contemporary university education. The provincial and newer universities provide mostly professional, vocational, and technical courses for corresponding careers open to the students from the less well-to-do sections of society. These courses being purely career-courses, are almost devoid of cultural values. The curricula of the older universities, on the other hand, suffer from their lack of relation to the present society. As a matter of fact, though they are pure and broad they become sterile owing to the prevailing view about them that they must not have any utility value. He thinks that the authorities of the older universities, from whose tuition mostly the students of the wealthier classes benefit, realizing their defect, have been in search of new slogans and methods. The principal method adopted is to provide courses which are composite and, therefore, broad, requiring, as they do, the students to study two or three subjects, more or less related, for their degree examinations. Simon's dissatisfaction with the older curriculum as well as this newer one is mainly the same. First it is that there is very little study of social sciences provided in the curricula. Second, the subjects are treated as specialisms, their inter-connexions being not properly stressed. Third, they are not brought into relation with the present-day problems and the weight of the teacher's authority not thrown on the side of what is progress and advance. One can see that if a proper quota of social studies is provided in the curriculum, the other objections of Simon need not be considered to be serious. For in any historical approach to the study of economic, political, social or religious institutions all scholarly treatment must tend to evaluate the past in terms of the present and the latter in terms of the past. Of course the value-judgements will not necessarily be such as Simon, or for the matter of that the exact number opposite,

the reactionary, would like. That is no condemnation of the curriculum, of the tuition or of the teacher. It is of the very essence of intellectual culture and of the freedom of the universities. Simon in his constructive proposals himself uses terms which keep this question open. His idea of the newer functions of the universities on the arts side is this : 'The study of the arts should widen the knowledge of the ways in which men of all nations have thought, felt, and acted on lines other than our own, and of the social, intellectual, and psychological problems which have arisen in the past. This knowledge should be used to view present-day society in its proper perspective and to help in the solution of current problems... courses in classics should be viewed less from the point of view of translating pieces of literature and widened to cover all aspects of ancient civilization."[18]

In a recent symposium in which well-known university professors have participated, John MacMurray, Bruce Truscot and Bonamy Dobrée, whatever the difference in their views regarding some other aspects of the universities, agree in looking upon them as the breeding ground of cultural values and traditions, however differently this fundamental agreement may be expressed. MacMurray considers culture to be the principal among the three objects of a university. He observes: 'A university is primarily a centre of cultural life and cultural progress.... A university cannot properly be partisan. It cannot serve a limited purpose or special policy—even if it be a national one. It must seek the truth and maintain the truth.... A university can only serve its own community by serving humanity.... It must provide for the maintenance and diffusion of culture in the community. It must arrange for carrying on research in all branches of learning.... The cultural function deserves special thought both because it is the key to the other two and because under present conditions it is apt to be overlooked and neglected.... To stress the cultural function of the university now is not to hanker after the past, but to look to the future.' Bruce Truscot writes about city-universities: 'I mean that they must do more than conform and adapt themselves ; they must lead. I want to see them put out their efforts to create a cultural tradition.' Bonamy Dobrée is more explicit in his pronouncement. He observes: 'What is desperately needed now is a body of people aware of the vital currents of thought of their time, of important discoveries in every field,

and of whom some at any rate are perceptive of modern art: a *body, in short, which understands and creates the formative* ideas of the age, from which the governing class, in cabinet, in local councils, and in industry will largely be drawn, and in which the inventors can live harmoniously. Surely it is the first business of universities continually to create this élite, and by far the most effective, perhaps the only instrument through which they can do it, is a freshly conceived Faculty of Arts.' In his opinion the demand that the universities must play an active part in the life of the society is properly met by the universities only by embarking upon the creation of the élite and not by attempting to link their technological, professional and vocational departments with industry and trade.[19]

Whether we weigh the thoughts of educationalists from Cardinal Newman to MacMurray and Bonamy Dobrée or consider the implications of the writings of scholars presenting the view of human civilization being a co-operative enterprise from H. G. Wells to Ralph Turner or ponder over the significant findings of students of periods of high civilization and of the essentials of culture from Emerson to Whitehead, we arrive at the same conclusion that the universities must play the role of the creators and disseminators of culture. If they mean to play it successfully, three problems connected with them will assume paramount importance: the organization of a university, its position *vis-a-vis* the State and the kind of courses it should offer. To take the latter first, it must be pointed out that the main result of teaching of and work in science for nearly a century has been the unsettling of beliefs without substituting anything positive. This is not meant as a criticism of science but it must be borne in mind that this has been the result of science-teaching. The hopes entertained of science-teaching, viz. that it would lead to rational conduct, have not been fulfilled. The brilliant teaching and writings of T. H. Huxley, as is rightly pointed out, created for a time for the lower middle class and perhaps even for the lower class a kind of scientific culture, but its main result which cannot be denied has been unsettling. Much was expected by way of indirect result of science-teaching through its methodological aspect. It was hoped that the inductive method of science would inculcate and instil in the minds of the young the intellectual habit of gathering one's facts scrupulously and formulating one's conclusions on that basis meticulously. This promise has not been

fulfilled. The spectacular success of science in practical life, its objective greatness, has, on the other hand, quite dazzled the eyes of many and has led, as John MacMurray points out, to a disbalance in the intellectual life of a university.[20]

The antithesis between arts and science corresponds to the old distinction between liberal education and technical, or vocational education. MacMurray exhorts that science should be included in liberal education just as well as that scientists should be men of large and balanced sympathies. Bonamy Dobrée insists on the broad-based education of the Arts Faculty for the creation of the élite because, as he says, 'Science deals with how things happen in the material world; technology is concerned with how to make things happen in the material world; the Arts are concerned with human values, with human responsibility, while the others have nothing to do with such matters'.[21]

The annual average output of graduates at the British universities during the period 1926-39 was 9,000 out of whom less than 5,000 graduated in humanistic, non-technical, non-professional studies.[22] About 1939 the British universities had in their science, medicine and technology departments 2,709 persons as teaching staff as against 1,987 in their arts departments, including law and education.[23] This disbalance between the scientific and the humanistic studies at the universities is going to increase in the future. But even more than the disbalance between science and humanities in the universities there is going to be, in fact there has already been, a great shift in opinion regarding prestige in favour of science and technology.

It is a commonplace of social history that the humanistic creation of the economic man with bare economic motives had its repercussions in the degradation of man, the dehumanizing of industry and the vulgarization of culture. The industrialist who worked on the postulate of the economic man was merely organizing business or industry for his profit, fully convinced that he was fulfilling a very proper mission of man. A little later the efficiency of the manager of the great industry was helped and enhanced by the science and art of business management. Between the motives of the captain of great industry and the scientific art of the business manager, the human element was completely lost sight of. Human beings were conceived as so many cogs in the whole machinery of business, industry, and

production. But the great industry and the business management of the past had not realized its full stature or rather had not appreciated its capacity till the first World War. It was during the first World War that organizing on a large scale for purposes of war production, and later for civilian ones, was undertaken. It was appreciated for the first time that a planned organization of economy would throw into the background for purposes of production the most fantastic expectations of the great industry and business management on the old scale. Yet planning of economy had not come into its own and was unable to get a foothold in Britain or in any other democratic country. It was the success of the first Five-Year Plan of the U.S.S.R. that seriously turned the eyes of the world to the potentialities of planned economy. Russia proved to the world by the success of her first Five-Year Plan that the country that was so disorganized economically a few years ago could satisfy not only its wants but could undertake some of the greatest projects of power-production and production of machine tools. But the eyes of the world were jaundiced after all against Soviet Russia because of its communism, particularly in Western democratic countries which were themselves highly industrialized. On the other hand. in countries backward in economic production such as India there were people who understood the significance of the success of the Five-Year Plan. During the world economic depression, the attitude of some of the most forward countries to the planning experiment of Soviet Russia changed remarkably. The U.S.A., for example, under the Roosevelt administration, started on its New Deal which was an aspect of economic planning under capitalistic system. Its success further inclined the world towards economic planning in a more marked manner, the T.V.A. scheme adding its own quota of prestige.

There is a large amount of literature on the subject of planning. We do not propose to go into the merits of economic planning, that being outside the scope of our study. The great success of the Soviet armies against the Germans proving the immense success that planning had achieved in the matter of production of heavy war materials, some of the finest calibre, has convinced the world that economic planning or planned economy has a charm of its own, a potentiality for solving the economic problems of a country, and a capacity for making it great. Planning, it would appear, has now come to stay. Whether the economists who opine that economic planning and

capitalistic society cannot go together, are right or wrong, capitalistically organized countries have been so far enamoured of the success of economic planning that there is no doubt that they are taking to it and they will take to it more and more. With economic planning technology comes more and more into prominence. As a matter of fact, modern technology renders planning easy and, as some would have it, even advisable and inevitable. With the era of economic planning, therefore, the applied side of science with its proved tremendous value in the prosecution of war is going to acquire a prestige never known before. This development of economy thus will have its repercussions on the life and organization of a university. The disbalance between the respect shown to science and humanities is going to be tilted more and more in favour of science and even of technology to the detriment of humanities.

There is an aspect of planning which has been reiterated by its critics so much that it must be seriously considered. It has been stated that planning cuts against freedom. Generally speaking, those who have a socialistic bent of mind think that planning is good and has no such consequences as militating against freedom. On the other hand, those who belong to the school of *laissez faire* in economics, and individual freedom and liberty in politics, have no doubt that planning curtails individual liberty. Without entering into the arguments advanced by the two sides, it must be stated that economic planning must lead to some kind of regimentation and must, therefore, affect the freedom of some sections of society. But that is no reason why economic planning should not be undertaken. At least sociologists should not be, and cannot be, opposed to planning because it is well known that when Comte organized the study of society under the caption of sociology, he had exactly this in mind—that by the study of the past experience through the science of sociology humanity would be able to guide its future course. Since guiding of future course is contemplated it must mean planning. Sociologists have pointed out that whereas natural life may be based on sheer struggle for existence, though there even mutual aid is seen, social life, on the other hand, without any doubt is meant to be based on moral considerations, to be based on rational organization. Now if society is to be rationalized social organization must be based on certain principles. The one principle which cannot be omitted is the welfare of every human individual constituting the

society. Organizing society for the welfare of its constituents does mean, therefore, rational guidance of social organization. Thus planning is inherent in the very idea of sociology.

Planning *a priori* is good. That should not be opposed simply because it is planning. At the same time it should be remembered that if planning is likely to lead to the curtailment of liberty of some sections it is the business of social organization to procure conditions wherein individuals are able to realize themselves to the fullest. If social life as opposed to natural life means the substitution of ethical considerations in place of natural forces, it also implies that social process must be differentiated from the natural process by the fact that whereas in nature, generally speaking, the individual does not count but his group, or the species, in society individual must count as much as the group or the society. If planning of economic life is one value, realization of the significance of individuals is another. There are potentialities in planning which are likely to work against free individual development and realization. Planning would thus militate against culture or high culture, in so far as it is likely to lead to the regimentation of life of some of the classes at least.

Taking into account the importance of the university in the civilization and culture of the people and keeping in view the inevitable accretion of prestige in the case of science and technology and mindful of the possibility of economic planning leading on to a planned economy and regimentation of life, planning will have to be judged not by the particular schemes about planning of particular industries or by the amount of money that is proposed to be devoted to it or even so much by the proposals about the distribution of the product of planning, though this latter is very important, but by the desires and actions of the planning authority in respect of the universities. A planning society if it cares for civilization and culture must strengthen its universities.

Strengthening the universities, it should be clear from our discussion so far, must be twofold. Firstly, to redress the disbalance of prestige which is tilted very heavily in favour of science and technology, a proper proportion of the money that is to be devoted for planning should be put at the disposal of university organization. This will enable the universities to strengthen and organize their departments of studies on much better scale both extensively

and intensively. Secondly, in order that universities may be able to discharge their functions properly they must have a status more or less autonomous in the body politic. It is more urgently necessary in a planned society. Here it must be pointed out that the peculiar position of British society, British civilization and culture in some degree—perhaps even to a preponderant degree—is the consequence of the position that the universities of Oxford and Cambridge have occupied in British life. With such long-established and autonomous universities, with great traditions and prestige behind them, British civilization and culture, in spite of its decline sometimes, has been able to show itself vital and progressive. These universities have kept up a tradition for humanistic studies in spite of their developing the science side in a manner which deserves our admiration. Whether we transport ourselves to Oxford of the days of Newman, Ruskin, and T. H. Green or Cambridge of the days of G. Lowes Dickinson, Russell and Whitehead we see the same phenomenon. The adventures of ideas take their birth in the serene atmosphere of Oxford and Cambridge and propagate themselves from there.

It is worth noting that there has come about a great revolution in regard to the nature of the personnel of the intellectuals and leaders of thought in England from about the middle of the nineteenth century. Before 1860 when young T. H. Green began to teach at Oxford the largest number of the leaders of thought were men having no regular connexion with the universities. During the last eighty years, however, the balance has tilted very heavily in favour of the university dons. Whereas in the earlier period history was taught by Macaulay, Carlyle and Froude. in the later era it was written by Maitland, Bury, Fisher, Gooch, Trevelyan and others, all connected with the universities. The leaders of the economic thought of the latter period have been most of them people teaching at the universities, such as Marshall, Canan, Pigou, Keynes, Young, Tawney, Clapham, Lipson, Power, Sidney Webb and others, there being only a few important thinkers not connected with the universities such as J. A. Hobson, Josiah Stamp, R. G. Hawtrey. On the other hand, the economic thought of the middle of the nineteenth century was dominated by practical men of affairs such as Bagehot and Ricardo. In political philosophy when Mill, Bagehot and Spencer taught their contemporaries there was hardly any one among the men at the universities who attempted to share the honours with

them. The entire position was, however, changed since Green lectured on the principles of political obligations. Maitland, Bosanquet, Graham Wallas, Hobhouse, Ernest Barker, G. Lowes Dickinson, Tawney, Cole, Finer and Laski, who later expounded the subject, have been all men of the universities. Whereas Mill and Spencer had left hardly any scope for the university don to make his mark in the domain of philosophy and psychology, Green, Bradley, Bosanquet, Ward, MacTaggart, Alexander, Johnston, Whitehead, McDougall, Stout, Rivers, Myers and others of the unversities so much occupied it later that outsiders had a bad time of it, only two names standing out prominently, Havelock Ellis and Alexander Shand, from among them. In science Davy, Faraday and Darwin, Lyell and J. D. Hooker who made the science of the first sixty years of the nineteenth century were not connected with the universities. So must also be considered Joule, though he was somewhat in touch with Owen's College, Manchester. The great popularizers of science, T. H. Huxley and Herbert Spencer, held no appointment at the universities. From the day William Thomson, Lord Kelvin, took charge of the chair at Glasgow the university scientist has been holding supremacy in the field of science in spite of the fact that the needs of modern industry and modern warfare have led to the foundation of a number of huge laboratories, where researches on almost a lavish scale are carried out. William Thomson, Clerk Maxwell, J. J. Thomson, Rutherford, W. L. Bragg, E. Ray Lankester, Archibald Geikee, Bateson, Sherrington, Hopkins, Adrian and others who are stars of the first magnitude in the scientific firmament of 1860 onwards have all been university men. The great popularizers of science, comparable to T. H. Huxley and Spencer, E. Ray Lankester, J. Arthur Thomson, and Lancelot Hogben have also taught at the universities and done their work there.

It is fortunate for Britain that she possesses universities such as Oxford and Cambridge which in their established tradition and prestige have been able to keep up strong schools of humanistic studies when social pressure led the provincial universities to provide almost wholly technical and professional education. Societies which do not possess such universities, hallowed in their age-old freedom and privileges, and which are on the path of planning should follow Britain in creating such universities, more or less autonomous and respected, and provided with adequate finance. Such action will give a positive proof of their *bona fides* that their economic planning is not

intended to swamp personalities or to regimentalize individuals or thought but first, to create the conditions for the reception and nurture of civilization and culture; second, to spread the same among larger and larger number of people and, thirdly, to foster the rise of free civilization and culture.

The role of the universities in the world that we would like to create is very significant. We have just seen how in England during the latter part of the nineteenth century and thereafter the universities have played the dominant role of leadership in thought, in creating a very large part of civilization and culture. We have also seen how writers and thinkers on university education such as Newman, Haldane, Bryce, Irvine, Angell, Butler, MacMurray, Bruce Truscot and Bonamy Dobrée, spread over more than eighty years, whatever their differences regarding other functions of a university, agree in this respect that a university must be the centre and source of creative thought, in short, of civilization and culture. It is thus clear that the higher type of culture, wherever else it may or may not flourish, is likely to arise and to be fostered in the quiet, serene and academic atmosphere of the universities.

In the matter of creating newer aspects of civilization and culture the universities in the Western countries have so far acquitted themselves well as centres where high culture has been nurtured and has flourished. In respect of dissemination of culture and the inculcation of high standards, which are the right privileges of universities to establish and promulgate, they can only be sustained if the university-life both in its intellectual as well as in its social and emotional aspects is properly integrated and organized. We have pointed out the shortcomings in the actual achievement of the cultivation of science at the universities in regard to its cultural qualities, but that does not mean that we should discourage science at the universities. Pure science affords perhaps the best intellectual discipline that can be imparted very systematically to a growing human mind. The claims of pure science as a constituent of general culture which were put down in the symposium, called *Modern Culture*, in 1869 by men such as Faraday are still valid and must be implemented. Science thus has a twofold value at the universities : its purely civilizational and its cultural creative value. Some of the greatest phenomena in man's civilization and culture are the result of the work of pure scientists either in the universities or university-

like laboratories. There has been doubt cast on the disinterested nature of the inquiries that scientists have been believed to have pursued. It has been suggested that the nature and the subject-matter of inquiries of a number of scientists were given by the social milieu and by the particular form of economic organization. That scientific inquiry, contrary to popular opinion, has not been particularly of the disinterested kind. This is generally the opinion of the school of thought which is partial to socialism and reorganization of that kind. There are other intellectuals who comment on the wastefulness of separate and private inquiries conducted by scientists. They point to the immensely greater amount of work and the remarkable output, both in extent and originality, that is manifest during the war years, to substantiate their claim that scientific research should henceforward be put on an organized basis. Research in science, in their opinion, should be planned just as the economy of a people should be planned. Here we should like to point out, without taking sides in a controversy in which high authorities are ranged on both sides—upholders of private and free inquiries in science on the one hand and the protagonists of planning in scientific research on the other—that such a world-renowned scientist as Sir W. L. Bragg has stated that the amount of research in Physics done at the British universities has been much greater both in its fundamental character as well as in its amount than that accomplished at the Government-organized institute for research in Physics, the National Physical Laboratory, though the latter consumes more than one and a half times the finance that supports research in Physics at all the British universities taken together.[24]

Planned society has permitted free search and scientific truth but has tended to canalize it in certain directions favourable to it. John Dewey, who, though not a partisan of the U.S.S.R. or of socialism is yet not known to be reactionary or an unthinking devotee of capitalism, has some very pertinent observations to offer on this issue. He remarks: 'Nazi Germany decrees what is scientific truth in anthropology regarding race, and Moscow determines that Mendelism is scientifically false and dictates the course to be followed by genetics.* Both countries look askance at the theory of Relativity, although on different grounds. Quite aside, however, from special cases a general

* Dewey's estimate of U.S.S.R. as regards genetics requires modification in view of the fact that Lysenko's doctrines have been almost defeated by the strictly scientific genetics of the academicians (*vide Nature*, 31 Aug. 1946 pp. 285-7).

atmosphere of control of opinion cannot exist without reacting in pretty fundamental ways upon every form of intellectual activity—art too as well as science."[125]

Whatever the needs of economic planning and its technological basis, it would, therefore, be wise to keep science almost entirely within the purview of the universities so that fundamental research in pure science is conducted in an atmosphere of freedom, with an indifference to consequences, which will guarantee the sprouting of free thought. Though there is a good deal of propaganda and a fair volume of informed opinion in favour of organizing scientific research, yet on the whole, the prestige of science is so high and such high authorities in science have spoken in no uncertain manner in favour of its continuing at the universities that there is no fear, in any economic planning, of science being neglected at the universities. In the din of economic planning and its accessory technology with its greater noise, on the other hand, humanistic studies are likely to be pushed into the background. And this danger is real and serious because even before the days of planning, there was already disbalance at the universities in favour of science. If the fears about the eclipse or the comparative insignificance of humanistic studies at the universities materialize, the situation would be fraught with serious consequences to civilization and culture. One striking phenomenon in the intellectual world that cannot escape the notice of any student of thought is the great anxiety shown by scientists as well as by other leaders during some years before second World War regarding the dissociation of science from moral ends. It is well known that J. D. Bernal and J. G. Crowther wrote books attempting to bring out the social relations of science. The one anxiety of the scientists and leaders was to see that scientists worked with cultural ends in view. The association between science and humanities, therefore, the need of which was stressed so much during some years before the last war, will be even more felt after the war in the reconstructed world which will evidently be dominated by economic planning. Humanistic studies which have always stood for culture and non-material side of civilization, for grace and dignity, for form and style, for essence and spirit are ever more needed in the reconstructed world for their valuable corrective to the scientific tilting that is inevitable and necessary. If the universities are to serve as the centres of culture and not merely as centres of

civilization, it is essential that humanistic studies must be very highly developed in them.

Maxwell Garnett has stressed the need of philosophical, natural-philosophical and social-philosophical studies at the universities in the post-war world for all those students who are not marked out for a more specialized course of study. Bonamy Dobrée has similarly stressed the need for a wide course, in which a number of social sciences form a part, as the best basis for the training of the young minds of tomorrow. G. D. H. Cole, commenting on the Modern Greats course, introduced after World War I at Oxford and comprising of the study of economics, philosophy and politics, concludes that though it is a good course he would like to see its basis widened.[26] Thus university teachers in England of the first rank are thinking in terms of offering at the universities wide courses of study involving work in more than one humanistic studies in order that the youths gathering at the universities for their intellectual training should be fitted for the role they will be called upon to play in the reconstructed world. In all these proposals an important place is given to social studies. The value of the humanistic studies even to scientists and technologists has sometimes been recognized by great scientists. Thus Millikan of cosmic radiation fame as the president of the California Institute of Technology has insisted that every student going through the four yours' course of his institution shall spend a quarter of his time on the humanistic studies.[27] Bernal laments the lack of development of subjects such as psychology and sociology in the research programmes of the universities.[28]

From all points of view it becomes clear that a community which cares for its civilization and culture must see to it that its universities shall develop the humanistic studies. The universities can best fulfil their role as centres of culture, creators of civilization, as disseminators of culture and as general inspirers of standards and qualities that in the opinion of various thinkers such as Emerson, Matthew Arnold, John Morley, Clive Bell, J. C. Powys, Bertrand Russell, Harold Laski and A. N. Whitehead, are the hallmark of high civilization, when they are in a position to have very strong and fully equipped departments—so well equipped that each department will be able to undertake instruction of the highest standard in its branch as well as incessantly conduct research in all its aspects—in Literature and Fine Arts, Linguistics and Pedagogy, History and Archaeology, Politics and

Jurisprudence, Economics and Geography, Sociology and Psychology, and Philosophy and Religion. Such departments would be centres from which will emanate a steady stream of influences laying down standards and fostering intellectual integrity—a stream of literature which will act as a counterblast to the general lowering of standards, which is bound to continue for a long time to come, till, as G. M. Trevelyan points out, secondary education is brought to a high pitch. In order that the universities thus endowed should be able to fulfil their mission satisfactorily, 'the permanent members of the university, must of course, be men and women of high culture as well as of intellectual distinction' and 'it is at least equally important that its students should be seeking knowledge and culture and not something else'.[29]

The development and status of the universities and the financial provision that would be made for them in a planning society in the immediate future will indicate whether or not that society cares for free culture in all its grades as one of the significant values worthwhile striving for. On it will depend the possibility of achievement of international amity.

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1 Dewey, (1), p. 128.
2 Trevelyan, (2), p. 582.
3 *supra*, p. 53; Dewey, (2), pp. 41-4.
4 Maxwell Garnett, (2), pp. 229-30.
5 Livingstone, pp. 11, 26, 27.
6 Newman, pp. 101, 177, 178.
7 Pollard, pp. 262-6.
8 Haldane, pp. 85, 107.
9 Bryce, p. 228.
10 Flexner, p. 228.
11 Kotschnig and Prys, pp. 21, 120.
12 Huxley, pp. 183-7.
13 Hobson, pp. 109-12.
14 *Obligations of Universities to the Social Order*, pp. 14, 52, 53. 55, 58, 89, 269.
15 ibid., pp. 55-6, 469-73.
16 ibid., pp 23, 25, 26.
17 ibid., p. 8.
18 Simon, pp. 132-3.
19 *The Political Quarterly*, Oct.-Dec., 1944.
20 ibid., p. 277.
21 ibid., pp. 284, 351.
22 ibid., pp. 332, 333.
23 Bernal, p. 417, App. I.
24 *The Political Quarterly*, loc. cit., pp. 338-9.
25 Dewey, (2), p. 134.
26 *The Political Quarterly*, loc. cit., pp. 353-8.
27 ibid., p. 288.
28 Bernal, p. 40.
29 *The Political Quarterly*, loc. cit., p. 283.

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